

The SAGE Handbook of Contemporary China



2 Volume Set

Edited by
Weiping Wu
and Mark Frazier




The SAGE Handbook of
Contemporary China



ASSOCIATE EDITORS

- Yanjie Bian, Sociology, University of Minnesota and Xi'an Jiaotong University, USA and China
- Kerry Brown, Political Science, King's College, UK
- Albert Hu, Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore
- Pál Nyíri, Anthropology and History, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
- Kristin Stapleton, History, University at Buffalo, SUNY, USA
- Elizabeth Wishnick, Political Science and Law, Montclair State University, USA

The SAGE Handbook of Contemporary China



Volume 1

Edited by
Weiping Wu
and Mark W. Frazier

 SAGE reference

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne



Los Angeles | London | New Delhi
Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

SAGE Publications Ltd
1 Oliver's Yard
55 City Road
London EC1Y 1SP

SAGE Publications Inc.
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
B 1/1 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road
New Delhi 110 044

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd
3 Church Street
#10-04 Samsung Hub
Singapore 049483

Editor: Robert Rojek
Editorial Assistant: Colette Wilson
Production Editor: Rudrani Mukherjee
Copyeditor: Jill Birch
Proofreader: Sunrise Settings
Indexer: Sunrise Settings
Marketing Manager: Emma Turner
Cover Design: Wendy Scott
Typeset by: Cenvo Publisher Services
Printed in the UK

At SAGE we take sustainability seriously.
Most of our products are printed in the
UK using responsibly sourced papers
and boards. When we print overseas we
ensure sustainable papers are used as
measured by the PREPS grading system.
We undertake an annual audit to monitor
our sustainability.

Library of Congress Control Number:
2017961311

**British Library Cataloguing in
Publication data**

A catalogue record for this book is
available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-4739-4894-5

Introduction © Weiping Wu
and Mark W. Frazier 2018
Chapter 1 © Dali Yang 2018
Chapter 2 © Prasenjit Duara
2018
Chapter 3 © Chris Bramall
2018
Chapter 4 © David Pietz 2018
Part II © Weiping Wu 2018
Chapter 5 © Linda Yueh 2018
Chapter 6 © Gary H. Jefferson
2018
Chapter 7 © Susan H. Whiting
and Dan Wang 2018
Chapter 8 © Jenny Chan 2018
Chapter 9 © Yasheng
Huang 2018
Chapter 10 © Ming He, Yang
Chen and Ronald Schramm
2018
Chapter 11 © Albert Hu 2018
Chapter 12 © Jo Inge
Bekkevold and Øystein Tunsjø
2018
Part III © Mark W. Frazier 2018
Chapter 13 © Kerry Brown
2018
Chapter 14 © Jiangnan Zhu
2018
Chapter 15 © Zhengxu Wang
2018
Chapter 16 © Wu Zhang 2018
Chapter 17 © Andrew Mertha
2018
Chapter 18 © John James
Kennedy and Dan Chen 2018
Chapter 19 © William
Hurst 2018
Chapter 20 © Vivienne
Bath 2018
Part IV © Mark W. Frazier
2018
Chapter 21 © Arthur Kroeber
2018
Chapter 22 © Gaye
Christoffersen 2018
Chapter 23 © 2016
Georgetown University Press,
Andrew J. Nathan, 'China's
Rise and International
Regimes.' From *China in the
Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic
and Foreign Domestic Policy
Challenges* Robert S. Ross
and Jo Inge Bekkevold,
Editors, pp. 165–195. Used
with permission. [www.press.
georgetown.edu](http://www.press.georgetown.edu).
Chapter 24 © Bei Tang and
Yanzhong Huang 2018
Part V © Mark W. Frazier 2018
Chapter 25 © Rosemary Foot
2018
Chapter 26 © Ed Griffith and
Caroline Rose 2018
Chapter 27 © Alexander Lukin
2018
Chapter 28 © Carla P.
Freeman 2018
Chapter 29 © Taomo Zhou
and Hong Liu 2018
Part VI © Mark W. Frazier
2018
Chapter 30 © Benjamin Darr
2018
Chapter 31 © Lowell Dittmer
2018
Chapter 32 © Ho-Fung Hung
2018
Chapter 33 © Nyíri Pál 2018
Chapter 34 © Ben Hillman 2018
Chapter 35 © Joanne Smith
Finley 2018
Chapter 36 © Katherine
Palmer Kaup 2018
Chapter 37 © André Laliberté
2018
Chapter 38 © William F.
Schroeder 2018
Chapter 39 © Weiping Wu 2018
Chapter 40 © Chaolin Gu and
Ian Gillespie Cook 2018
Chapter 41 © C. Cindy Fan
2018
Chapter 42 © Weiping Wu
2018
Chapter 43 © Jiang Xu 2018
Chapter 44 © Jia Feng and
Guo Chen 2018
Part VII © Weiping Wu 2018
Chapter 45 © Björn
Gustafsson 2018
Chapter 46 © Felix Haifeng
Liao and Yehua Dennis Wei
2018
Chapter 47 © Huimin Du and
Wenfei Winnie Wang 2018
Chapter 48 © Xiushi Yang,
Hongyun Fu and Meizhen
Liao 2018
Chapter 49 © Yanjie Bian, Lei
Zhang, Yinghui Li, Yipeng Hu
and Na Li 2018
Part IX © Weiping Wu 2018
Chapter 50 © David R. Phillips
and Zhixin Feng 2018
Chapter 51 © Daniel
Hammond 2018
Chapter 52 © Mette Halskov
Hansen 2018
Chapter 53 © James Farrer
2018
Chapter 54 © Jieyu Liu, Eona
Bell and Jiayu Zhang 2018
Chapter 55 © Lawrence R.
Burns and Gordon G. Liu 2018
Chapter 56 © Jian Xu and
Wanning Sun 2018
Chapter 57 © Sarah Mellors
and Jeffrey Wasserstrom 2018
Chapter 58 © Kristin
Stapleton 2018
Chapter 59 © Mark W. Frazier
2018

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	x
<i>List of Tables</i>	xii
<i>Notes on the Editors and Contributors</i>	xiv

Introduction	xxxvii
<i>Weiping Wu and Mark W. Frazier</i>	

VOLUME 1

PART I	CONTEXT: HISTORY, ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT	1
1	The Making of the Modern State and Quest for Modernity <i>Dali Yang</i>	3
2	Nationalism and the Nation-state <i>Prasenjit Duara</i>	31
3	Continuity and Change: The Economy in the Twentieth Century <i>Chris Bramall</i>	48
4	Geographic and Environmental Setting <i>David Pietz</i>	67
PART II	ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS: INTRODUCTION	93
	<i>Weiping Wu</i>	
5	Evolution of Market Reforms <i>Linda Yueh</i>	101
6	State-Owned Enterprise: Reform, Performance and Prospects <i>Gary H. Jefferson</i>	121
7	The Rural Economy <i>Susan H. Whiting and Dan Wang</i>	143
8	Economic Growth and Labor Security <i>Jenny Chan</i>	166
9	Inbound Foreign Direct Investment <i>Yasheng Huang</i>	189

10	Financial System <i>Ming He, Yang Chen and Ronald Schramm</i>	205
11	Technology, Innovation and Knowledge-Based Economy <i>Albert Hu</i>	242
12	Sustaining Growth: Energy and Natural Resources <i>Jo Inge Bekkevold and Øystein Tunsjø</i>	262
PART III POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: INTRODUCTION <i>Mark Frazier</i>		281
13	The Communist Party and Ideology <i>Kerry Brown</i>	287
14	Corruption in Reform Era: A Multidisciplinary Review <i>Jiangnan Zhu</i>	302
15	Campaigns in Politics: From Revolution to Problem Solving <i>Zhengxu Wang</i>	324
16	Popular Protest <i>Wu Zhang</i>	340
17	Bureaucracy and Policy Making <i>Andrew Mertha</i>	365
18	Local and Grassroots Governance <i>John James Kennedy and Dan Chen</i>	388
19	Labor Politics <i>William Hurst</i>	406
20	Legal and Judicial System <i>Vivienne Bath</i>	421
PART IV CHINA ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: INTRODUCTION <i>Mark W. Frazier</i>		441
21	China as a Global Financial Power <i>Arthur Kroeber</i>	447
22	China and Global Energy Governance <i>Gaye Christoffersen</i>	459
23	China and Global Regimes <i>Andrew J. Nathan</i>	477

24	Engagement in Global Health Governance Regimes <i>Bei Tang and Yanzhong Huang</i>	497
----	--	-----

PART V	CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: INTRODUCTION	517
	<i>Mark W. Frazier</i>	

25	China–US Relations in a Changing Global Order <i>Rosemary Foot</i>	523
----	---	-----

26	China–Japan Relations <i>Ed Griffith and Caroline Rose</i>	544
----	---	-----

27	Chinese–Russian Relations <i>Alexander Lukin</i>	565
----	---	-----

28	China's Relations with the Korean Peninsula <i>Carla P. Freeman</i>	587
----	--	-----

29	Chinese Foreign Policy: Southeast Asia <i>Taomo Zhou and Hong Liu</i>	610
----	--	-----

VOLUME 2

PART VI	NATIONAL AND NESTED IDENTITIES: INTRODUCTION	631
	<i>Mark W. Frazier</i>	

30	Popular Nationalism <i>Benjamin Darr</i>	635
----	---	-----

31	Taiwanese Identity <i>Lowell Dittmer</i>	657
----	---	-----

32	Hong Kong Identity <i>Ho-Fung Hung</i>	676
----	---	-----

33	Chinese Outside China <i>Nyíri Pál</i>	696
----	---	-----

34	Studying Tibetan Identity <i>Ben Hillman</i>	713
----	---	-----

35	Uyghur Identities <i>Joanne Smith Finley</i>	736
----	---	-----

36	Ethnic Studies Beyond Tibet and Xinjiang <i>Katherine Palmer Kaup</i>	760
----	--	-----

37	Religion <i>André Laliberté</i>	779
38	Sexual Minorities <i>William F. Schroeder</i>	799
PART VII URBANIZATION AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT: INTRODUCTION <i>Weiping Wu</i>		821
39	Urbanization and Urban System <i>Chaolin Gu and Ian Gillespie Cook</i>	827
40	Population Mobility and Migration <i>C. Cindy Fan</i>	848
41	Financing Urbanization and Infrastructure <i>Weiping Wu</i>	878
42	Land and Housing Markets <i>Jiang Xu</i>	898
43	Socio-Spatial Transformation of Cities <i>Jia Feng and Guo Chen</i>	920
PART VIII POVERTY AND INEQUALITY: INTRODUCTION <i>Weiping Wu</i>		941
44	Poverty and Its Alleviation <i>Björn Gustafsson</i>	947
45	Regional Inequality: Scales, Mechanisms and Beyond <i>Felix Haifeng Liao and Yehua Dennis Wei</i>	967
46	The Making of the 'Migrant Class' <i>Huimin Du and Wenfei Winnie Wang</i>	985
47	Gender, Migration and HIV/STI Risks and Risk Behaviors <i>Xiushi Yang, Hongyun Fu and Meizhen Liao</i>	1003
48	Income Inequality and Class Stratification <i>Yanjie Bian, Lei Zhang, Yinghui Li, Yipeng Hu and Na Li</i>	1022

PART IX	SOCIAL CHANGE: INTRODUCTION	1043
	<i>Weiping Wu</i>	
49	Demographics and Aging <i>David R. Phillips and Zhixin Feng</i>	1049
50	Social Welfare <i>Daniel Hammond</i>	1072
51	China's Education System: Loved and Hated <i>Mette Halskov Hansen</i>	1093
52	Nightlife and Night-Time Economy in Urban China <i>James Farrer</i>	1112
53	Family Life <i>Jieyu Liu, Eona Bell and Jiayu Zhang</i>	1131
54	Health, Disease and Medical Care <i>Lawton R. Burns and Gordon G. Liu</i>	1151
55	Media since 1949: Changes and Continuities <i>Jian Xu and Wanning Sun</i>	1172
PART X	FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY CHINA STUDIES	1193
56	The Future(s) of China Studies <i>Sarah Mellors and Jeffrey Wasserstrom</i>	1195
57	The Future of China's Past <i>Kristin Stapleton</i>	1208
58	China and the Challenges of Comparison <i>Mark W. Frazier</i>	1227
	<i>Index</i>	1245

List of Figures

3.1	Per capita GDP, 1952–78 (1990 prices)	55
3.2	Real Chinese GDP growth, 1979–2015	59
4.1	China’s physical geography	71
4.2	China’s population distribution	74
4.3	The ‘Water Tower of Asia’	77
4.4	South-to-North Water Diversion Project	88
7.1	Agricultural land and labor productivity by country, 1961–2013	151
8.1	Composition of Chinese urban employment by ownership, (1998–2014)	169
8.2	Composition of China’s employment by industry, 1980–2014	170
8.3	Composition of students in China’s senior secondary schools, 2001–14	173
8.4	Aging trend of Chinese rural migrant workers, 2008–15	176
10.1	Shadow economy from flow of funds data	206
10.2	Loans and deposits of all banking institutions	213
10.3	Growth in loans and deposits – all financial institutions	214
10.4	Loans and deposits as a share of GDP	214
10.5	Relative bank size by country	216
10.6	Value of corporate and government bonds in China	219
10.7	Local bonds and negotiable shares in China	219
10.8	Maturities of corporate bonds in China	220
10.9	Chinese bonds by principle issuer	221
10.10	Interbank SHIBOR and CHIBOR	222
10.11	Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, number of listed companies	224
10.12	Market capitalization – Shanghai and Shenzhen	225
10.13	Negotiable shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges	226
10.14	Pricing discrepancies between Hong Kong and Mainland China in the Hang Seng AH Premium (HSAHP) Index	228
10.15	Stock market performance (Shanghai) and government intervention	229
10.16	Bank deposits relative to national wealth	231
10.17	China’s total social financing as a share of national savings	234
11.1	R&D to GDP ratio and GDP per capita	245
11.2	Resident patent applications at national patent offices	246
11.3	USPTO patent applications	247
11.4	Science and technology papers published	248
11.5	Papers published in <i>Nature</i> and <i>Science</i>	249

14.1	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of China, 1995–2015	305
14.2	The Supreme People's Courts' verdicts of corruption cases, 1983–2012	309
14.3	Corruption investigation by the DICs, 2013–15	317
17.1	Budget-based authority relations	379
17.2	<i>Xitong</i> and leading groups	381
31.1	Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992–2015.06)	663
31.2	Changes in the unification–independence stances of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1994–2017.12)	664
39.1	Chinese national urban development axes of three verticals and two horizontals	840
39.2	Layered urban network space pattern	841
39.3	Development axis of urban system in China 2030	844
40.1	Volume of inter-provincial migrants (ages 5+), 1990–2010	855
40.2	The 30 largest inter-provincial migration flows, 1985–1990	858
40.3	The 30 largest inter-provincial migration flows, 1995–2000	859
40.4	The 30 largest inter-provincial migration flows, 2005–2010	859
41.1	PPI in China and select emerging economies, 1990–2012 (investment in US\$ millions)	890
43.1	The juxtaposition between urban sprawl and migrant enclaves	929
44.1	The development of relative poverty in urban China, 1988–2013	959
45.1	A typology of multi-scalar regional inequalities in China	970
45.2	Decomposition of interprovincial inequality using Theil Index, 1952–2012	972
48.1	Trend of income inequality (generated from multiple data sources)	1023
49.1	Birth rate, death rate, and natural growth rate of China's population, 1949–2013	1053
49.2	The evolution of China's Total Fertility Rate, 1950–2015 (TFR, children per woman)	1053
49.3	Population age 65 and over (percentages) by province, 2014	1059
49.4	Per capita disposable income of households, 2014 (RMB)	1060
49.5	Provincial differences in sex ratios at birth (SRB), 2010	1062
53.1	Average size of Chinese families, selected years, 1930–2010	1134
53.2	Divorce rate in three countries, 1975–2010	1141
54.1	World Bank framework	1152
54.2	Dynamic model of transitions	1159
54.3	China's healthcare system	1164

List of Tables

3.1	Estimates of Chinese GDP growth, 1914–36	50
6.1	Ownership composition: number of enterprises and percentage of industrial sales/output	123
6.2	Chinese industry, enterprise performance measures (yuan figures in 100 million)	124
6.3	Share of overall measures (%)	124
6.4	Largest Chinese corporations (ranked by Fortune) (non-state owned in bold italics)	126
8.1	The total number of Chinese rural migrant workers, 2009–15	176
10.1	China flow of funds	209
10.2	United States flow of funds	209
10.3	China non-financial corporates balance sheet	210
10.4	United States non-financial corporates balance sheet	211
10.5	Key developments in China's banking sector	213
10.6	China's balance sheet for all banking financial institutions	215
10.7	China Development Bank yield curve (June 2016)	221
10.8	Major internet money market funds (2014 average returns)	223
10.9	Basic market characteristics, 2016	227
10.10	2016 stock estimates of shadow banking sectors	235
17.1	Rank and authority relations in China	377
32.1	Views toward different proposals as solutions to the Hong Kong question, 1982	680
39.1	Number of cities, China, by administrative level	829
39.2	China's population and urbanization level	834
39.3	Floating population 1982–2015	838
39.4	Forecast of future urbanization level 2015–2050	843
40.1	Inter-provincial migrants (ages 5+), 1990 and 2010	856
41.1	Urban maintenance and construction revenues, 1990–2012 (billion RMB)	884
44.1	Poverty rates for China and India and the number of people deemed poor	949
45.1	Interprovincial and interregional inequalities in China, 1952–2013	971
46.1	Employment segregation of migrants from selected studies	990
46.2	Migrant's access to urban housing	993
48.1	A summary comparison of middle and working classes	1031

51.1	Educational attainment for people (age 6 and over) by gender and education, 1996 and 2010	1099
52.1	Varieties of leisure venues in key cities	1114
52.2	Total revenue of food and beverage sector in key cities by year	1117
52.3	Types of cuisines available in major Chinese cities	1126

Notes on the Editors and Contributors

THE EDITORS

Weiping Wu is Professor and Director of the Urban Planning Program in the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation at Columbia University. She is internationally known for her research on global urbanization with specific expertise in migration, housing, and the infrastructure of Chinese cities. Author and editor of seven books, most recently of *The Chinese City* (Routledge 2012), which offers a critical understanding of China's urbanisation and explores how the complexity of Chinese cities conforms to and defies conventional urban theories and experience of cities elsewhere. Others include *The Dynamics of Urban Growth in Three Chinese Cities* (Oxford University Press 1997), *Pioneering Economic Reform in China's Special Economic Zones* (Ashgate 1999), *Local Dynamics in a Globalizing World* (Oxford University Press 2000), and *Facets of Globalization: International and Local Dimensions of Development* (World Bank 2001). Currently she is the President of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning. She also has been a Public Intellectuals fellow of the National Committee on US–China Relations and a consultant to the Ford Foundation, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and World Bank. Before joining Columbia University in 2016, she held faculty positions at Tufts University and Virginia Commonwealth University.

