The Causal Structure of Long-Term Supply Relationships

An Empirical Test of a Generalized Transaction Cost Theory
Softcover Nachdruck of the original 1. Auflage 2000
ISBN: 978-1-4613-7041-3
Verlag: Springer US

Buch, Englisch, 155 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 280 g

Long-term supply relationships are of crucial importance in industrial organization. The present (r)evolution in information and communication technology such as e-business is proof of the increasingly dynamic environment in which firms operate. As a result, firms have to focus on their core competencies and obtain complementary ones from partner firms to be able to survive. This can hardly be realized without having long-term supply relationships. In the past decades, research on strategic alliances -the class of interfirm arrangements to which long-term supply relationships belong­ mushroomed. Many ofthe (empirical) studies in the alliance literature focus on a single variable that is then explained by a set of independent variables. For example, for international joint ventures the level of commitment, interdependence, asymmetry, and dedicated investments explains the development of trust. By itself there is nothing wrong in this approach. On the contrary, because of all these studies we now have some knowledge about the reasons why firms enter in alliances and why some alliances are more successful than others. In fact, one of our first studies also belonged to this research-tradition.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Nooteboom, Bart

de Jong, Gjalt

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Industrielle Organisation
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Organisationstheorie, Organisationssoziologie, Organisationspsychologie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Betriebswirtschaft: Theorie & Allgemeines
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 Introduction.- 1.1 Scope and Purpose.- 1.2 Overview of Theory.- 1.3 Overview of Empirical Results.- 2 Theoretical Background.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Transaction Cost Economics.- 2.3 Limitations of Transaction Cost Economics.- 2.4 Competencies.- 2.5 Relational Features.- 2.5.1 Commitment.- 2.5.2 Trust.- 2.6 Conclusions.- 3 The Theoretical Model.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Definitions and Related Research.- 3.3 The Theoretical Model.- 3.3.1 Asset Specificity.- 3.3.2 Uncertainty.- 3.3.3 Value of the Partner.- 3.3.4 Commitment.- 3.3.5 Trust.- 3.4 Conclusions.- 4 Methods and Data.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 A LISREL Approach.- 4.2.1 Models, Methods and Matrices.- 4.2.2 Model-Fit and Model-Modification.- 4.3 The Samples.- 4.4 Operationalization.- 4.5 Conclusions.- 5 Empirical Results.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 The United States.- 5.2.1 Measurement Models.- 5.2.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.3 Japan.- 5.3.1 Measurement Models.- 5.3.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.4 Europe.- 5.4.1 Measurement Models.- 5.4.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.5 Conclusions.- 6 An International Comparison.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 The Convergence of Long-Term Supply Relationships.- 6.2.1 A First Perspective on the Convergence.- 6.2.2 The United States versus Japan.- 6.2.3 The United States versus Europe.- 6.2.4 Japan versus Europe.- 6.3 The Third Way.- 6.4 Causal Loops.- 6.5 Conclusions.- 6.5.1 Point of Departure.- 6.5.2 Convergence within the Triad.- 6.5.3 Explaining the Convergence.- 6.5.4 Limitations and Further Research.- Appendix A Constructs, Items And Scales.