Mark W. Frazier is Professor of Politics at The New School (New York City), where he also serves as Academic Director of the India China Institute. He teaches and writes about social policy in China and efforts to reduce inequalities. His recent research draws comparisons between China and India in terms of how each has coped with challenges related to inequality and urbanisation. In his capacity as a director at the India China Institute, he works with faculty colleagues to sponsor research projects and conferences to support scholarship on comparative research on China and India, as well as Sino-Indian relations and their joint impact on the rest of the world. He is the author of *Socialist Insecurity: Pensions and the Politics of Uneven Development in China* (Cornell University Press, 2010) and *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Vivienne Bath is Professor of Chinese and International Business Law, Director of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law and Director of Research, China Studies Centre, at the University of Sydney. She has first class honours in Chinese and law from the Australian National University and a Masters of Law from Harvard Law School. Her research interests are in Chinese law, international business and economic law (particularly investment law) and private international law. Professor Bath has extensive professional experience in Sydney, New York and Hong Kong, specialising in international commercial law, with a focus on foreign investment and commercial transactions in China and the Asian region. Representative publications include 'China and International Investment Policy: The Balance Between Domestic and International Concerns' in Toohey, Picker and Greenacre (eds) *China in the International Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms* (2015; Cambridge University Press, New York, 227–244); and 'Overlapping Jurisdiction and the Resolution of Disputes before Chinese and Foreign Courts', (2015–2016) *17 Yearbook of International Private Law* (pp. 111–150). Professor Bath speaks Chinese (Mandarin) and German.

Jo Inge Bekkevold is Head of the Centre for Asian Security Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS). His research focuses on China's rise and Asian security issues. His recent publications include *China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges* with Robert S. Ross (Georgetown University Press, 2016), *International Order at Sea: How it is Challenged. How it is Maintained* with Geoffrey Till (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and *Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-Regional Perspectives* with Ian Bowers and Michael Raska (Routledge, 2015). Bekkevold is a former career diplomat.

Eona Bell is a Social Anthropologist specialising in the anthropology of China and migration. She worked as a Post-Doctoral Research Associate at the SOAS China Institute, 2015–2016. She was awarded a PhD in social anthropology from the London School of Economics in 2012 for research on ethnic group-making and cultural transmission in the everyday lives of Hong Kong Chinese families living in Scotland.

Yanjie Bian is Professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota, USA. Concurrently, he is Director of the Institute for Empirical Social Science Research at Xi'an Jiaotong University, China. Dr Bian is a co-founder (with Professor Li Lulu) of the Chinese General Social Survey, which is a public data archive available to domestic and international users. Author of 13 books and numerous articles on China's social stratification, social networks, and institutional change, his current projects include the development of the sociology of

guanxi, a panel study about networks and jobs in Chinese cities, and East Asian social networks. He was recognized as one of the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Elsevier most-cited Chinese researchers in social science.

Chris Bramall is Professor of Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He is a China specialist who has focused on twentieth century economic development, with special reference to the Maoist era. Bramall's principal publications include *In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning* (1993), *Sources of Chinese Economic Growth* (2000), *The Industrialization of Rural China* (2007) and *Chinese Economic Development* (2008). He was editor of *The China Quarterly* from 2011 to 2016. His current research centres on agricultural performance in the late Maoist era, and on China's economic take-off during the 1970s.

Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, London, and Associate Fellow on the Asia Programme at Chatham House. From 2012 to 2015 he was professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. He headed the Asia Programme at Chatham House until 2012, and from 1998 to 2005 was a member of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, serving as First Secretary at the British Embassy in Beijing. He is the author of 13 books on contemporary China, the most recent of which are *CEO China: The Rise of Xi Jinping* (I.B. Tauris, 2016) and *China's World: What Does China Want* (I.B. Tauris, 2017). He is currently working on a study of the Communist Party as a cultural movement.

Lawton R. Burns is the James Joo-Jin Kim Professor, a Professor of Health Care Management, and a Professor of Management in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also Director of the Wharton Center for Health Management & Economics, and Co-Director of the Roy & Diana Vagelos Program in Life Sciences and Management. He received his doctorate in Sociology and his MBA in Health Administration from the University of Chicago. Dr Burns taught previously in the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago and the College of Business Administration at the University of Arizona. He completed a book on supply chain management in the healthcare industry, *The Health Care Value Chain* (Jossey-Bass, 2002). He has also edited *The Business of Healthcare Innovation* (Cambridge University Press, 2012) which analyses the healthcare technology sectors globally: pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, medical devices, and information technology. Most recently, he has served as lead editor of the 6th Edition of the major text, *Healthcare Management: Organization Design & Behavior* (Delmar, 2011). His three latest books, *India's Healthcare Industry*, *China's Healthcare System and Reform*, and *Managing Discovery in the Life Sciences* were published in 2014, 2017, and 2018 respectively by Cambridge University Press.

Jenny Chan is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Elected Board Member of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee on Labor Movements (2014–2018), Editor of the *Global Labour Journal* (2015–2018), and Contributing Editor of the *Asia-Pacific Journal* (2015–). She is co-author of *Dying for an iPhone* (with Mark Selden and Ngai Pun, under contract with Rowman & Littlefield). She has published articles on Chinese labor politics, social inequality, and the state for *Current Sociology*, *Modern China*, *Rural China*, *Critical Asian Studies*, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, *Human Relations*, *Globalizations*, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, *New Labor Forum*, and *New Technology, Work and Employment*, among others. She received her PhD in 2014, and between 2014 and 2016 she was Lecturer of Sociology and Contemporary China Studies at the University of Oxford's School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, and held a Junior Research Fellowship at the Kellogg College.

Dan Chen is Assistant Professor at Elizabethtown College Department of Political Science, and she received her PhD at the University of Kansas in 2014. Her research is on media, market reforms and state censorship in China. She has published several book chapters and a number of articles in journals such as *The China Quarterly*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *Modern China*, *Journal of Contemporary China* and the *Journal of East Asian Studies*.

Guo Chen is Associate Professor at the Department of Geography, Environment, and Spatial Sciences, with a joint appointment at the Global Urban Studies Program at Michigan State University. She is a Wilson Center Fellow 2017–2018. She is author/co-author of close to forty publications on China's inequality and urbanisation, housing justice and inequality, migration and urban poverty. She is co-editor of *Locating Right to the City in the Global South* (Routledge, 2013) with forthcoming publications and a documentary on China's hidden slums.

Yang Chen is a Lecturer at International Business School Suzhou, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, China. She received her PhD from Nanyang Technological University. Her research interests mainly include urban economics, public finance, and development issues on Chinese economy. She has published in *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, *Economic Letters*, *Energy Economics*, *Economic Modelling*, *International Journal of Finance and Economics*, *Journal of Regional Science*, *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, *Theoretical Economics Letters*, and *Urban Studies*.

Gaye Christoffersen is Resident Professor of International Politics in the School of Advanced and International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Nanjing Center, where she teaches Asian energy security. She was a visiting researcher with the Chinese Ministry of Petroleum Industry in 1986. Recent publications include: 'Pathways to a Northeast Asian Energy Regime', in *China's Rise and Changing*

Order in East Asia (2017); 'The Role of China in Global Energy Governance', *China Perspectives* no. 2 (2016); 'US–China Relations in Asia-Pacific Energy Regime Complexes: Cooperative, Complementary and Competitive', *Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations: Change and Continuity, Causes and Cures* (2015); 'The Multiple Levels of Sino-Russian Energy Relations', in *Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: China, Russia, and Central Asia* (2012).

Ian Gillespie Cook is now Emeritus Professor of Human Geography at Liverpool John Moores University. An experienced educator, researcher, PhD supervisor and examiner, his research interests include Ageing, Urbanisation, Health Policy, and Environmental issues in China with papers, books and book chapters in a range of outlets including *Health Policy*, *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, *Social Science and Medicine*, *Urban Studies*, *Urban Geography* and *Urban Design and Planning*. He also researches global ageing and community engagement in public health across a range of countries. Recent books include the co-authored *Aging in Comparative Perspective: Processes and Policies* (2012) and *Sociability, Social Capital and Community Perspective: A Public Health Perspective* (2015), both published by Springer, New York.

Benjamin Darr is Associate Professor of Politics at Loras College in Dubuque, Iowa. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Iowa in 2011. His research has specialised in Chinese public opinion and nationalism, with an emphasis on the role of national identity in providing state legitimacy. He has also published work on democratization in Kyrgyzstan, and on teaching a critical approach to global political economy by using a variant of the game of Monopoly. Dr Darr frequently teaches on American foreign policy, the politics of the global south, and environmental politics. Some of his other scholarly interests include world-systems theory, the ideological function of the median voter theorem, and the intersections between games and political argumentation.

Lowell Dittmer is Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley, where he teaches Chinese and Asian comparative politics, and editor of *Asian Survey*. He is currently working on a study of Chinese political morality. Recent works include *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications* (1992), *China's Quest for National Identity* (with Samuel Kim, 1993), *China Under Reform* (1994), *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (rev. edn, 1997), (with Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee, eds), *Informal Politics in East Asia* (Cambridge, 2000), *South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), (with Guoli Liu, eds) *China's Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), *Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity*

(2010), and many scholarly articles. His most recent book is *China's Asia: Triangular Dynamics since the Cold War* (Rowland & Littlefield, 2018).

Huimin Du is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at David C. Lam Institute for East–West Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University. Her research interests include migration, housing, youth, and urban studies. She held a number of awards, including *inter alia* the Dissertation Writing-up Grant of the Foundation of Urban and Regional Studies of the United Kingdom, and the Best Paper Award of the China Geography Specialty Group of the Association of American Geographers Student Paper Competition. Her publications include a co-edited special issue of *China Review*, articles in *Urban Studies*, *Population, Space and Place*, and the *Journal of Youth Studies*, and chapters in the book *Housing Inequalities in Chinese Cities*.

Prasenjit Duara is the Oscar Tang Chair of East Asian Studies at Duke University. Born and educated in India, he received his PhD in Chinese history from Harvard University. He was Professor of History and East Asian Studies at University of Chicago (1991–2008) and Raffles Professor and Director of Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore (2008–2015). His books include *Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942* (Stanford University Press) winner of Fairbank Prize of the AHA and Levenson Prize of the AAS, USA, *Rescuing History from the Nation* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Rowman, 2003) and *The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future* (Cambridge, 2014). He was awarded the *doctor philosophiae honoris causa* from the University of Oslo in 2017.

C. Cindy Fan is Professor of Geography at UCLA. She is also Vice Provost for International Studies and Global Engagement and is the first woman and Asian to hold that position. Previously, she was Associate Dean of Social Sciences and Chair of Asian American Studies. Born and raised in Hong Kong, Dr Fan received her PhD from the Ohio State University and is internationally known for her research on migration, regional development and gender. Dr Fan has numerous publications, including the book *China on the Move*, a pioneering study on rural–urban migration and split households in China. She has also co-edited *Regional Studies* and *Eurasian Geography and Economics*. Dr Fan frequently contributes to the *New York Times* and China Radio International and gives keynotes throughout the world. She has received the UCLA Distinguished Teaching Award, the Distinguished Scholar Award from the Asian Geography Specialty Group of the American Association of Geographers, and major grants from the Henry Luce Foundation, Andrew Mellon Foundation and National Science Foundation.

James Farrer is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies at Sophia University in Tokyo. Largely employing ethnographic methods, his research focuses on cities in East Asia, including projects on sexuality, nightlife, expatriate communities, and urban food cultures. His publications include *Opening Up: Youth Sex Culture and Market Reform in Shanghai*, *Shanghai Nightscapes: A Nocturnal Biography of a Global City* (with Andrew Field), and *Globalization and Asian Cuisines: Transnational Networks and Contact Zones* (editor). Reports on his ongoing research on Japanese foodways can be found at www.nishiogiology.org/ and www.global-japanese-cuisine.org/. James Farrer has lived in Asia for more than two decades, spending part of every year in Shanghai while based in Tokyo.

Jia Feng is Geography Lecturer at Washburn University. He received his PhD in Geography and an MS in Statistics and Probability from Michigan State University and his MA in Geography from Miami University. His research interests include migration, marginality, recycling, and migrant enclaves. His NSF-DDRI-funded dissertation project explored the migrant recycling enclaves in Beijing.

Zhixin Feng is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Research on Ageing at the University of Southampton, UK. He obtained his PhD degree in Human Geography at the University of Bristol. His research interests are population health, health geography, health inequality and ageing both in the United Kingdom and China. He has published widely on these areas, including in *Social Science and Medicine*, *Health and Place*, *Population, Space and Place*, and *Age and Ageing*.

Rosemary Foot, FBA, is Professor Emeritus and a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. She is also an Emeritus Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford. She is the author of several books, including *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–53* (Cornell University Press, 1985); *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford University Press [OUP], 1995); *Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over Human Rights in China* (OUP, 2000); and with Andrew Walter as co-author, *China, the United States, and Global Order* (Cambridge University Press, 2011). A recent co-edited book, with Saadia M. Pekkanen and John Ravenhill, is *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia* (OUP, 2014). Her research interests cover security relations in the Asia-Pacific, US–China relations, human rights, and Asian regional institutions.

Carla P. Freeman is Associate Research Professor of China Studies and Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She writes on the linkages between China's foreign and domestic policy. Prior to joining the SAIS faculty, she was a risk analyst and foundation program officer. She has been a fellow at the US Institute of Peace and

the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and a visiting scholar of Harvard University's Fairbank Center. She is a graduate of Yale University (BA) and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (PhD). Recent publications include edited volumes: *Handbook of China and Developing Countries* (editor) (Edward Elgar Press, 2015; paperback edition, 2016); *China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives from a Changing China* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); *International Relations of China* (with Shaun Breslin and Simon Shen, Sage, 2014). She is the editor-in-chief of *Asian Perspective*.

Hongyun Fu is currently Assistant Professor at the Community Health and Research Division at the Eastern Virginia Medical School (EVMS). Prior to EVMS, she served as China Country Program Manager of the USAID-funded CAP-3D HIV Program at the Population Services International China platform, where she led implementation of prevention interventions addressing HIV and other major sexually transmitted infections (STIs) in key populations in Southwest China using novel behavior change communication and social marketing approaches. Dr Fu received her doctorate from Tulane University's School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. She has more than a decade of experience in research and programs addressing HIV/AIDS, sexual/reproductive health, migrant/immigrant health, behavioral treatment of illicit drug use and harm reduction. Her current research focuses on synthetic drug use and STIs risks/resilience in young adults in China.

Ed Griffith is Senior Lecturer in Asia Pacific Studies at the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan). His research focuses on China's Japan policy, particularly with regard to the Yasukuni Shrine issue. His other research interests are mainly focused on the international relations of East Asia and China's approach to its own changing role in the region. He is interested in exploring how established IR theories can be adapted to deepen our understanding of China's behaviour in developing its relationships with neighbouring countries.

Chaolin Gu is Professor in the School of Architecture at Tsinghua University, the Vice President of the Chinese Futurology Association, and Councilman of China Society for Urban Sciences. Gu is mainly engaged in research work in urban and regional planning, regional economics, and urban geography in China. Since 1986, he has published 26 monographs and more than 400 papers. Gu is also a leading urban researcher in China and a well known author on urbanization and urban planning. He has successfully led many major research and planning projects and won several prestigious prizes.

Björn Gustafsson received a PhD in Economics and is now Professor Emeritus at the department of Social Work, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany. At present his research is focused on issues related to poverty, social assistance, the distribution of income and immigrants/ethnic minorities in Sweden

as well as in China. Recent publications include: ‘Age at Immigration Matters for Labor Market Integration: The Swedish Example’ (with Hanna MacInnes and Torun Österberg), *IZA Journal of Development and Migration*, 2017, 7(1); ‘Charitable Donations by China’s Private Enterprises’ (with Xiuna Yang, Gang Shuge and Dai Jianzhong), *Economic Systems*, 2017, 41(3), 456–469; ‘Earnings among Nine Ethnic Minorities and the Han Majority in China’s Cities’ (with Xiuna Yang), *Journal of Asia Pacific Economy*, 2017, 22(3), 525–546.

Daniel Hammond is Lecturer in Chinese Politics and Society at the University of Edinburgh. His main research focus has been on social assistance in contemporary China focusing in particular on the urban resident minimum livelihood guarantee system. This has included studies at both national and local level. In addition, he has written about China’s representation in international media and co-authored on China and international politics. Current projects include China’s state discourse on poverty, how China is represented in social media and digital games, and the teaching of Chinese politics and policy making.

Mette Halskov Hansen is Professor in China Studies at the University of Oslo. She started doing fieldwork in ethnic minority schools in Yunnan Province in the early 1990s and has since then published widely on issues concerning, for instance, minority education, Han settlers in ethnic minority areas, and individualization processes in mainstream schools. Her most recent book on education was *Educating the Chinese Individual: Life in a Rural High School* (University of Washington Press, 2015). In recent years her interest has turned towards issues of pollution and climate change and she is currently directing an international research project on the human dimensions of air pollution in China. This research has resulted in a series of co-written articles relating to policies, histories, and perceptions of air pollution in China, some of them published in a special issue of *The China Quarterly* (online versions October 2017, paper version June 2018).

Ming He is currently Lecturer in Economics at the International Business School of Suzhou, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. He earned his PhD from the University of Colorado at Boulder and worked at Zhejiang University and Hunan University before joining XJTLU in 2014. His current active fields of research are Geographical Economics and Urban Economics, topics including China’s urban land market, agglomeration economics, and technology spillover. His work has been published in *Journal of Regional Science*, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy, and Society*, *Urban Studies*, *Regional Studies*, and *Economic Modelling*.

Ben Hillman is Associate Professor and Director of the Policy and Governance Program at Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. He studies political development, nationalism and ethnic relations in Asia, with a focus on China and Indonesia. He has published widely on China’s Tibetan

regions, China's ethnic policies and ethnic unrest. His most recent book is *Shangrila Inside Out*, published in Chinese by Yunnan People's Publishing House. He is co-editor (with Gray Tuttle) of *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West* (Columbia University Press, 2016), and author of *Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-state Resilience in Rural China* (Stanford University Press, 2014). He is also an Editor at *East Asia Forum*, a platform for analysis and research on politics, economics, business, law, security and international relations in the Asia Pacific.

Albert Hu is Associate Professor of Economics at the National University of Singapore. His main research interests are technological change and the Chinese economy. He received a Bachelor's degree in International Finance from Nankai University, PRC, and a PhD in International Economics from Brandeis University, U.S.A. His research interests include technological change, economic growth and development, and the Chinese economy. His research has appeared in academic journals such as *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *Journal of Development Economics* and *Research Policy*. He is an associate editor of *China Economic Review*. He has consulted for the Asian Development Bank, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Bank.

Yipeng Hu is Associate Professor of Sociology at Wuhan University, China. Teaching sociological theory and Chinese social thoughts, his research interests include the indigenisation of sociology, social stratification and mobility, and class consciousness in contemporary China. He is currently developing a theoretical interpretation of the growth of sociological masters in and outside China.

Yanzhong Huang is Professor and Director of the Center for Global Health Studies at Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations. He is also an adjunct senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directs the Global Health Governance roundtable series. He is the founding editor of *Global Health Governance* journal. Huang has written extensively on global health governance, health diplomacy and health security, and public health in China and East Asia. He has published numerous reports, journal articles, and book chapters, including articles in *Survival*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Public Health*, *Bioterrorism and Biosecurity*, and the *Journal of Contemporary China*, as well as op-ed pieces in the *New York Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, *YaleGlobal*, and *Straits Times*, among others. In 2012, he was listed by *InsideJersey* as one of the '20 Brainiest People in New Jersey'. He was a research associate at the National Asia Research Program, a public intellectuals fellow at the National Committee on US-China Relations, an associate fellow at the Asia Society, a visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore, and a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has taught at Barnard College and Columbia

University. He obtained his BA and MA degrees from Fudan University and his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago.

Yasheng Huang is the International Program Professor in Chinese Economy and Business and a Professor of Global Economics and Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He is a co-principal investigator of a large-scale, interdisciplinary research project on food safety in China. He is currently working on a book about how China has scaled its politics and economics. His research papers have been published in *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *Business and Politics*, *European Journal of Finance*, *World Politics*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *Journal of Management Perspectives*, *China Economic Review*, and *Journal of International Business and Policy*. He has published ten books, including *Inflation and Investment Controls in China* (1996), *FDI in China* (1998), *Selling China* (2003), *Financial Reform in China* (2005, co-edited with Tony Saich and Edward Steinfield), *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics* (2008, one of *The Economist's* best books of the year) and in Chinese, *Innovating Innovations* (2016), *MIT and Innovations* (2015), *The Transformation of the Chinese Private Sector* (2012), *What Exactly Is the China Model?* (winner of the Blue Lion Prize for the best book published in 2011) and *The Path of Big Enterprises* (2010).

Ho-Fung Hung is the Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor in Political Economy at the Department of Sociology and the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. He researches global political economy, protest, and nationalism. He is the author of the award-winning *Protest with Chinese Characteristics* (2011) and *The China Boom: Why China Will not Rule the World* (2016), both published by Columbia University Press. His articles have appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*, the *American Sociological Review*, *Development and Change*, *New Left Review*, *Review of International Political Economy*, *Asian Survey*, and elsewhere. His analyses of the Chinese political economy and Hong Kong politics have been featured or cited in *The New York Times*, *The Financial Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, Bloomberg News, BBC News, *The Guardian*, *Folha de S. Paulo* (Brazil), *The Straits Times* (Singapore), *The South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), *Xinhua Monthly* (China), and *People's Daily* (China), among other publications.

William Hurst is Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *The Chinese Worker after Socialism* (Cambridge, 2009) and *Ruling Before the Law: the Politics of Legal Regimes in China and Indonesia* (Cambridge, 2018), and co-editor of *Laid-off Workers in a Workers'*

State: Unemployment with Chinese Characteristics (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009) and *Local Governance Innovation in China: Experimentation, Diffusion, and Defiance* (Routledge, 2015). His ongoing research, in China and elsewhere, focuses on: political economy, law and society, urban politics, contentious politics, labor politics, and aspects of international relations. Before coming to Northwestern, he was a postdoctoral fellow at Oxford and assistant professor at the Universities of Texas and Toronto.

Gary H. Jefferson writes about institutions, technology, economic growth, and China's economy. At Brandeis, Jefferson has joint appointments in the Department of Economics and the International Business School. Jefferson's publications include 'Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1994; 'R&D and Technology Transfer: Firm-Level Evidence from Chinese Industry', *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2005; 'The Sources and Sustainability of China's Economic Growth', *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2006; 'A Great Wall of Patents: What is Behind China's Recent Patent Explosion?', *Journal of Development Economics*, 2009; 'The Future Trajectory of China's Political Reform: A Property Rights Interpretation', *Unfinished Reforms in the Chinese Economy*, 2014; 'Restructuring China's Research Institutes', *Economics of Transition*, 2017; and 'Chinese Patent Quality and the Role of Research and Ownership Collaboration', in process. Jefferson's research has involved extended collaborations with China's Academy of Social Sciences, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the Ministry of Science and Technology.

Katherine Palmer Kaup is James B. Duke Professor of Asian Studies and Politics and International Affairs at Furman University in Greenville, SC. She holds an A.B. from Princeton University (1989) and an MA/PhD (1997) in Government and Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia. Kaup's research focuses on ethnic minorities and rule of law developments in China. Her most recent article 'Controlling Law: Legal Developments in China's Southwest Minority Regions' (*China Quarterly*) is based on fieldwork in Honghe Prefecture in Yunnan Province and examines how conflicts between customary minority law and state law are resolved. She is the author of *Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China*, several articles and chapters on ethnic minorities, and editor and contributor to the textbook *Understanding Contemporary Asia*. Kaup has served as special adviser for Minority Nationalities Affairs at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Public Intellectuals Fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Distinguished Visiting Scholar at Yunnan Minzu University, and PI/Project Director on several federally funded Chinese language grants and Furman's Luce Initiative on Asian Studies and the Environment.

John James Kennedy is Associate Professor in the department of Political Science at the University of Kansas (KU), and he received his PhD at the University of California, Davis in 2002. His research is on local governance and topics include local elections, tax and fee reform, rural education, health care, family planning and the cadre management system. He has published over a half dozen book chapters and over a dozen research articles in journals such as *The China Quarterly*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, *Asian Survey*, *Political Studies*, the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, the *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, *China Information*, *Asian Politics and Policy* and *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*.

Arthur Kroeber has studied the Chinese economy since 1991 as a financial journalist and researcher and has spent more than 20 years living in Beijing, Guangzhou and Taipei. He is founder and head of research at Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic consultancy in Beijing; senior non-resident fellow of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center; and adjunct professor at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. His latest book is *China's Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford, 2016).

André Laliberté is Professor of Comparative Politics at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada, as well as associate researcher at the Groupe Sociétés, Religions et Laïcités in Paris and research fellow at the Center on Religions and Chinese Societies, at Purdue University. He is the author of more than 50 articles and book chapters, about religion in China and Taiwan, in relation to state regulation, philanthropy, development, political change, and cross-strait relations. He has co-edited *The Moral Economies of Nationalist and Ethnic Claims*, and *Secular States and Religious Diversity*, and he is finishing a co-edited book on Buddhism in China after Mao. His current research interests look into the incorporation of religious actors in East Asian welfare regimes by the state, with special attention to how education and propaganda promotes traditional values that shape the reproduction of family-based care in Chinese cities and in Taiwan.

Na Li is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China. Her research interests include inequality of Chinese higher education, social stratification and mobility, and social work in China. Her current project is about how social stratification and mobility affects the equality and inequality of higher education in China.

Yinghui Li is Lecturer of Sociology at the Northwest University of Political Science and Law, China. Her research is mainly focused on China's social stratification and mobility, status attainment, labor markets, and social class identity. Her current work is about China's middle class and income disparity between migrants of rural origin and urbanites in Chinese cities.

Felix Haifeng Liao is Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of Idaho in the United States. He is primarily an economic geographer with research interests in regional development, foreign direct investment, and industrial locations/agglomeration. He is also interested in urban and environmental studies and planning, and has methodological expertise in spatial analysis, spatial econometrics, and geographic information science and routinely uses these tools and statistical methods in his work. Dr Liao's research has been published in *Applied Geography*, *The Professional Geographer*, *Annals of Regional Science*, *Environment and Planning C*, *Urban Studies*, *Habitat International*, *Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment*, and *Sustainability*, among others. He is a member of the American Association of Geographers, the Regional Development and Planning Specialty Group, and the Regional Science Association International.

Meizhen Liao is currently Associate Professor at the Institute for AIDS/STD Control and Prevention at Shandong Center for Disease Control and Prevention, China. Her formal training is in epidemiology, specialising in surveillance. Dr Liao has been working on risk behaviours and STIs among HIV-related high-risk populations since 2003. Her current research and programs focus on HIV risk behaviour, behavioural surveillance and harm reduction, qualitative data management and analysis.

Gordon G. Liu is a PKU Yangtze River Scholar Professor of Economics at Peking University National School of Development (NSD), and Director of PKU China Center for Health Economic Research (CCHER). His research interests include health and development economics, health reform, and pharmaceutical economics. Prior to PKU NSD, he was a full professor at PKU Guanghua School of Management (2006–2013); associate professor at UNC Chapel Hill (2000–2006); and assistant professor at USC (1994–2000). He was the 2005–2006 President of the Chinese Economists Society, and the founding chair of the Asian Consortium for the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Dr Liu has served as Associate Editor for leading academic journals *Health Economics* (HE), *Value in Health* (The ISPOR official journal), and *China Economic Quarterly* (CEQ). Dr Liu sits on The China State Council Health Reform Advisory Commission; the UN 'Sustainable Development and Solution Network' (SDSN) Leadership Council led by Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University, and Co-Chairs the SDSN Health Thematic Group.

Hong Liu is Tan Kah Kee Endowed Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, where he serves as Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Director of the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration. He was previously Chair Professor of East Asian Studies and Founding Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at Manchester University. Apart from articles in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, *The China Quarterly*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, and

Ethnic and Racial Studies, his recent publications also include *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949–1965* (National University of Singapore Press/Kyoto University Press, 2011), *Dear China: Migrant Letters and Remittances, 1820–1980* (co-authored with Greogor Benton, University of California Press, 2018), and *The Qiaopi Trade and Transnational Networks in the Chinese Diaspora* (co-edited with Gregor Benton and Huimei Zhang, Routledge, 2018).

Jieyu Liu is Reader in Sociology of China and Deputy Director at the SOAS China Institute, SOAS University of London. Her research interests include gender, sexuality, family and generation in China. She is the author of *Gender and Work in Urban China* (Routledge) and *Gender, Sexuality and Power in Chinese Companies: Beauties at Work* (Palgrave). In 2015, she was awarded a five-year European Research Council grant to examine changing family relations in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Alexander Lukin is Head of Department of International Relations at National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia), Director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Organization Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) and Chair Professor at Zhejiang University School of Public Affairs (Hangzhou, China). He received his first degree from Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1984, a DPhil in Politics from Oxford University in 1997, a doctorate in history from the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow in 2007 and a degree in theology from St Tikhon's Orthodox University in 2013. Lukin's research focuses on Russian and Chinese politics and foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on Russia's relationships with the Asia-Pacific region and Sino-Russian relations. He is the author of numerous books on these subjects, his most recent entitled *The Pivot to Asia: Russia's Foreign Policy Enters the Twenty-First Century* (Vij Books India, 2016) and *China and Russia: A New Rapprochement* (Polity, 2018).

Sarah Mellors, as of August 2018, is Assistant Professor of History at Missouri State University. She is primarily interested in gender and sexuality and the history of medicine in modern Chinese history. She completed her PhD in 2018 at the University of California, Irvine, and her dissertation examines birth control practices in urban China before the implementation of the One Child Policy. Prior to attending graduate school, she researched Chinese rule of law issues with the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and served as the assistant director of summer study abroad for the China Institute's Shanghai program. She has also contributed to the *Los Angeles Review of Books* and *Women and Gender in China* (WAGIC).

Andrew Mertha is the George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies and Director of the China Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is the author of *The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary China* (Cornell University Press, 2005), *China's Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change* (Cornell University Press, 2008), and *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979* (Cornell University Press, 2014) and editor of *May Ebiara's Svay: A Cambodian Village, with an Introduction by Judy Ledgerwood* (Cornell University Press/Cornell Southeast Asia Program Press, 2018). He has articles appearing in *The China Quarterly*, *Comparative Politics*, *International Organization*, *Issues & Studies*, *CrossCurrents*, and *Orbis*, and chapters appearing in several edited volumes.

Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. He studies the politics and foreign policy of China, political participation and political culture in Asia, and the international human rights regime. Nathan's books include *Chinese Democracy* (1985), *The Tiananmen Papers* (2001), *China's Search for Security* (2012), and *Will China Democratize?* (2013). He has served at Columbia as director of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and as chair of the Political Science Department. He is chair of the Morningside Institutional Review Board (IRB). Off campus, he is a member of the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy and Human Rights in China. He is the regular Asia and Pacific book reviewer for *Foreign Affairs*.

Nyíri Pál is Professor of Global History from an Anthropological Perspective at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. His research focuses on the international mobility of emerging elites in China. His most recent books are *Reporting for China: How Chinese Correspondents Work with the World* and *Chinese Encounters in Southeast Asia: How People, Money, and Ideas from China are Changing a Region* (edited with Danielle Tan).

David R. Phillips is Lam Woo & Co. Ltd Chair Professor of Social Policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong and an Adjunct Professor at Macquarie University, Australia and McMaster University, Canada. He has research and teaching interests in social gerontology, ageing, global health and social epidemiology, with special reference to ageing in China and the Asia-Pacific. He has published widely in these areas and his book *Global Health* appeared in a second edition in 2017 (Kevin McCracken and David R. Phillips, Routledge). He has been an adviser and resource person to the World Health Organization and other international agencies on many occasions.

David Pietz is Professor of Chinese History, and Director of the Global Studies Program at the University of Arizona. He also holds the UNESCO Chair in Environmental History. Dr Pietz's research focuses on the environmental history of China. His publications include *The Yellow River: The Problem of Water in Modern China* (2015), *Engineering the State: The Huai River and Reconstruction in Nationalist China* (2002) and *State and Economy in Republican China: A Handbook for Scholars* (1999). His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Mellon Foundation, the American Philosophical Society, and the Institute for Advanced Studies (Princeton).

Caroline Rose is Professor of Sino-Japanese Relations at the University of Leeds. Her research focuses on the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations, with particular reference to the textbook problem, Yasukuni Shrine issue, and compensation cases. She has also published on the nature of China–Japan relations beyond the Asia Pacific, and is currently writing a monograph on patriotic education in China and Japan and the implications for national identity formation and Sino-Japanese relations.

Ronald Schramm has been conducting research related to China since the early 1990s and is a Visiting Associate Professor at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs. He is the author of *The Chinese Macroeconomy and Financial System: A US Perspective* (Routledge). He was on the faculty of IBSS in Suzhou as an Associate Professor (2013–2016), creating and directing its Economics PhD program. Before IBSS he had been on the faculty of Columbia Business School for over 27 years. He also served as Finance Editor for the *International Journal of Emerging Markets*. He holds a Bachelor's Degree from Harvard University (with Honors) and Master of Arts, Master of Philosophy and PhD in Economics from Columbia University. Schramm was a Fulbright Scholar at UIBE in Beijing and held visiting faculty positions at HKST in Hong Kong, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and CEIBS Shanghai. He was at the IMF for three years as an Economist.

William F. Schroeder is an independent researcher. He received his PhD in Sociocultural Anthropology at the University of Virginia in 2010 and was Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Manchester, UK, until December 2016. His research has focused on leisure practices in the queer community in Beijing and draws on queer, play, affect, and kinship theories. His work has appeared in *GLQ* (Duke University Press) and edited volumes and blogs, and he has recently co-edited a book titled *Queer/Tongzhi China: New Perspectives on Research, Activism and Media Cultures* (2015, NIAS Press). He is a co-founder of the Queer China Working Group, an international collaboration of artists, activists, and scholars concerned with the queer PRC, and continues to publish on related themes.

Joanne Smith Finley joined Newcastle University in January 2000, where she is currently Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies in the School of Modern Languages. Her research interests include the formation, transformation, hybridisation and globalisation of identities among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, China; strategies of symbolic resistance in Xinjiang; alternative representations in Uyghur popular culture (including subaltern cosmopolitanism); the gendering of ethno-politics in Xinjiang; and gender in Xinjiang and the Uyghur diaspora in the context of Islamic revival. She has published a range of journal articles and book chapters on these topics. Her monograph *The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur–Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang* (Brill Academic Publishing) was published in 2013. This is an ethnographic study of evolving Uyghur identities and ethnic relations over a period of 20 years (from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union through the 1997 Ghulja disturbances and the 2009 Ürümqi riots to 2011). Dr Smith Finley is also co-editor of two volumes: *Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia* (Ashgate, 2007) and *Language, Education and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang* (Routledge, 2015).

Kristin Stapleton is Professor of History at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York, edits the journal *Twentieth-Century China*, and serves as a member of the editorial board of *Education About Asia*. She contributes to the work of the Chinese Urban Research Network and the Global Urban History Project. Her research explores modern Chinese urban history, comparative urban history, the ways in which Chinese history is represented in fiction, and the continuing relevance of imperial and twentieth-century Chinese urban planning in China and the world today. She is the author of *Civilizing Chengdu: Chinese Urban Reform, 1895–1937* (Harvard Asia Center, 2000) and *Fact in Fiction: 1920s China and Ba Jin's Family* (Stanford, 2016).

Wanning Sun is Professor of Media and Communication Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Technology, Sydney. She is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities. She specializes in Chinese media and communication, rural-to-urban migration and cultural politics of inequality in contemporary China, diasporic Chinese media, health and environmental communication. She is the author of *Subaltern China: Rural Migrants, Media and Cultural Practices* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014) and co-author of *Telemodernities: Television and Transforming Lives in Asia* (Duke University Press, 2016).

Bei Tang is Associate Professor of international relations and assistant director of the Center for Global Governance Studies at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Shanghai International Studies University. She was a visiting scholar at Columbia University from 2014 to 2015. Tang has published numerous journal articles and newspaper articles in the area of global health governance, including international health governance regimes, major powers' health diplomacy, China's health system reform and the World Health

Organization's role in international cooperation. In addition to health issues, her research interests also include international institutions and international organizations. She was awarded Shanghai's Chenguang scholar in 2010. She got her BA and PhD in international relations from Fudan University.

Øystein Tunsjø is Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Tunsjø is the author of *The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States and Geostructural Realism* (Columbia University Press, 2018); *Security and Profits in China's Energy Policy: Hedging Against Risk* (Columbia University Press, 2013) and *US Taiwan Policy: Constructing the Triangle* (London: Routledge, 2008). Tunsjø is co-editor with Robert S. Ross of *Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017); co-editor with Robert S. Ross and Peter Dutton of *Twenty First Century Seapower: Cooperation and Conflict at Sea* (London: Routledge, 2012); and co-editor with Robert Ross and Zhang Tuosheng of *US–China–EU Relations: Managing a New World Order* (London: Routledge, 2010). Tunsjø has published articles in journals such as *Survival*, *International Relations*, *Cooperation and Conflict* and *World Economy and Politics* (in Chinese).

Dan Wang is an analyst in The Economist Intelligence Unit of the Economist Group. She is responsible for editing analytical reports on regional development and white papers providing the latest insights on the Chinese economy. She is also involved in modelling short- and long-term forecasts of key regional indicators. Before joining the EIU, Dan was a post-doctoral fellow in the Chinese Academy of Sciences as an economist. She led projects to evaluate China's livestock industry and agricultural policy, and was heavily involved in assessing the results of the National Clean-Water projects. Dan holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Washington, where she specialised in econometrics, natural resources and environmental economics. Dan has published works on agricultural price reform and subsidy, pork cycles and overseas agricultural investment. Her current research covers a wide range of topics, such as local government debt, fiscal policy and consumer markets.

Wenfei Winnie Wang is a Senior Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol. She obtained her PhD from UCLA and taught at University of South Alabama as a tenure-track Assistant Professor before joining the University of Bristol. Her research primarily concerns migration, development and health studies in China, particularly rural–urban migration and urbanisation, return migration and its impacts on rural development, as well as ageing population and health. She has published widely in top journals in those areas such as *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *Urban Geography*, *Environment and Planning A*, *Health & Place*, *Social Sciences & Medicine* and *Dialogues in Human Geography*.

Zhengxu Wang is Shanghai City's 1000-Talent Distinguished Professor and Oriental Scholar Distinguished Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs Fudan University, China. He obtained his PhD in Political Science from the University of Michigan, and subsequently obtained academic experience in the National University of Singapore and the UK's University of Nottingham, where he served as Associate Professor at its School of Contemporary Chinese Studies and Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of its China Policy Institute. He researches on national party and state institutions and politics in China, especially the politics among top political elites, citizen values and political behaviours in China and East Asia, and institutional changes and political reforms in China, among other topics. His publications have appeared in *Governance*, *International Review of Sociology*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *Contemporary Politics*, *Asian Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *The China Quarterly*, *The China Journal*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, and others.

Jeffrey Wasserstrom, who received his Masters from Harvard and his PhD from Berkeley, is Chancellor's Professor of History at UC Irvine, where he edits the *Journal of Asian Studies* (term ending June 2018) and holds courtesy affiliations with the Law School and program in Literary Journalism. He has written five books, including *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China* (1991) and *Eight Juxtapositions: China through Imperfect Analogies from Mark Twain to Manchukuo* (Penguin, 2016). He has edited or co-edited several others, including, most recently, *The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China* (2016). In addition to writing for academic journals, he has contributed to many general interest venues, among them *The New York Times*, the *TLS*, and the *Los Angeles Review of Books* (LARB). He is an advising editor at LARB and an academic editor of its associated China Channel.

Yehua Dennis Wei is an economic/urban geographer and China specialist, with research interests in globalization, urbanization, and regional/sustainable development in China. He is author of *Regional Development in China* and more than 150 referenced journal articles. His research has been funded by the US National Science Foundation, Ford Foundation, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). He has received awards for excellence in research from Association of American Geographers' (AAG) Regional Development and Planning Specialty Group, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and NSFC (Outstanding Young Scientist Award). His professional services include: adviser/panelist for the NSF, consultant to the World Bank, Chair of AAG's China Geography, Asian Geography, and Regional Development & Planning specialty groups, and vice president of Chinese Professionals in GIS.

Susan H. Whiting is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington in Seattle. She holds a BA from Yale and a PhD from the University

of Michigan and specializes in political economy and governance with a focus on China. Her first book, *Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change*, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2001. She has published articles and chapters on rule of law, property rights, and fiscal reform in numerous publications, including *Comparative Political Studies*, *China Quarterly*, and *Urban Studies*. She has contributed to reports on governance, fiscal reform, and non-governmental organizations under the auspices of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Ford Foundation, respectively. Her current research interests include property rights in land, the role of law and courts in economic transition, and the politics of fiscal reform in transition economies. At the University of Washington, she teaches courses in Comparative Politics, Political Economy, and Chinese Politics.

Jian Xu is Lecturer in Communication in the School of Communication and Creative Arts, Deakin University. He researches Chinese media and communication with a particular interest in the sociology and politics of digital media. He is the author of *Media Events in Web 2.0 China: Interventions of Online Activism* (Sussex Academic Press, 2016) and co-editor of *Chinese Social Media: Social, Cultural and Political Implications* (Routledge, 2018).

Jiang Xu is Professor in the Department of Geography and Resource Management and Associate Dean (Education) of the Faculty of Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her main research areas include critical urban studies, mega-city development, urban planning, and changing state spatialities in transitional societies. She has published widely in these areas. She is the co-author of the award-winning book *Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market and Space* (2007, Routledge, with F. Wu and Anthony G.O. Yeh), and the editor of a volume *Governance and Planning of Mega-City Regions: An International Comparative Perspective* (2011, Routledge). She is the recipient of the 2008 Research Output Prize of the University of Hong Kong, and 2012 Research Excellence Award of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her co-authored work on environmental discourses in planning has been awarded the 2014 Annual Best Paper by *International Development Planning Review*.

Dali Yang is the William Claude Reavis Professor in the Department of Political Science and the College and Senior Advisor to the President and Provost on Global Initiatives at the University of Chicago. He is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as the founding Faculty Director of the University of Chicago Center in Beijing (2010–2016). His research is focused on the politics of China's development and governance. Among his books are *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China* (Stanford University Press, 2004); *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine*

(Stanford University Press, 1996); and *Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China* (Routledge, 1997). His recent articles have appeared in *Chinese Political Science Review*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Governance*, *International Political Science Review*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, and *Political Studies*.

Xiushi Yang is Professor of Sociology at the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University. A social demographer, Dr Yang has extensive survey research experience in China. He received his PhD in Sociology with a concentration in population studies from Brown University in 1991. His research interests include migration, HIV risk behaviours and behavioural intervention. For the past 20 years, his research focused on the impact of migration and socioeconomic changes on reproductive and HIV risk sexual and drug using behaviours in China. His recent research included survey research on the interactive impact of migration and gender on HIV risk sexual behaviours and HIV prevention intervention research. Dr Yang has been the principal investigator for several National Institutes of Health funded studies. Currently, he is the principal investigator of a behavioural study on synthetic drug abuse (funded by NIH/NIDA) in China.

Linda Yueh is Fellow in Economics, St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford and Adjunct Professor of Economics, London Business School. She is also Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science and was Visiting Professor of Economics at Peking University. She is the author of *China's Growth: The Making of an Economic Superpower* and *Enterprising China: Business, Economic and Legal Development Since 1979*, among other books. She is Editor of the Routledge Series on Economic Growth and Development.

Jiayu Zhang is a Research Associate at China's People University after having worked as a Post-Doctoral Research Associate at the SOAS China Institute 2015–2016. She received her PhD in Gender Studies from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2013. Her research interests include gender policy and law in China, gender equality ideology, sexuality and human rights in Chinese societies.

Lei Zhang is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Colorado – Colorado Springs. His research interests include quantitative research methods, social networks and social capital, social stratification and mobility, entrepreneurship, and the labor market of China, as well as mental health and subjective well-being. He is currently conducting a counterfactual analysis of how social capital affects entrepreneurship and the performance of Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Wu Zhang holds a PhD in Government from Cornell University. She is a Professor in the College of Political Science and International Relations at Central China Normal University and serves as a member of the editorial board of *Asian Journal of Political Science*. She has published articles on popular protest in *The China Quarterly*, *The China Journal*, and *The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*. She is completing a book manuscript on local governance and peasant protest in China in the age of reform.

Taomo Zhou is Assistant Professor at the History Programme, School of Humanities, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She specialises in modern Southeast Asian as well as Chinese history. Taomo received her PhD in History from Cornell University. Her publications have appeared in journals such as *The China Quarterly* and *Indonesia*. She is completing a book manuscript on revolutionary diplomacy and diasporic politics between China and Indonesia during the Cold War.

Jiangnan Zhu is Associate Professor of the Department of Politics and Public Administration and Coordinator of Contemporary China Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. She is primarily interested in Chinese political economy, especially the politics of corruption and anticorruption. She has published a series of research in leading journals such as *Comparative Political Studies*, *Governance*, *Public Administration Review*, *Journal of Happiness Studies*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, *Crime, Law, and Social Changes*, and so on.



Introduction

Weiping Wu and Mark W. Frazier

Today's China presents a fascinating yet challenging area of scholarly inquiry. The dynamism and complexities of contemporary China, and the dramatic changes that have taken place in the Chinese economy, society, and environment in recent decades, pose numerous challenges for scholars of China who populate the broad field known as China Studies. Where does the field of China Studies stand? Given China's prominence in global affairs, is the China Studies field connecting itself sufficiently with transnational and global modes of inquiry? How should the China Studies field analyze China's broader socioeconomic dynamics, systems and levels of governance, and key institutions?

These are the motivating questions for this handbook. China Studies, like other area studies, draws from the research traditions of multiple disciplines. The diverse methodological approaches that characterize the contemporary China Studies field have led to a vibrant and eclectic tradition of academic training and research production. In this handbook, specifically, we have collectively aimed for four broad directions of inquiry, the achievement of which we hope will help increase the visibility of China Studies:

- Investigate how we can best study China;
- Explore the transformations of contemporary China that inform how we study China;
- Present the breadth and depth of the China Studies field; and
- Identify future directions for China Studies.

This handbook is anchored in one of the largest and most productive subfields of China Studies, the social sciences. Our intention is to provide an in-depth understanding of China's contemporary development that is grounded in history

and context. China's recent history of social and cultural transformation, as well as its rapid economic development, have produced a wide range of scholarship in such social science fields as politics, economy, geography, law, anthropology, sociology, urban studies and planning, as well as in history and the humanities.

It comes as no surprise that a handbook like this draws on the work of many scholars in and outside of China, to showcase the best work representative of the field. As editors, we have invited both established and rising scholars to contribute. They come from every major region where China Studies prospers: North America, Europe, Oceania, East Asia (including China), and Southeast Asia. In addition to presenting the analytical richness for a broad range of important subjects, some contributors use case studies to ground the discussion and highlight important and timely issues pertinent to the field.

CONTEMPORARY CHINA STUDIES AS A FIELD

To what extent is contemporary China Studies a coherent field of inquiry, and what are its boundaries? How has disciplinary training and specialization, particularly in research methods, influenced the way that scholars of contemporary China speak to what are at times competing audiences of China scholars more broadly, versus disciplinary colleagues? How well has the field of contemporary China Studies connected with more recent trends to cover 'global Asia' and other transnational connections? Each of these questions is of great importance to the future of contemporary China Studies as a field.

Contemporary China Studies can be defined as a broad area of inquiry into the social, economic, cultural, and political forces underlying the rapid changes in China and Chinese society since approximately the late 1970s (and understanding the connections across this period marking the onset of reform and opening). The field is also defined by China's re-emergence as a global power and the extent of its influence in regional and global affairs. The rapid social and economic changes within China, and China's rise internationally, have attracted a great many more commentators and analysts publishing in disciplinary journals, academic presses, and general audience outlets than has been the case in other fields defined by a region or a country (e.g., Latin American studies, India studies). On the 'consumption' side, the audience for the field of contemporary China Studies is vast: professionals and practitioners in various domains of expertise who have some stake in understanding developments in China for their line of work, diplomats and other policy makers, and a general public around the world whose encounters with China and Chinese citizens are multifaceted and rapidly growing.

Yet as is often the case in any academic enterprise, the questions and answers are increasingly complex, and the producers and consumers of the research tend to fragment into their own networks and communities. Even a seemingly simple question of, 'what accounts for China's record of successful economic

performance and poverty reduction?’ is of intrinsic interest to many and may offer clues for those seeking to reduce poverty elsewhere in the world. To answer it requires far more than the perspective of one discipline or subfield (e.g., development economics). The question is also illustrative of the tensions that arise for those trained in the China Studies field along with their respective disciplinary and methodological specializations. For example, how important is deep knowledge of China’s modern or even pre-modern history relevant to the sources of post-1980 economic growth? Some would say historical roots of economic growth are essential to understand, and therefore require at least reading knowledge of Chinese language primary sources, including possibly classical Chinese, if the point is to look at county gazetteers for information about commerce and production from the Qing dynasty or before. Others would say that sophisticated data collection and modeling is of far greater import than historical sources, that training in advanced econometrics and statistics must be deployed to identify the interaction of variables that account for specific economic outcomes. Another of many possible approaches would be those that seek to understand the meanings and significance that the participants, such as entrepreneurs or factory workers, attach to the phenomenon of China’s growth.

From these contending approaches to address the same or similar questions, two consequences have emerged. First, since each approach comes with its own technical language and idioms of expression shared with like-minded practitioners, the findings can be put out of reach of China Studies colleagues in other disciplines, not to mention the interested and informed public. Research published in sub-disciplinary journals is not usually read across the China Studies field as a whole. Second, highly specialized methodological approaches have tended to generate relatively narrow questions that may be more about refining measurement techniques rather than engaging with colleagues from other disciplines who also study contemporary China and even ask similar questions using different methods. This is in many respects a natural tendency in scholarship, but the process of integrating findings from different disciplines tends to fall to the wayside.

The question of comparability is also of great importance, as is the related problem of concept formation and application. A number of China scholars (as Frazier notes in Chapter 58) have begun to follow earlier examples of those who examined China–Japan or China–Russia comparisons and interactions by taking up the study, even languages in some cases, of countries viewed as analytically comparable with China. The issue of concepts applied or misapplied to China has been addressed in several state-of-the-field essays by China Studies scholars. Such essays consistently raise concern over the tendency of those in the contemporary China Studies field, in political science in particular, to import concepts from the study of other regions or countries. By contrast, few concepts are generated from within China to be ‘exported’ for application elsewhere (Harding 1984; Perry 1994; Tsai 2013). In this respect, the expectation for China Studies scholars to produce concepts that can be applicable outside of China is a standard entirely lacking in the study

of American politics or in the field of American Studies. ‘Americanists’ are not expected to generate concepts whose value is assessed on their applicability outside of the US case. As the state-of-the-field essays on China Studies also note, fashionable research methods and theories (in addition to concepts) are also frequently brought to the study of China. Yet scholars such as Kevin O’Brien (2011) have rightly asked whether theories aspiring to universal application and the research tools used to test them actually advance broader understandings of China. As he notes, ‘social science theories come and go but China will last’ (2011: 541).

Finally, there is the question of what role China Studies plays in a 21st century context in which world regions and transnational connections are spawning centers and institutes with titles such as ‘Global Asia’ or ‘Inter-Asia Connections.’ Here the emphasis is on an Asia-centric, historically and culturally rooted understanding of connections and cultural contacts that were understudied in state-centered or ‘impact of the West’ narratives that marked much of the study of Asia in academia during the Cold War. As discussed below, China’s vastly expanded presence in the world, and the multifaceted forms of connections in Asia and its various sub-regions, have greatly informed the study of the emerging field of inter-Asian studies, or to use a term once popular among intellectuals a century ago, ‘Pan-Asian’ perspectives. This transnational turn carries significant implications for the field of contemporary China Studies. It suggests, among other things, that social scientists interested in China’s expanding influence should obtain deeper training and engagement in the cultural and historical precedents of Chinese interactions in Asia.

MAPPING OUT CONTEMPORARY CHINA: CRITICAL ISSUES

Here, we address some of the central themes found in current thinking about China across a range of disciplines.

China in the World and the World in China

China’s return to global prominence over the past three to four decades has disrupted conventional approaches to studying ‘China in the World’. A book by that title a few decades ago would understandably most likely limit its focus to diplomatic and security relations between Beijing and foreign counterparts. Or it would ask about China’s nascent steps to joining international organizations, and perhaps include some chapters on the influence of the overseas Chinese (even then, attention would likely be on their influence in China proper, in the form of foreign direct investment and commercial networks). Today, such a title would have to include a full range of non-state flows, including financial entities, tourists, Chinese state-owned and private corporations, and even the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students at institutions of higher education around the world. Moreover, the crucial issues of cybersecurity and climate change, among

others once regarded as ‘non-traditional security’ problems, now need to take center stage in any survey of China in the world.

The multiple and overlapping connections that have emerged in some of these areas also suggest that ‘the world’ is also in China – notwithstanding efforts by the Chinese government to limit or block some of these flows. Many global corporations such as General Motors, Samsung, Toyota, and Apple have derived a large share of their operating profits from sales of their units based in China. They also face the prospect that losing market share in China can diminish overall revenues and share prices. But beyond the corporate sector, ‘the world in China’ also means that cultural and educational institutions, from Hollywood studios to art galleries, from Ivy League campuses to public universities, have established or seek to make a presence in China. All of these connections and the contestations that frequently arise over issues of censorship, restrictions, intellectual property transfers, and much else, are worthy of continued scholarly investigation.

The dimensions of these flows, in both directions, but especially the impact of these connections and influences on the rest of the world, reveal the gross oversimplifications in the ‘go-to’ question that comes up in any conference or publication addressing China’s role in the world: ‘What will China do with its power?’ The question is important, but inquiring into the intentions and effects of Chinese power in this way is to presume a single actor that makes strategic choices about where and how to deploy its power internationally. No clearer example is the high level of attention and anxiety surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As an infrastructure and aid project, the BRI has attracted vast levels of attention for its presumed master strategic plan to first build railways, dams, bridges, and ports in the Central, Southeast, and South Asian regions, then to dominate the governments and markets within these regions. But given the wide-ranging intentions and capabilities of the multiplicity of actors involved in the BRI, it is fruitless to attach a coherent plan to what will predictably be a mix of infrastructure successes and failures. The unintended consequences of BRI projects are, by definition, highly unpredictable. Beyond the BRI, studies of China in the world also have to grapple with the question of how to distinguish state-sponsored strategic intentions from autonomous decisions by households, corporations, tourists, and professional associations, among others, to go abroad for various motivations. Given this multiplicity of flows, how can the China Studies field examine China in the world in ways beyond an exclusively state-centric framework? While it’s still worth asking how the Chinese government deploys its capabilities abroad and in various regions and international forums, the impact of China and *Chinese* in the world is a promising area of future inquiry for the China Studies field.

Progress and Impact of Economic Reform

China since around 1979 presents a truly unique chronology of development. Nowhere have market economy conditions been applied with state control at

such a large scale. Most scholars agree that reform policies have had overwhelmingly positive consequences for the Chinese people. One indicator points to the largest advance in poverty alleviation in the history of humanity: 500 million people in China have been lifted from lives of subsistence agricultural production (World Bank 2014). Though there are continuing debates on whether economic transition will engender political liberalization, the majority of scholarship has focused on the former, its progress and impact in particular.

The transition from a planned to a market economy has gone through a series of phased reforms. In general, these were not the results of a grand strategy, but immediate responses to pressing problems. Throughout, two key features stand out. The first is pragmatism: criteria for success are determined by experiment rather than by ideology. The second is incrementalism: an idea is implemented locally or in a specific sector and, if successful, is gradually adopted throughout the country. As a result, fundamental structural changes have been introduced to the economic system, with genuine competition and gradual reduction of state interference.

How complete is China's economic transition? What are the prospects? Both are fair questions to ponder after close to four decades. While there is consensus on the multifaceted nature – from plan to market, from agrarian to industrial economy, from autarky to open door, and lately from export-led to consumption-based growth model, at least two schools of thought have persisted in its assessment. The more optimistic sees China as having reached a point of no return on a path generally upwards, while the more pessimistic cautions about crossroads on many fronts and a tipping point towards instability. The many shades of gray in between nonetheless present a range of challenges: capital account convertibility, state sector reform, sub-national debt, among others.

Furthermore, certain characteristics of economic transition – for example, outdated institutions and regulatory ambiguity – have produced conditions many consider to be contradictory to progress. Chief among these are increasing inequality and social stratification. When market reforms first began, poverty levels were so high that inequality was not a major concern. Around 1983–84, China was probably the most equal (especially in urban areas) that it had ever been. But since then the relationship between inequality and growth has become a top political and social issue. In addition to a persistent level of rural poverty, there are now three major groups of the emerging urban poor: unemployed and furloughed workers, migrants, and chronic poor (including people with no ability to work, no savings, and no relatives to rely on).

A major aspect of inequality relates to the millions of migrants. Migrant workers and entrepreneurs have provided substantial human impetus for the rapid modernization of cities. As a result of a matter of institutional legacy (the household registration system), except in small cities and towns, migrants have limited access to local public schools, welfare programs, state sector jobs, and the mainstream housing distribution system (Wu and Gaubatz 2012). (Proposed reform of the household registration system in the 2014 urbanization plan remains

confined to small and medium-sized cities and towns.) As the second generation of migrants grows up in cities with limited access to the urban education system, their future as an urban underclass is a serious challenge for the Chinese state. The volatility of export manufacturing, on the other hand, complicates the economic prospects of migrants. The quantity of migrants is often tied to the production level of export processing firms, which in turn is driven by the global demand for Chinese goods. Therefore, the volatility of the global economy directly affects the livelihood of migrants.

Despite massive changes to the structure of China's political economy, the country's legacy of state socialism has engendered an enduring sense of civil commitment within party cadres. The agenda of the central government has been largely characterized by the need to balance the growth of the national economy with the state's obligation to enable public wellbeing: security, inclusion, health, etc. Although the government's desire for growth and its civil responsibilities are not by definition at odds, unbridled economic growth often obstructs the public pursuit of wellbeing, especially for the poor, elderly, and other disadvantaged groups.

State and Society

The transformation of the Chinese state and Chinese society over the past four decades has deeply impacted contemporary China Studies. The image of an omnipotent and omnipresent state and a fragmented or subordinated society never held much sway under close scrutiny, even during the Maoist era. Yet social forces at no time in post-1949 China (or before, many would claim) possessed the vibrant, nationally networked array of interest groups or civil society formations that some would term as the mark of a genuinely pluralist polity to counter state power. Studies of state and society in China have generally shown, especially in the reform era, a complex interaction in which close attention must be paid to the venues, claims, scales, and strategies taken among a range of actors and organizations. Calls to 'disaggregate the state' (O'Brien 2011) have generally paid off by illustrating that a complex interaction of governance practices, coercion, responsiveness, and even representation appear in certain venues and institutions in the state and the party agencies that oversee them.

In addition, the plausible scenario in the 1990s, that insurmountable pressures on the Chinese state would bring about its erosion if not collapse, seems far less likely today, if not highly improbable. At that time, the most commonly noted pressures included inadequate fiscal capacity, elite polarization (including an erosion of civil-military relations), endemic corruption, rural unrest and anti-state mobilization, threats of inflation, risks of massive bank failures, recalcitrant provincial heads, environmental calamities, and foreign policy crises leading to armed conflict, among others. Even if one or more of these scenarios or threats does come to fruition in the 2020s or beyond and brings about some form of state failure or political collapse, the longevity and adaptability of the Chinese state and

Communist party to have navigated such massive social transformations over a forty-year stretch beginning in the late 1970s would be a remarkable achievement.

If anything, the accumulated scholarship on state–society relations in contemporary China Studies reveals the very hazards of making too much of this dichotomy. While it can be obvious in some cases who is the state and who is society, the boundary between these two and the respective sources of power dynamics are not as straightforward as one might think, and therefore theoretically compelling. Do political campaigns enhance state power or channel it in directions that strengthen it in some areas and weaken it in others? Do popular protests and other forms of social mobilization empower social forces, or can they also provide power to parts of the state while they challenge other parts of the state? An extensive literature on popular protest and official responses to it has shown the complex interactions, suggesting that the leaders even at the very top can be responsive at times. They may suspend policy or make adjustments to policies, largely out of the fear of social instability.

Finally, the question arises of how to characterize both change and continuity in state–society relations between the Maoist and reform period. Clearly the state no longer attempts to manage Chinese society through what Vivienne Shue called the ‘cellular polity’ (1988: 146). During the Maoist era, mobilizing the population for participation in politics was the norm. A heterogeneous array of employment and housing forms have supplanted the work unit, and with urban transformation has come more nuanced forms of governance and regulation. Carefully managed campaigns arise on occasion but nothing on the scale of the Maoist period. Citizens with grievances can find ways to make those grievances heard by state officials, through petitioning or courts. Social media can take a political turn at times, but open forms of collective action remain extremely constrained. But then as now, the most nuanced pictures of state–society relations that emerge in scholarly accounts are those that highlight the different scales in which state power operates (central, local, etc.) and the ways that societal actors engage with a highly differentiated Chinese state.

Questions of Sustainability

To many China scholars and observers, especially those concerned with sustained growth, the unraveling of the country’s progress will likely stem from its already fragile human–environment relationship. Externalities of industrial expansion, acceleration of urban development, exhaustion of water resources (in large swaths of China), and destruction of ecological systems have become all too common. If we were to resort to the wisdom of the environmental Kuznets curve (in which such externalities reach a peak and then decline as income rises), these would be considered the inevitable byproducts of China’s economic climb. But given its explosive scope and pace, scholars have sounded alarms on the irreversible impact of growth on the environment, resources, and the global climate.

Market reform has fundamentally changed the role of urban land. Commodification of land and housing has fueled rural land conversion and urban expansion. The expansionary processes have precipitated excessive sprawl, and unsustainable

forms of habitation and transportation in cities. In fact, in many cities, the growth in urban land area has significantly exceeded that of urban population (World Bank and Australian Aid 2015), captured in public imagination by the so-called ghost cities. Urban expansion also has intensified the depletion of water and other resources, stemming from both growing demand and rapidly increasing levels of pollution. Scholars agree that the ecological footprint of the urban population enlarges with modernization, motorization, and heightened consumption. In addition, uncoordinated growth reduces agglomeration effects of planned urban space, which leads to increased transportation costs and diminished productivity.

Although considerably smaller and less modern, the Chinese city during state socialism was in many ways more socially and environmentally sustainable than today. Cities were intentionally restricted in size and conceived as centers of production. Thus, the socialist city was relatively austere, compact, and functional; construction of facilities deemed ancillary to the goals of the socialist city was controlled. By comparison, the residential and transportation choices of reform-era urban residents are vastly more energy intensive. Aside from the effect of rising income and increasing mobility, the urban landscape is moving away from the compact and pedestrian oriented cities of Mao's era. This retreat from sustainable forms of urbanism presents a paradoxically regressive circumstance of urbanization. Compared to rates of automobile ownership in Europe and North America, for instance, the motorization of China is considerably more accelerated and concentrated in urban areas (World Bank 2014).

Depletion of land resources has geopolitical and social ramifications as well. The first is on food security, a subject of growing concern. While it may be subject to debate whether China can achieve food security given the large population coupled with limited arable land, China's central government has pursued this goal as a matter of national security. The conversion of farmland to non-agricultural use during the last two decades in China has been arguably the most widespread in the country's history, and in coastal China the process has been more intense than any other regions (Long and others 2009). Such encroachment also infringes upon farmers' interests and their collective stakes in farmland. Protests against land grabs have ensued across the country, posing a significant challenge for social accord and regime stability.

China's growth model has also made its mark on the global environment. The most direct evidence is pollution of coastal water by industries and untreated wastewater, cross-border and intercontinental air pollution, and emissions of greenhouse gas (Kamal-Chaoui and others 2009). China is now the largest contributor to global warming. A fundamental problem is the enormous dependence on coal for energy. Industries such as steel, cement, and chemicals are by far the largest users. But much of the country's environmental protection effort relies on initiatives by local officials, leading to a patchwork of mitigation and adaptation. Theorizing and interpreting the impact of China's economic transition on the planet remains a top priority. It also makes us wonder: To what do we compare China? Is China like any other country?

ORGANIZATION OF THE HANDBOOK

The handbook consists of two volumes, with ten parts containing a total of 58 chapters. Part One situates the field of China Studies in history and context. Each chapter in Part One provides an overview and historiography of how scholars have conceptualized respectively the Chinese state, nation, economy, and environment, and analyzes trends in terms of different research approaches, types of sources, and trends in the study of these broad concepts.

The next eight parts cover substantive themes in contemporary China Studies. The primary aim of chapters in these parts is to reflect the wealth of research undertaken in the past three decades or so. The eight parts include economic transformations, politics and government, China on the global stage, China's foreign policy, national and nested identities, urbanization and spatial development, poverty and inequality, and social change. Three common questions motivate all the contributions, providing a consistent format:

- How should we study China in a particular topical area? This requires situating the discussion in both the larger theoretical background and China's historical context.
- What are the core issues and how have scholars conceptualized them?
- Upon an assessment of the current 'state of art' in a particular topical area, what is the direction of possible future scholarly development?

As a conclusion to the handbook, Part Ten draws together three forward-looking contributions with the aim of charting the future of the China Studies field. These provide discussion on the future of China Studies, trends in historical studies of China, and recent efforts to place China in comparative context.

To ensure a high standard of editorial oversight, we established an editorial board of six Associate Editors representing major disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches found in China Studies. Their roles were critical, ranging from recommendation of contributors and subsequent interactions, to more importantly reviewing and critiquing drafts and revised chapters. The final product clearly has benefitted from their collective wisdom, in terms of the overall quality and individual contributions. The Associated Editors, in alphabetical order, are:

- Yanjie Bian, Sociology, University of Minnesota and Xi'an Jiaotong University, USA and China
- Kerry Brown, Political Science, King's College, UK
- Albert Hu, Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore
- Pál Nyíri, History, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Kristin Stapleton, History, University at Buffalo, SUNY, USA
- Elizabeth Wishnick, Political Science and Law, Montclair State University, USA

We invited contributors on the basis of their research profiles, but also to achieve an appropriate multidisciplinary and international mix as well as a range of different perspectives, theoretical positions, and methodological

approaches. Starting from a brief outline for each chapter, we worked with contributors to find a balance between their expertise and our general vision for the handbook. Some contributors brought on collaborators. Each chapter draft was reviewed by one Editor or Associate Editor, who provided substantive comments as well as feedback in regards to the writing and format features important for a handbook.

Showcasing the best work in contemporary China Studies, this handbook is designed as a resource to China scholars across social sciences and possibly beyond. We have aimed to provide original discussions of core issues. Even within the ambitious scope of the handbook, however, it was not possible to cover every important topic. For example, the absence of an issue such as China's increasing influence in specific world regions is by design, given the recency of the phenomenon as well as the limited (though growing) number of scholarly investigations. Given the multi-year span of the entire process, in some topical areas the situation may have moved on somewhat since the commencement of original writing around 2015–2016. Readers will, we hope, appreciate the myriad reflections on and assessments of the wealth of research undertaken in the past three to four decades on a rapidly changing China. For this vision, we owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to SAGE's Senior Publisher, Robert Rojek.

REFERENCES

- Harding, Harry. 1984. 'The Study of Chinese Politics: Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship.' *World Politics* 36(2): 284–307.
- Kamal-Chaoui, Lamia, Edward Leman and Rufei Zhang. 2009. 'Urban Trends and Policy in China.' OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 2009/1, Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Long, Hualou, Yansui Liu, Xiuqin Wu, and Guihua Dong. 2009. 'Spatio-Temporal Dynamic Patterns of Farmland and Rural Settlements in Su–Xi–Chang Region: Implications for Building a New Countryside in Coastal China.' *Land Use Policy* 26(2): 322–333.
- O'Brien, Kevin J. 2011. 'Studying Chinese Politics in an Age of Specialization.' *Journal of Contemporary China* 20(71): 535–541.
- Perry, Elizabeth J. 1994. 'Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State–Society Relations.' *China Quarterly* 139: 704–713.
- Shue, Vivienne. 1990. *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Tsai, Kellee S. 2013. 'China's Political Economy and Political Science.' *Perspectives on Politics* 11(3): 860–871.
- World Bank and Australian Aid. 2015. *East Asia's Changing Urban Landscape: Measuring a Decade of Spatial Growth*.
- World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council. 2014. *Urban China: Towards Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization*.
- Wu, Weiping and Piper Gaubatz. 2012. *The Chinese City*. Abingdon, Oxon and New York, NY: Routledge.

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank

PART I

Context: History, Economy and the Environment



This page intentionally left blank



The Making of the Modern State and Quest for Modernity

Dali Yang

INTRODUCTION

The modern state system emerged in the Peace of Westphalia, which marked the conclusion of the brutal Thirty Years' War (1618–48) in Europe. Central to this new type of world order known as the Westphalian system are the principles of state sovereignty and equality (Kissinger 2014).

While the concept of the state is subject to definitions from different perspectives, Max Weber offers us the most popular definition of the state as a political organization: 'The modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory' (Weber [Gerth and Mills] 1947).

As one goes beyond Weber and looks at the making and operations of the modern state, however, the task becomes far messier (Abrams 1988; Silberman 1993; Tilly 1992). In a recent attempt at a synthesis, Bob Jessop (2016) proposed that 'just as there can be no general theory of the state, there can be no general theory of its decline, crisis, or failure.' To gain traction on studying actually existing state systems, Jessop (2016) offers a four-element definition of the state, although he immediately lists six qualifications after this definition:

The core of the state apparatus comprises a relatively unified ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions and organizations [*Staatsgewalt*] whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society [*Staatsvolk*] in a given territorial area [*Staatsgebiet*] in the name of

the common interest or general will of an imagined political community identified with that territory [*Staatsidee*]. (Jessop 2016: 49)

Weber's classic definition of the state, with its focus on domination through the legitimate use of physical violence, reflected well on the violent origins of European state-making (Tilly 1992). In contrast, Jessop's definition a century later takes a strategic-relational approach to state power and pays more attention to claims of common interest or general will. While neither definition is perfect for the job of describing and analyzing the origins and evolution of the modern Chinese state, between them they offer valuable vantage points for our endeavor.

As one of humanity's most enduring civilizations, China had well-established patterns and a culture of autocratic rule when it had to confront with modern western states in earnest during the Qing Dynasty under Manchu rule. During this extended and humiliating confrontation, the old order collapsed with the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, but this has been followed by more decades of struggles, mostly among Chinese, through which the Chinese state has been reconstituted. To anticipate the rest of this chapter, the late Qing proved to be inadequate to the task of confronting powerful imperialist powers and domestic rebellions. It suffered from declining legitimacy, was unable to reconstitute itself into a modern state, and saw the end of the dynasty. Republican China after Yuan Shikai muddled through as a weak state during the warlord era but enjoyed growing legitimacy and fitful progress in state-building during the Nationalist era. Yet this proved inadequate against the Japanese onslaught and the rise of the CCP. With its massive victory in civil war, the CCP under Mao had a huge reservoir of legitimacy as well as coercive power. While Mao expended much of that legitimacy on one political campaign after another, post-Mao leaders have been able to regain public trust on the premises of development and national rejuvenation and to constitute the Party-state. Today the Chinese state, led by the Communist Party of China, boasts the world's second largest economy. A study of the modern Chinese state is by necessity a review of the remaking of the Chinese state, still in progress today.

LATE IMPERIAL CHINA AND THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNITY

Despite much basic agreement on the contours of Chinese history following the Qin unification in 221BC, there exists interesting and important disagreement over what 'China' means or what 'Chinese civilization' is about (Ge 2011). It is useful to note that Chinese dynasties aspired to the *tianxia* or 'all-under-heaven' model and considered China as the center of the universe. In the Qin, Han, and Tang dynasties, the rulers of China achieved political, military, and cultural dominance but nonetheless the borders of the empire were not clearly fixed, as befitting the theory of *tianxia* or 'all-under-heaven' (Xu 2015). Among other things, the lack of a clear boundary is one element that clearly distinguished the

earlier Chinese empires from the modern state. Thus, in his popular *On China*, the eminent historian Xu Zhuoyun (Cho-yun Hsu) concludes that China has been ‘an ever-changing and complex community’ (Xu 2015).

With the Song Dynasty (interrupted by the Yuan, which was part of the Mongol empire), clear boundaries became the norm a necessity, because the Song had to coexist with the Liao and the Jin. The most famous of such boundaries is what is today known as the Great Wall. Most of the wall that exists today was built during the Ming Dynasty (Waldron 1990). A Han Chinese identity also began to emerge in the Song and became further enhanced by the brutality of Mongol rule. In seeking to overturn Mongol rule, Zhu Yuanzhang, the founding emperor of the Ming, marched to the north with the charge that the Mongols had misruled. Xu (2015) argues that by distinguishing between Mongol and Han Chinese rule, Zhu essentially ‘proclaimed the end of the Tianxia system in Chinese history and affirmed the Han’s ethnic affinity for the Huaxia culture.’

Historians generally consider the later Ming and Qing as belonging to the late imperial or early modern period (Rowe 2009). Our consideration of the modern Chinese state thus begins with this period. Interestingly, the Thirty Year’s War in Europe coincided with the last decades of the Ming Dynasty. Both were affected by what is today known as the Little Ice Age. The historian Timothy Brook (2010) writes, ‘No emperor of the Yuan or Ming faced climatic conditions as abnormal and severe as Chongzhen (the last emperor of the Ming, r. 1627–44) had the misfortune of doing.’ By the 1630s, the Ming, buffeted by persistent severe weather, suffered from repeated famines and epidemics. To keep the machinery of state running, the Ming levied heavier and heavier taxes, causing resentment among its subjects and providing fertile ground for rebels such as Li Zicheng, who stormed into Beijing to pronounce the founding of the Shun Dynasty. Emperor Chongzhen hanged himself, but the Shun Dynasty quickly fell to the Manchus, a hereditary professional caste which had only been assembled during Ming times but was far more ready to rule than Li Zicheng. The Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) was born.

It is now well established that the Qing Empire was a multinational polity that practiced Confucian rule primarily in the former territory of the Ming, where the Qing ruler was the Chinese emperor. Elsewhere, however, he was also the khan of khans, and Buddha reincarnate (Rawski 1998). The Qing Empire achieved its zenith in the eighteenth century, particularly during the 60-year reign of the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735–96). As its territory and population expanded steadily and vastly, the Qing economy was indisputably the largest in the world and in fact was still the largest when the Qing was humiliated by the British in the First Opium War (1839–42) and had to sign the first of many ‘unequal’ treaties (Maddison 2006).

A stylized outline of Confucian governance would go as follows. The emperor, endowed with the mythical ‘mandate of heaven,’ exercised absolute rule that should also aim to be benevolent in accordance with Confucian teachings and

ritual (Faure 2007). The emperor governed with the support of a meritocratic elite of Confucian scholar-officials selected through a rigorous system of civil service examinations that was open to (male) talent from throughout the empire. This elite was in turn rooted in the landed class. As a result, the Confucian civil service examination system not only became the major conduit for the governing elite but also served to integrate the empire politically, economically, and culturally, though Confucian orthodoxy dominated at the expense of the spirit of innovation (Elman 2000 and 1991; Lin 1995).

Whereas in the Confucian world the political attained primacy over other spheres of life, the scholar-officials, with their moral training, would in the ideal world of Confucian rule counterbalance the emperor's despotism. In practice, the authority of the emperor had already become dominant by the Eastern Han dynasty. While few would dispute the historical importance of Confucianism, modern-day scholars including Kung-chuan Hsiao (1976) and Ying-shih Yu (2014) have underscored the importance of 'legalism' in imperial Chinese governance (Zhao 2015). Confucian ideals were often honored in their breach and all too often the practice of 'revering the emperor and belittling the ministers (君尊臣卑)' prevailed. The character of dynastic rule in late imperial China, dominated by alien rule by the Mongols and the Manchus (and the Ming inherited much of the brutality of Mongol rule), was especially autocratic, tempered as it was by the veneer of Confucian rule.

From today's perspective, the early modern dynastic states of China were modest in size and, in the words of William Rowe (2010), it was governance on the cheap, with significant continuities as well as adaptations in the organizations of imperial governments. In the 'expansionist, multinational, early modern empire' that was the Qing (Rowe 2010), the Manchu emperor governed with the assistance of the Grand Secretariat (Grand Secretaries) along with Six Boards (Revenue, Civil Office, Criminal Justice, Public Works, Rites, and War). There was also a Censorate, a system of surveillance over all governmental operations, that had become especially prominent in the Ming (Hucker 1966). Outside of the capital, the emperor appointed local officials, including governors-general and governors of provinces, prefects of prefectures, county magistrates, and various functional specialists that reported to respective Boards.

As a conquest dynasty, it is no surprise that the Manchu emperor directly controlled the military, comprised of the Bannermen and the Chinese Green Standard Army. He also further enhanced control over the communications system that had served successive dynasties, receiving information from throughout the empire and frequently issuing edicts to appointed officials and generals at the front (Wu 1969). Much thought went into the adoption of mechanisms to enhance central control and get the appointees to govern with the empire's interest in mind. In addition to the Censorate and other forms of supervision and surveillance, the well-known avoidance rule prohibiting the appointment of an official to his home province and areas in close proximity to his home province was strictly followed.

Officials were also regularly moved around rather than being allowed to sink roots. There were also various other forms of checks and balances, such as that between the governor-general and the governor.

Compelled by the need to govern an expanding territory, the Qing further substantiated and elaborated a system of provincial appointments and administrations – a development that helped to sustain the Qing for nearly 270 years (Guy 2010). Within the provinces were prefectures and counties and it is conventional wisdom that the county magistrates, as outsiders, often lacked the resources to dominate the locales. Instead, while collecting revenue and administering justice, the (roving) county magistrates must make accommodations with the local communities (the local gentry, guilds, and lineages) that took the lead on education and ritual (Chang 1955). Thus autocratic rule was tempered by Confucian teachings, ritual, and local society. Yet recent research also suggests that the emperor's reach went below the county not simply with the imposition of the *baojia* system, but there were in fact various forms of sub-county control mechanisms adopted around the country (Hu 2015).

In a multi-national empire dominated by the Manchus, ethnic relations was of paramount importance. While the Manchu emperors integrated the civil service system into the imperial system and espoused a fiction of multinational unity 'all under heaven,' they were also worried and vigilant about Han dominance (Yao 2015). To ensure the predominance of the Manchus, each of the Boards was headed by two presidents, one Manchu, one Han. The Qing emperors also set up several other institutions outside of the civil service system, especially the Grand Council (军机处 or Office of Military Planning), that effectively concentrated information and decision-making power in their own hands. When the Kangxi emperor was traveling outside of Beijing, he mostly relied on his non-Han advisers (Yao 2015). It was a system that Edward Rhoads aptly termed 'separate but unequal' (Rhoads 2000).

As a product of Manchu imperialism, the Qing Empire was extraordinarily successful for its times, with expanding territory, burgeoning population, and growing commercial prosperity. European Enlightenment thinkers initially lavished praise on Chinese-style despotism. Voltaire stated: the Chinese empire was 'the oldest of the entire world, the best governed doubtless because it was the longest lasting' (Pagden 2013). The German polymath and philosopher Leibniz showed so much admiration for the Chinese art of government in 1697 that he thought it 'necessary that Chinese missionaries should be sent us to teach the aim and practice of natural theology' (Grieder 1983).

By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Qing Empire more than met its match in western imperialism and the Manchu reign of prosperity and stability began to crack under international and domestic pressures. In foreign policy, the Qing, like its predecessor dynasties, relished the trappings of a tributary system and treated neighboring and foreign ruling regimes as vassal states and barbarians (Fairbank and Teng 1941). Steeped in the air of superiority, the Qing emperors

and elites found it hard to treat as equals those foreigners coming from across the oceans, as Lord Macartney famously found out earlier during his mission to Emperor Qianlong in 1793–94 (Macartney 1963). Politically, diplomatically, culturally, and psychologically, the rulers of the Qing empire, like their peers in other empires, were simply not prepared for a world of modern sovereign states of equality.

Yet the Treaty of Westphalia, which brought the major European powers sovereign equality and mutual respect, also helped free them to pursue overseas ventures. By the mid-nineteenth century European powers, reaping the fruits of the Industrial Revolution, had become formidable on the global stage. Meanwhile, unlike earlier during the Enlightenment, European thinkers had by then acquired civilizational self-confidence. Whereas liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville championed liberty and equality at home, they also supported colonial conquest in backward or savage areas (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2009). Little of the earlier European admiration for China's 'oriental despotism' remained (Pagden 2013).

In this context, the extraordinarily arduous remaking of the Chinese state from empire to modern state began in earnest with the Opium Wars (1839–42; 1856–60) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) and was partly the product of a monumental clash of empires from East and West that, one may argue, lingers to this day.

The historian Timothy Brook (2010), one of the world's foremost scholars on the Ming, notes that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ming China had become increasingly tied to a maritime world-economy centered on the South China Sea, which pivoted the Ming economy offshore to connect with global supply and demand through trade with South Asia, Europe, and South America. The Qing halted this process by tightly controlling the borders and confining trade to Canton. As a consequence of the Opium Wars and others that followed, however, the Qing empire was forced to open up. Karl Marx, worshipped in today's China as the guiding spirit of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848 and was a foreign correspondent for the *New York Tribune* for more than a decade, beginning in 1852. While lamenting the consumption of opium as being 'at the expense of human life and morality' and the Opium War as 'unfortunate,' Marx, in a dispatch dated June 14, 1853, saw the First Opium War's potential in bringing change to China, which he thought was in a state of 'hereditary stupidity'. Thus Marx celebrated the Opium Wars' effect on the Manchu Qing Dynasty:

Before the British arms the authority of the Manchu dynasty fell to pieces; the superstitious faith in the eternity of the Celestial Empire broke down; the barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilized world was infringed; and an opening was made for that intercourse which has since proceeded so rapidly under the golden attractions of California and Australia. (Marx, Ledbetter and Wheen 2007: 3)

Marx wasn't very accurate in predicting European revolutions, but his quixotic prognosis on the Qing was prescient, if not for the right reason: 'That isolation

having come to a violent end by the medium of England, dissolution must follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into contact with the open air' (Marx, Ledbetter, and Wheen 2007).

The Qing didn't simply dissolve. Unable to rely on its centrally controlled but weak regular armies to quell the Taiping Rebellion (and also the Nian and Moslem Rebellions), the Qing came to lean on forces organized by the local gentry, particularly the Hunanese army, which owed its loyalty to Zeng Guofan. It was also willing to use foreign forces to join in the suppression of domestic rebellion, something that would be unimaginable in today's China. It was clear the soldiers were not fighting for the honor of the nation-state. After quelling the Taiping Rebellion, the exhausted Qing managed substantial restoration and self-strengthening, including significant developments in military industries.

By the early 1890s, the Qing Beiyang Fleet looked as formidable as the naval fleet of Japan, which had since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 undergone rapid transformation into a modern industrial state with powerful military forces. Yet in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 (in Chinese, known as the Jiawu War 甲午战争), the Qing was soundly defeated and the Beiyang fleet was annihilated. As a result, the Qing had to cede Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula as well as to pay a huge indemnity to the Empire of Japan, and to give up suzerainty over Korea. The ramifications of these losses continue to reverberate to this day.

The utter defeat by the neighboring and far smaller Japan underscored the failure of the Qing Dynasty's half-hearted efforts to modernize and sounded the death knell of the Qing tributary system. Immediately afterward, Yuan Shikai was tasked to build a (Beiyang) New Army and he did so by learning from the German Empire. The defeat also became a catalyst for the bold reforms of 1898 that Emperor Guangxu sought to promote on the principle that 'in a true sense, there is no difference between China and the West in setting up government for the sake of the people' (Hsü 2000). These reforms were soon halted by the Empress Dowager Cixi, who put the emperor under house arrest. Several years later, following the Boxer debacle, the chastened Empress Dowager herself began to champion a broad range of significant reforms in commerce, education, police, and industry under the rubric of New Policies. A 1902 edict lifted the ban on Manchu–Han marriages. The Civil Service Examinations were finally abolished in 1905. Many of the reforms occurred under the leadership of Yuan Shikai, who was promoted to Viceroy of Zhili and Commissioner for North China Trade.

Public demands for constitutional reforms to emulate Japan escalated following Japan's dramatic victory over Russia in 1905. Sensing danger, the Empress Dowager came to see constitutionalist reforms as a bulwark against overthrow by anti-Manchu revolutionaries such as Sun Yatsen and eventually approved an outline plan for constitutional reforms in August 1908. This reform plan mandated a preparatory period of nine years but both Cixi and, mysteriously, Emperor Guangxu died in November 1908. Prince Chun (Zaifeng), regent to

Puyi (Emperor Xuantong), sought to accelerate the constitutional reforms but, in spite of popular demands for a ‘responsible cabinet’, the new cabinet Prince Chun introduced in May 1911 was clearly designed to keep power in the hands of Manchu princes. Such obtuseness only added fuel to a politically volatile environment. By October 1911, the Wuchang Uprising took place. Within weeks, seventeen out of twenty-two provinces declared their independence from the court. The Qing could no longer hold and, following careful maneuvers, the peaceful abdication of Emperor Xuantong occurred in spring 1912 to make way for a new republic.

THE REPUBLIC OF FRUSTRATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE MAINLAND

One summer evening in 1867, Zhao Liewen (赵烈文), long-term confidante to Zeng Guofan (then leading the successful suppression of the Taiping Rebellion), joined Zeng in worrying about the fate of the Qing Dynasty. Zhao predicted when the end came it would be because ‘the empire will be bereft of leadership; all will have to fend for themselves within 50 years’ (Zhao 2013). The abdication of Emperor Xuantong happened about 45 years after the Zeng–Zhao conversation.

Yet a leader did exist during the transition, and that was Yuan Shikai, who enjoyed the support of a formidable military and bureaucratic coalition. Asked by the court to form a new cabinet in November 1911, Yuan was not eager to help prolong the Qing Dynasty and played a pivotal role in helping arrange for the emperor’s peaceful abdication. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries who advocated for the overthrow of Manchu rule chose Sun Yatsen as provisional president of the new Republic of China, but Sun and the rest of the nation thought that only Yuan possessed the resources and gravitas to fill the leadership void (非袁莫属) (Ma 2016). Sun accordingly invited Yuan to take his place as the President and Yuan accepted in March 1912. Nonetheless, Sun and his colleagues sought to constrain the president’s power with a provisional Constitution that drew on the American Constitution in spirit.

For a while the Chinese Revolution of 1911 looked like a Chinese version of the Glorious Revolution. However, following the 1913 assassination of Song Jiaoren, a rising star of the recently formed Nationalist Party (KMT), Sun Yatsen called for a second revolution, this time against Yuan Shikai. Yuan responded with a massive crackdown on Sun and his followers. In a time of national weaknesses, Yuan made persistent efforts to acquire more power and resources. Advised by the Columbia University Professor Frank Goodnow, who didn’t believe the Chinese were mature enough for democracy, Yuan eventually sought to become the Hongxian emperor in 1915 amid a perilous international environment (Japan sought to impose the notorious Twenty-one Demands on China) (Kroncke 2012).

Yuan's imperial ambitions were greeted by national condemnation, however, as in 1911, province after province declared their independence. To appease the opposition, Yuan repeatedly postponed his imperial accession ceremony and finally gave up on the monarchy in late March 1916. A few weeks later, on June 6, Yuan died at the age of 56, profoundly humiliated.

Yuan left a gigantic power vacuum behind. The military and bureaucratic coalition centered on him splintered. This time Zhao Liewen's prediction came true. Even though a nominal and impotent central government continued to exist in Beijing, China fell into provincial militarism and warlordism for more than a decade, with battles and wars galore, though this was also an era of intellectual experimentation and political diversity (Chi 1976; Fung 2010; Furth 1976; McCord 1993; Sheridan 1975). It was China's decade of state failure.

The Nationalist Party (KMT) regrouped in Canton and set up a provisional military government in 1918. Sun Yatsen was made Grand Marshal, though power in Guangdong was held by Chen Jiongming, who would break with Sun in 1922 but is also known for his federalist vision (Chen 1999). With Soviet support, the Chinese Communist Party got its start in 1921 and soon joined in a United Front with the KMT, which also received Soviet assistance (Pantsov and Levine 2013). Sun also sought to reorganize the KMT along Leninist lines in 1924 but couldn't complete it (Yu 1966).

Following Sun's death in March 1925, Chiang Kai-shek emerged as one of the KMT's most influential leaders and led the revolutionary army on the highly successful Northern Expedition to pacify the warlord armies and reunify the country. At the end of 1928, Generalissimo Chiang became head of the national government as well as of the KMT and commander in chief of the armed forces. Major warlords pledged their allegiance to the central government, at least nominally, though the central government had direct control over a small number of provinces only.

A left-leaning Confucian as well as converted Christian, Chiang couldn't rely on established institutions but worked hard to appeal to a broad political spectrum amid contending political forces (Taylor 2009). Ideologically, Chiang espoused Sun Yatsen's three principles of the people (Democracy, Nationalism, and People's Livelihood). Ethnically, Chiang and the KMT chose to emphasize that the Republic of China was a unitary nation-state comprised of one Chinese nation (中华民族), predominantly Han in origin but having assimilated others such as the Manchu. Such a doctrine appeared to be inclusive and yet satisfied the notion of Chinese culture being superior and therefore even conquerors of the Han had been assimilated; it also justified continuing efforts at assimilation (Fiskesjö 2006; Rhoads 2000; Zhao 2004).

Not surprisingly, Chiang persevered in efforts to build an effective national state. Most such efforts focused on the economy. On the recommendation of Sir Arthur Salter of the League of Nations, the Nationalist Government set up the National Economic Council (NEC) in 1931 and pursued major financial and

currency reforms (Young 1971). Taxes on farmers were cut. And in spite of the Great Depression and Japanese depredations, Republican China in its first decade achieved decent economic growth, with notable development in industries ranging from textiles and, heavy industry, to transportation and finance (Eastman 1986; Rawski 1989; Sih 1970). This first decade was considered the golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie (Bergère 1989; Taylor 2009).

In government administration, the KMT regime made little progress toward the building of a modern administrative system (Tien 1972). Official ideology called for social mobilization in the localities in preparation for self-rule. In practice, local KMT Party branches focused their energy on punishing 'local bullies and evil gentry' at first and over time strangled local autonomy, thereby undermining the KMT's revolutionary commitment and eroding central state authority (Thornton 2007). Seen from the village level, a process of state involution took place, undermining the legitimacy of both local elites and the state (Duara 1988). Consolidation of civilian and military leadership occupied much of Chiang's attention. Chiang had to confront wayward warlords repeatedly and fought significant wars against anti-Chiang coalitions in 1929–30. He also had major challengers from within his own Party, especially from Wang Jingwei, until Wang left in 1939 to establish a collaborationist government in Japanese-controlled areas.

As Chiang enlisted German advice to modernize the military (Central Army), his two biggest worries were the CCP and the Japanese. During the Northern Expedition, learning that Stalin had instructed the CCP to replace KMT leaders, Chiang, together with Wang Jingwei and with the support of warlords such as Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, conducted a brutal purge of CCP members in Shanghai and elsewhere in 1927 (Taylor 2009). As Chiang focused on pacifying the warlords, however, CCP remnants gained breathing room to develop soviets or base areas in mountainous regions between 1927 and 1930. In 1932–34, Chiang's government forces were eventually able to dislodge the Communist forces out of their base areas into an uncertain retreat that would later be glorified as the Long March. The Red Army, which included Mao Zedong among its leadership, escaped in October 1934 and reached Yan'an more than a year later, a shadow of its former self but now with Mao in charge.

Toward the end of the KMT's first decade in power, Chiang's combination of neo-authoritarianism and neo-traditionalism appeared to be working (Gao 2010: 20–38). China seemed to be finally leaving the post-imperial chaos behind and making headway toward the building of a modern republic. In the words of Jay Taylor (2009: 121), 'the power and authority of the Chinese central government was greater than at any time since the Taiping Uprising.' Yet any optimism was premature. Effective national control turned out to be far more elusive.

While Chiang wanted to finish off the CCP once and for all, the CCP leadership was able to rally public opinion around the growing Japanese threat and thus harness what Chalmers Johnson called peasant nationalism (Johnson 1962). Following the Xi'an Incident (December 1936), when Chiang was kidnapped by

the warlord general Zhang Xueliang working in alliance with the CCP leadership, Chiang agreed to another United Front with the CCP against Japanese aggression, a development that Stalin also wanted. Following his release, Chiang could have tried to launch another offensive against the weakly armed CCP forces but chose not to go back on his word.

By mid-1937, China was bearing the brunt of full-scale Japanese invasion. Chiang committed the best Chinese forces – German-trained and armed divisions – to the front against the Japanese killing machine in the hope that they would be able to hold the Japanese invaders off. Nationalist Chinese forces fought bravely but also suffered horrendous losses and were no match for Japanese military might. Eventually Chiang led the government to retreat to Chongqing, the war-time capital. He had to settle for a long game, tying down more than one million Japanese troops in China until allies entered the war and eventually turning the tide (Mitter 2013).

During the Sino-Japanese War, Chiang's national government sent funds each month to the CCP forces, as did Stalin's USSR. While part of the United Front against Japan, the CCP under Mao was careful to preserve and expand its strengths while the Central Army under Chiang fought valiantly and suffered the bulk of the casualties. In a secret report to Stalin written in January 1940, Zhou Enlai reported that as of August 1939 more than one million Chinese soldiers had been killed or wounded in the War against the Japanese. About 3 percent of the casualties, or 30,100, were from the Communist troops (Dallin, Stalin, and Dimitrov 2000; Taylor 2009). Chiang appeared to be aware of Mao's chicanery but the central government kept on providing funds to the CCP troops. While he hated the CCP's ideology of class struggle, he nonetheless admired its discipline and was critical of many of his own Party for showing 'selfish concerns' (Taylor 2009).

Chiang's strategic vision paid off after the United States entered the war after Pearl Harbor. With the staggering losses and sacrifices China had sustained for more than a decade, the Republic of China was on the side of the victors and Chiang was among the world's leading statesmen when Japan finally surrendered in 1945. China became one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The chapter of humiliation that began with the Opium War appeared to have finally been brought to a close.

Yet for Chiang and the KMT the victory over Japan proved pyrrhic. As territory in the most developed parts of the country was lost, so went most of the tax revenue base at a time when the government desperately needed funds to finance the war effort. To make up for lost revenue, fiscal extraction became more rapacious and came at the expense of legitimacy (Boecking 2017). The same could be said of conscription and government administration more broadly. Meanwhile, the CCP under Mao's leadership tightened Party discipline, including Party control over the military, and conducted a brutal purge of unwelcome elements in Yan'an that strengthened Mao's power (Gao 2000; Xiao 1999). The CCP also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to offer an alternative discourse to

appeal to the public, including the intelligentsia (Apter 1993). In this discourse, propagated through CCP-controlled media outlets, including in KMT-dominated areas and through foreign reporters such as Edgar Snow, the CCP attacked the KMT for being autocratic and corrupt and promised freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism (Xiao 1999).

Mao personally sang paeans to freedom and democracy that would be pleasing even to the ears of American visitors (Bernstein 2014). In a legendary conversation in a Yan'an cave between Mao and Huang Yanpei (黄炎培), an eminent educator and democratic leader from the KMT government in Chongqing, Huang noted that historically organizations and states (dynasties) often rose rapidly and fell swiftly in cycles. Mao answered, 'We have found a new path; we can break out of such cycles. This new path is that of democracy. Only under people's oversight will the government not slacken its efforts; only by everyone taking responsibility will the government continue to perform well when the (present) leaders are gone' (Huang 1945). The propagation of such rhetoric by Huang and others in government-controlled areas contributed to the CCP's winning of hearts and minds in the ensuing years.

With the Sino-Japanese War behind, Chiang and the KMT, in what appeared to be partly a response to CCP criticism and partly a reflection of resurgent Chinese pride, decided that it was time to follow Sun Yatsen's three-stage theory from military rule to tutelage to constitutionalism and lead the Republic of China into the phase of democratic constitutional government. A revised Republic of China Constitution was enacted by the National Assembly in December 1946 and went into effect a year later. On the surface this was a time of immense national pride. It appeared that the efforts at modern nation-building and state-building in the Republic of China were coming to fruition.

The CCP under Mao's leadership, however, boycotted the subsequent election (which elected Chiang the president). Instead, in spite of international mediation, the CCP and the KMT fought out in the epic Chinese Civil War. As is well known, the KMT-led central government started with a much larger and better-equipped military force (Chassin 1965; Spence 1990). Yet Chiang, seeking to contain what would today be considered an insurgency, contended with a regime riven with fissures and corruption and made various strategic errors (Lary 2015; Tsou 1967; Westad 2003). In the end, the KMT-led government forces were no match for the CCP's growing mass appeal, superior intelligence operations, and strong fighting spirit and strategies. On October 1, 1949, the victorious Mao led the CCP to install the People's Republic of China. Chiang and the KMT retreated to Taiwan, though the Republic of China retained its seat in the United Nations until 1971. The historian Harold Isaacs thus summed up this momentous shift in fortunes for the two contending revolutionary parties:

The Kuomintang [KMT], which had risen to the top in 1927, disappeared as a major ingredient. The Chinese Communist Party, having smothered whatever chance there might have been for the emergence of a new Chinese urban democracy, shaped itself through

hardening years of war in the remoteness of rural China onto an instrument for winning and wielding power by the absolute use of force (Isaacs 1961, 318–19).

Marx could not have imagined that the land that he ridiculed nearly a century earlier would now be dominated by a dictatorial behemoth ruling in his name.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATE: THE MAO ERA

Prior to taking national power, the CCP under Mao's leadership showed great discipline as well as policy moderation as it had to contend with the KMT. As Mao got closer to taking national power, however, he announced that the new CCP-led regime would lean to one side, the side of socialism led by the Soviet Union, the CCP's long-time benefactor and guide (Mao 1959). Nonetheless, Mao and his comrades continued to adopt a coalition strategy to broaden the CCP's appeal and gain popular support on the advice of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and at a time when fighting in parts of the country had not yet stopped (Li 2001). In September 1949, on the eve of the official founding of the People's Republic of China, the CCP leadership convened a Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and invited a substantial number of non-CCP delegates to participate in the conference. This CPPCC conference approved a *Common Program* and the *Organic Law of the Central People's Government* as the interim founding documents for the PRC state and central government.

Mao took a cavalier attitude toward institutions and made use of such legislative bodies as the CPPCC at his convenience. The *Common Program* called for a National People's Congress (NPC) to serve as embodiment of highest state power and elect the Central People's Government Committee (中央人民政府委员会). It also stipulated that before the NPC existed, the CPPCC plenary session would serve in the NPC's place. In practice, a CPPCC plenary meeting was not convened again until the NPC came into being in 1954. Thus the Central People's Government Committee (CPGC) was the highest state power between 1949 and 1954. As the CPGC Chairman, Mao was clearly the supreme leader.

The CPGC initially included the Government Administrative Council (GAC, headed by Zhou Enlai), the People's Revolutionary Military Commission (Mao), the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. In 1952, as China began to turn to central planning, a State Planning Commission (SPC), overseeing eight industrial ministries, was added with Soviet help and charged with the drafting and implementation of Five-Year Plans (the first five-year plan covered 1953–57).

Heeding Soviet advice, Mao invited a substantial number of non-CCP figures to join the central government (GAC) leadership, including three of six Vice Chairmen, two of four Vice Premiers, and 14 of 34 ministers (Bo 1991). Huang Yanpei, for example, was made Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry.

Nonetheless, the CCP leadership formed Party committees and groups in every government agency to maintain firm control.

As late as October 1952, Mao resisted the formal drafting of a Constitution and wanted to wait until China had entered into socialism. Ironically, it was Joseph Stalin who cajoled Mao into agreeing that the People's Republic of China should have a Constitution. Amid the Cold War, it was necessary for socialist countries to put on the appearance of having a Constitution. Hence the Constitution of 1954 was drafted and adopted (Han 2004; Weng 2007).

The 1954 Constitution was modeled on the 1936 Soviet Constitution in terms of state organization structure and citizens' rights and duties (Teiwes 1987). The NPC is the fountain of state power and has the authority to amend the constitution and enact laws, elect the President and Vice Presidents (previously translated as Chairman and Vice Chairmen), and ratify the appointment of the State Council Premier upon nomination by the President. The President would be the head of state and Chairman of the National Defense Committee. The State Council, led by the Premier, would become synonymous with the central government (The 1954 Constitution).

The 1954 Constitution projected an image of institutional constraints on power. In practice, the CCP leadership, partly in response to complaints from Party stalwarts that too many positions were offered to non-CCP luminaries, chose to sideline the non-CCP luminaries into largely ceremonial positions on the NPC or the CPPCC. Worse was still to come for these luminaries in future political campaigns. Around the same time (1953–54), Mao, taking a page from Chinese history, abolished the six pan-regional military-administrative councils and moved the regional leaders to Beijing, away from their regional bases. The Center took direct control of the provincial-level jurisdictions.

Just as Yuan Shikai chafed against the Provisional Constitution of 1912, Mao became increasingly frustrated with the trappings and routines of the newly emerging system. For someone who set his own schedule (indeed, China's top leaders at the time learned to adapt to Mao's schedule of working at night), the ceremonial functions of the President were an onerous burden. Another form of constraint was emerging for the likes of Mao who had spent a lifetime plotting wars and battles, for central planning relied on technocrats good with numbers and details. As China moved to adopt a Soviet-style planning system, Mao initially placed the State Planning Commission directly under the GAC, reporting to him. Yet soon he was confronted with stacks of documents with mind-boggling amounts of details and often signed them off without a good grasp of the contents. He was probably relieved that the SPC became a constituent part of the State Council with the enactment of the PRC Constitution.

As the history of the CCP's struggle against the ruling KMT revealed, Mao was superbly adept at mobilizing political support for attacks against 'enemies.' Whereas China's push for a planned economy required growing bureaucratization, politically Mao was in command. Riding on the wave of revolutionary tide,

everything seemed possible. Even without central planning, there was growing state control. Following years of chaos, the imposition of control and the appearance of order were initially welcomed by most, especially as the CCP used the authority it had acquired on the battlefield to impose draconian measures to bring down inflation. On various matters, dictatorial methods appeared to be both efficient and effective. Drug addicts were forced to quit, cold turkey style. Many prostitutes rounded up in Shanghai were sent to remote Xinjiang to marry soldiers who had recently fought in the civil war and were then garrisoned in the sparsely populated frontier region.

Forged in the titanic struggle with the Nationalist government over more than two decades, the Chinese revolutionary state of the CCP, led by leaders who used to be targets of crackdowns and suppressions, now became an instrument of terror against real or imagined enemies. Mao and his comrades were bent on transforming an old society through class struggle and quickly launched one campaign after another to suppress various groups, especially 'counter-revolutionaries.' Since China, then with about 600 million people, was overwhelmingly agrarian, the pursuit of land reform, which often resulted in the killing of landlords, was of fundamental political, economic, and cultural significance; it decimated the social class that provided a major pillar for the traditional order. Many other campaigns would follow and a widely circulated list enumerates no fewer than 55 campaigns during Mao's rule (Bennett 1976; Cell 1977).

The intensity of the domestic campaigns was heightened following Mao's fateful decision to send Chinese forces to Korea to fight against American-led United Nations forces in fall 1950. This decision was accompanied by a domestic campaign to 'Resist America, Aid Korea' and it firmly put China on the opposite side of the United States, a confrontation that would not ease until Nixon's visit to China in 1972. In consequence, the US imposed an embargo on the PRC and thwarted Mao's ambition of a quick takeover of Taiwan.

With Stalin's death in 1953 and Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin's brutal rule in 1956, Mao began to move into his own orbit. In 1956, concerned about the revolts that occurred in Hungary and Poland in the post-Stalin era, Mao sought to enliven the system with the Hundred Flowers Campaign to encourage the airing of different opinions and constructive criticism. The criticism turned out to be sharper and more vociferous than Mao (Party Chairman), Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi, and Secretary General Deng Xiaoping had anticipated. They turned on the critics and in 1957 launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign, which wrecked the careers of more than a half million people, especially those with an intellectual background or who had played a part in or collaborated with the old regime. Most importantly, the Anti-Rightist Campaign revealed how harshly the regime would deal with what today might be considered its 'critical citizens' and taught survivors to refrain from speaking up. China had become what Avery Goldstein called a 'bandwagon polity,' with officials eager to follow cues from Mao (Goldstein 1991).

Hailing from rural Hunan, which had provided a rich and stimulating intellectual milieu for numerous political leaders in China's modern history (Platt 2007), Mao found special comfort in seeking to reshape rural affairs. Most importantly, following in the footsteps of Joseph Stalin, he was a firm believer in transforming rural organizations to unleash the productive potential of peasants obsessed with owning more land of their own and thus to provide the surplus needed for industrialization and national power. This obsession of his in a 'bandwagon polity' became the fuse for what turned into the Great Leap Forward as, following the Soviet success with Sputnik, China joined the Soviet Union in efforts to catch up with capitalist economies in late 1957.

Mao's 'secret' for China to leap forward in (heavy) industrialization was by mobilizing the masses, a move that played to his strengths as revolutionary strategist but with an emphasis on producing iron and steel that even the planners found hard to resist (Bachman 1991). Nonetheless, in promoting the Great Leap Forward Mao relied on the Party faithful, including especially his trusted Party secretaries in the provinces (Yang, Xu, and Tao 2014). There was no patience for bureaucratic caution and the State Statistical Bureau was largely suspended. Rural residents were rushed into people's communes. Able bodies were mobilized to build water works and, in both urban and rural areas, to smelt iron and steel with the so-called backyard furnaces.

If the Great Leap Forward had worked, it would have enabled Mao to lead China on to a different path from that of Soviet-style planning and established Mao as the preeminent leader in the socialist bloc following Stalin's death in 1953. In reality, however, the messianic Great Leap Forward resulted in the worst famine in human history. In the aftermath of the Great Leap Famine, Mao lost 'interest' in personally steering the economy and let Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping help lead the economic stabilization and recovery, only to become disappointed with the right-leaning tendencies of his colleagues (Yang 1996; Yang 2012). In 1962 Mao began to turn his attention to class struggle and directed his colleagues to pursue a socialist education campaign in the countryside (Baum 1975).

In the ensuing years, Mao became increasingly disgruntled with his senior colleagues, especially President Liu Shaoqi. In 1966, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR). A constant refrain of Mao's was against bureaucratism. The CR is best known for Mao's mobilization of Red Guards to attack Party and government apparatuses, most of which were paralyzed as 'power seizures' occurred in ministries and organizations (Harding 1991; MacFarquhar 2009; White III 1989). Numerous members of the elite as well as many others with 'bad' class backgrounds were persecuted to death, including Liu Shaoqi and former Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, in particular, were attacked for 'revisionism' and for 'taking the capitalist road'. Huang Yanpei, whom Mao had referred to as a representative of the bourgeoisie, could not have expected to fare well in this extreme political environment but

Huang died at the age of 87 before the CR had erupted. His widow, however, was subjected to much abuse and committed suicide in January 1968.

Through all this, Mao simply ignored the Constitution and laws or Party rules. For more than a decade, he refused to convene a national Party Congress. It was not until Liu Shaoqi and others had been purged that Mao finally convened such a Congress in 1969 and packed the Party Central Committee with his handpicked followers. China degenerated into personal dictatorship during the late Mao era. Luckily for China, Mao's elder son Mao Anying (the other son was mentally handicapped) was killed during the Korean War and thus not available to succeed Mao. Even then Mao allowed his nephew to gain great influence and appeared to have intended for his widow and his nephew to play major roles in national leadership following his death (Xin Ziling 2010).

With the abandonment of normal working procedures, Premier Zhou Enlai, who was also under pressure from the radicals, had to form a special group to keep the State Council functioning. When the political chaos subsided in 1969, Mao and Zhou cut more than half of the State Council ministries. Despite the Maoist rhetoric against bureaucracy, it should be noted that the life of an individual Chinese during these years was bound up with the state, through their work units or production brigades (Walder 1988). Thus Martin King Whyte notes that in practice Mao was not against bureaucracy at all (Whyte 1989).

The Chinese official verdict was that the Cultural Revolution brought China to the brink of collapse. By the time of Mao's death, China was among the world's poorest countries and a prominent example of misrule (Tsou 1986). Ironically, Mao's genius for destruction meant that China did not systematically practice Soviet-style central planning for an extended time period and this deficiency from the perspective of central planning became an advantage when China turned to the pursuit of economic reform and opening up.

THE PARTY-STATE IN THE POST-MAO ERA: MARKET REFORMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALIZATION

Numerous volumes have been written about China's political changes and socio-economic development in the post-Mao era. Because of limited space, I will skip the politics of transition into the age of reform except to note that much of the emphasis in the immediate post-Mao years was on getting the institutions of state to function again following the turmoil and destruction of the Cultural Revolution years. To give a sense of the scale of the restoration, the number of State Council constituent organs more than doubled to reach 100 between 1977 and 1981.

The most obvious change is simply the disappearance of Mao the personal dictator. In the 1980s, politics at the top were dominated by Party elders, especially Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, but the elders also left much space for reformist leaders Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Wan Li (Tsou 1995; Vogel 2011).

Showing their distaste for and fear of Mao as Chairman, the Chinese leadership abolished the title of 'Party Chairman' in 1982 and replaced it with 'General Secretary'. With the introduction of retirement norms in the early 1980s, the formal retirement of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1989, and the abolition of the Central Advisory Commission (of the Elders) in 1992, significant progress has been made to regularize the processes of leadership selection and succession. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao served two terms as president (State Chairman), though the constitutional amendment of 2018 removed the two-term limit and thus paved the way for Xi Jinping to continue beyond two terms.

The relationship between the Party and the state has been fraught with unease throughout the PRC's history (Zheng 1997). With Mao, Chairman of the CCP Central Committee, mobilizing the masses to attack the Party and state institutions during the Cultural Revolution, the CR marked an especially poisonous era in Party–state relations. At the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987, reformist leaders, with Deng's blessing, put together a blueprint for the separation of Party and government, including gradual abolishment of party groups in government bodies and the weakening of Party organizations such as the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Yang 2017a). This initiative was aborted in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis. Instead, much more systematically than the Manchus/Qing resisted political reforms in the late nineteenth century, Communist Party leaders have shown no sign of loosening the Party's leash but have repeatedly invoked fears of crisis and doom to strengthen the Communist Party's predominant position in response to changing circumstances.

First and foremost, the Party leadership has kept a tight grip on the military, maintaining a tradition of Party command over the gun dating back to the Sanwa Reorganization of the military in 1927 (having a Party representative in each company unit). Mao's harsh attack on Marshall Peng Dehuai during the Great Leap Forward stemmed partly from a fear of military insubordination. During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping chose not to take up the top Party position and was a vice premier in the government lineup but he assumed the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission and no one doubted that he was the paramount leader. After Deng's formal retirement from the CMC in 1989, the top positions of Party, State, and Military have been concentrated in the hands of the same person, with the exception of the 2002–2004 transition between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping has gained real power more quickly than his two predecessors. He has not only established a National Security Commission to provide overall coordination of national security affairs but has also undertaken far-reaching reorganizations of the Central Military Commission and of the military command system.

Second, through the nomenklatura system, the Central Party leadership controls top appointments of all key institutions throughout the country, including the selection of leaders of the so-called democratic parties (Chan 2004). In addition to direct leadership of the national legislature and the State Council, members of the Politburo Standing Committee also have Party organs for leadership

of Party discipline (anticorruption), propaganda, economy and finance, law and stability maintenance, foreign affairs and for various specific purposes such as Taiwan Affairs. Within the State Council, only one or two government ministries are led by token non-CCP members and some of the State Council agencies actually report to the Party's leading groups.

Through interlocking institutions and leaders, the Communist Party leadership and those of the state institutions, including the armed forces, are bound together. Thus there is much credence to the conventional idea of the Party-state. As such, today's Chinese leaders possess far more potent organizational resources than their predecessors in the Qing and Republican periods.

The configurations of the Chinese state have undergone substantial change in the post-Mao era. In a nutshell, post-Mao leaders have sought to promote institutional reforms in their quest for growth and power. Changes in the economy under the rubric of reform and opening up have in turn facilitated certain types of rationalizing institutional reforms and created demand for others in order to curb and cope with unruly markets and practices and promote socio-economic order (Yang 2004). Major government restructuring requires the approval of the National People's Congress, which has been provided regularly since the late 1980s (1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018).

These government restructuring efforts began with downsizing the bureaucracy. In the words of then Premier Zhao Ziyang, 'the problems of overstaffing institutions, overlapping and ambiguous responsibilities and low efficiency have reached an intolerable level' (Zhao 1982). As the Chinese economy became more market-oriented, the focus of government reforms also shifted toward the transformation of government functions, especially after the CCP Party Congress adopted the concept of building a socialist market economy in 1992. Ministries at the core of the planned economy, from metallurgy to petroleum, were turned into central-administered SOEs or abolished. Amid the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji slashed the number of ministries and commissions from 40 to 29. A recurring theme has been the combination and rationalization of government administrations with overlapping functions. There have also been efforts to streamline and rationalize government approvals, especially to improve the business environment but also to make lives easier for ordinary people, whether they are seeking a driver's license or applying for a passport.

While China's leaders have eliminated most industrial ministries, they have also had to devise new mechanisms to cope with the 'turmoil' and 'chaos' that have emerged with an increasingly market-oriented economy. Following a financial crisis in 1993, the Chinese leadership revamped the fiscal system in favor of the central government and also began to restructure the People's Bank of China. Over time regulatory commissions have been established for securities, insurance, and banking. As of 2017, dedicated ministerial or ministerial-ranked regulatory institutions (in parentheses are abbreviations for the corresponding American regulatory agencies) had been established in the following areas: Environmental

Protection (EPA); Quality Supervision, Inspection & Quarantine (CPSC); Work Safety [also State Administration of Coalmine Safety] (OSHA); Food and Drug (FDA); Civil Aviation (FAA). These regulatory institutions increasingly look like their American or European counterparts. The China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), for example, was explicitly named to mimic the US FDA, which has a sterling reputation among American regulators.

Most other government ministries and administrations also possess significant regulatory functions and some, such as the Ministry of Public Security, act both as regulators and political gatekeepers (Yang 2017b).

CONTINGENCY

In examining the changes in the patterns of Chinese state organizations and political power over time, one should not be misled into thinking that all were over-determined and were inevitable. Nothing was further from the truth.

Two factors are especially worthy of attention. One is the role of leadership, which our discussions so far have touched upon. The other factor is the element of contingency. In fact, in recent years discussing the big ‘what ifs’ has become a fashionable pastime in certain Chinese circles, particularly in contemplating the difficult courses of history China might have taken had some of the pivotal leaders in Chinese history died at different times than had been the case.

To begin with, what if the Empress Dowager Cixi had died either ten years earlier or ten years later than 1908 and if the reformist Emperor Guangxu had not died suddenly in 1908. The social critic Liu Zaifu, for example, conjectured that if the Empress Dowager Cixi had died ten years earlier, then Emperor Guangxu’s Reforms of 1898 would have stood a good chance of getting implemented. If the Empress Dowager had died ten years later, she would have been able to lend her considerable political authority to the promotion of constitutional reforms. In both cases, the Great Qing might have had a real chance of evolving into a constitutional monarchy and the 1911 Revolution might not have occurred, dramatically altering the course of subsequent Chinese and global history (Interview with Liu Zaifu. Ifeng.com. November 15, 2015).

Another key individual was Yuan Shikai, the late Qing modernizer and strongman who became the President of the Republic of China. Yuan’s attempt to become the Hongxian emperor in 1915–16 turned into a debacle. Yet even the humiliated Yuan Shikai still retained enormous power and clout. What if Yuan had not died in June 1916 at the age of 56 but had stayed around to help revive the Republic and strengthen its central government?

Then there is Mao. Tang Tsou (2000), in a posthumous article ‘Interpreting the Revolution in China,’ sought to apply the rational choice framework to the study of the Chinese revolution. Yet he came away keenly aware of Mao’s crucial

role, particularly in the survival of the Red Army during the Long March. He also noted that Mao would have been killed in an air raid in spring 1948 had Chen Boda not rushed to cajole a reluctant Mao to go to the air raid shelter (Ye 1993). What would have become of the Chinese revolution had Chiang Kai-shek been successful in annihilating the Red Army? Or if Japan had not invaded China in 1937? Or if Mao had been killed in 1948?

We cannot mention Mao without discussing his elder son Mao Anying (1922–50), whom Mao apparently sought to groom to become a major player in Chinese politics. What if Mao Anying, who joined Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai for a short sojourn, had not perished in 1950 during the Korean War? Had he survived, Mao Anying would have been 54 at the time of his father's death and would likely be in the prime of his political career. What would China and the Chinese state be like with a Soviet-educated Mao Anying at the helm?

We cannot but conjecture the role or absence of post-Mao leaders, especially of Deng Xiaoping. Would China's post-Mao reforms be as far-reaching and momentous had Deng had not survived the Cultural Revolution and outlasted Mao? How would China's developmental path have fared had Deng died earlier, say at the age of 84 (in 1988) instead of at the age of 93 (in 1997)?

CONCLUSION

As this survey concludes, a bit of exercise in contrast and comparison is in order. The Qing dynasty was a highly successful enterprise of colonial conquest. A growing body of historical research points to how diligently and seriously Manchu rulers took the governance of their expansive domains. These autocratic rulers also showed much political and cultural sophistication, presenting a Chinese face to the Han Chinese but other (esp. Manchu, Tibetan, Mongolian) faces to subjects in the rest of the empire (Smith 2015). Much of the legitimacy of Manchu rule lay with its acceptance and continuation of Chinese imperial rule, but the Manchu rulers adapted and devised various governance mechanisms as they expanded the Qing empire (Hostetler 2001). Some of these institutional mechanisms, however, became hindrances to Qing dynastic survival in the world of modern states and thus made it especially difficult for China as well as the Chinese state to make the transition to the modern age.

The first to adopt parliamentary elections in Asia, the Republic of China went through multiple and often painful phases of political turmoil, except for the Nanking decade under KMT leadership. A member of the victorious allies during World War II, it plunged into civil war shortly thereafter and collapsed altogether on the Chinese Mainland by the end of the 1940s. The enduring theme throughout the era of Republican China were the persistent, occasionally hopeful but ultimately futile efforts to strengthen the state, particularly the central government.

All was not lost, however, because under KMT leadership the remnant of the Republic of China rose from the ashes on Taiwan and in the 1990s became a liberal democratic polity in fulfillment of Sun Yatsen's vision. The ROC has thus weaved a sorrowful yet ultimately inspiring narrative of state building and democratic transformation, dispelling the notion that Confucian societies were culturally anti-democratic (Kim 1994).

Originally animated by a foreign ideology (Marxism-Leninism) and foreign support, the Chinese Communist Party adapted and indigenized under Mao's leadership and captured national power from the KMT. While retaining much of the territory of the Qing Empire, its approach to governance represented a far more radical break from Chinese imperial tradition. For the Mao era, CCP rule, under the rubric of class struggle, was initially destructive of all that was traditional, destroying the landed elites in the early 1950s and attacking Confucius in Mao's last years. The CCP's domination over Chinese society was totalistic in ambition if not in reality (Tsou 1986).

Marked by the calamitous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the Mao era was one of colossal misrule. Yet the pains of that era, at a time when much of the rest of East Asia was leaping ahead economically, also served, to paraphrase François Furet, to disabuse the Chinese of the illusion of Communism and prepared the ground for the pursuit of economic reforms under newer and more cosmopolitan leaders in the post-Mao era (Furet 1999; Yang 1996).

In an era of globalization and economic liberalization, the Chinese Communist Party-state has been repurposed for the pursuit of growth, albeit on territory that, figuratively and literally, had been cleared by Maoist rule. As it has sought, in fits and starts, to reshape the Chinese economy and society, the Chinese Party-state, both intentionally and in response to the changes in the broader institutional environment, has undergone significant changes. In particular, the institutions for the planned economy were mostly rationalized while regulatory institutions in many domains have been established or reconfigured to suit a more market-driven and globally inter-connected economy. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership has jealously guarded the CCP's political dominance, promoting more market-friendly reforms but standing guard against a liberal political vision. Order and governability, rather than democratic participation, have been the central preoccupation of the Chinese CCP leadership. This defensiveness, sometimes bordering on paranoia, stems from multiple sources, including the CCP's own underground past and the fear of 'color revolutions'. Although Hong Kong (part of the PRC since 1997) and Taiwan have contributed to the rapid economic resurgence of the Mainland with capital and ideas, they have nonetheless represented alternative models for governance and are regarded as bases for subversion, whose influence must be strictly limited (White 2016).

Fear of decay and rot within the Party has been a perennial concern of Communist Party leaders as they know the KMT's ignominy of defeat on the Mainland was to a large extent due to internal problems (Tsou 1967).

Mao was notorious for the many campaigns and purges that caused much suffering and left numerous scars in the Chinese psyche. Post-Mao leaders have been especially concerned about the corrosive effects of corruption, which tends to thrive in hybrid political economies like China's (Wedeman 2012). Following repeated campaigns to curb corruption by his predecessors, Xi Jinping, together with anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan, launched an audacious campaign beginning in 2013 to root out numerous corrupt officials in the Party, government, and the armed forces, and tighten party discipline. This massive anti-corruption drive, followed by the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission, raises the intriguing question of whether China may be following in the footsteps of more developed societies in curbing corruption (Manion 2006).

In a volume published in 2015, Qin Hui (2015), an eminent historian at Qinghua University in Beijing, reviewed China's modern history from the perspective of China's enduring and protracted history of centralized imperial autocracy since the Qin Dynasty. Qin Hui left no doubt in the readers' minds that he thought contemporary China had yet to go beyond the Qin system of autocratic rule. Qin Hui's book was promptly banned by the censors. The ban not only underscores the contemporary relevance of Qin Hui's argument but also reminds us that the remaking of the Chinese state continues to refract the tensions articulated by Weber and Jessop at the start of this chapter. In view of China's growing strengths and increasing global presence, how China reconciles these tensions has profound consequences within China and beyond.

REFERENCES

- Abrams, Philip. 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977).' *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 58–89. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6443.1988.tb00004.x.
- Apter, David. 'Yan'an and the Narrative Reconstruction of Reality Author.' *Daedalus*, 122, no. 2 (1993): 207–32.
- Bachman, David M. *Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Baum, Richard. *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962–66*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.
- Bennett, Gordon. *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership*. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1976.
- Bergère, Marie-Claire. *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Bernstein, Richard. *China 1945: Mao's Revolution and America's Fateful Choice*. New York: Knopf, 2014.
- Bo, Yibo (薄一波). 若干重大决策与事件的回顾.北京: 中共中央党校出版社. Beijing: Central Party School Press, 1991.

- Boecking, Felix. *No Great Wall: Trade, Tariffs and Nationalism in Republican China, 1927–1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2017.
- Brook, Timothy. *The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Cell, Charles P. *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China*. New York: Academic Press, 1977.
- Chan, Hon S. 'Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998.' *The China Quarterly* 179 (2004): 703–34. doi:10.1017/s0305741004000554.
- Chang, Chung-li. *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-century Chinese Society*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1955.
- Chassin, Lionel. *The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War 1945–49*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Chen, Leslie H. Dingyan. *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement: Regional Leadership and Nation Building in Early Republican China*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1999.
- Chi, Hsi-sheng. *Warlord Politics in China, 1916–1928*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Dallin, Alexander, Iosif, V. Stalin, and Georgi, Dimitrov. *Dimitrov and Stalin: 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
- Duara, Prasenjit. *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Eastman, Lloyd E. *The Nationalist Era in China, 1927–1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Elman, Benjamin A. 'Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China.' *The Journal of Asian Studies* 50, no. 01 (1991): 7–28. doi:10.2307/2057472.
- Elman, Benjamin A. *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Fairbank, J. K., and S. Y. Teng. 'On The Ch'ing Tributary System.' *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6, no. 2 (1941): 135–246. doi:10.2307/2718006.
- Faure, David. *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Fiskesjö, Magnus. 'Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-building in the Twentieth Century.' *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2006): 15–44. doi:10.1163/157006106777998106.
- Fung, Edmund S. K. *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Furet, François. *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- Furth, Charlotte, and Guy Alitto. *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Gao, Hua (高华). 红太阳是怎样升起的: 延安整风运动的来龙去脉. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2000.
- Gao, Hua (高华). 革命年代. 广州: 人民出版社, 2010. Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Press, 2010.
- Ge, Zhaoguang (葛兆光). 宅兹中国: 重建有关中国的历史论述. 北京: 中华书局. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Publishing, 2011.
- Goldstein, Avery. *From Bandwagon to Balance-of-power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949–1978*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.

- Grieder, Jerome B. *Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
- Guy, R. Kent. *Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010.
- Han, Dayuan (韩大元). 1954. 年宪法与新中国宪法. 长沙: 湖南人民出版社. Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 2004.
- Harding, Harry. 'The Chinese State in Crisis.' *The Cambridge History of China*, 1991, 105–217. doi:10.1017/chol9780521243377.003.
- Hostettler, Laura. *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- Hsiao, Kung-Chuan. 'Legalism and Autocracy in Traditional China.' *Chinese Studies in History* 10, no. 1 (1976): 125–43. doi:10.2753/csh0009-4633100102125.
- Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. *The Rise of Modern China*. 6th edn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Hu, Heng (胡恒). 皇权不下县? 清代县辖政区与基层社会治理. 北京: 北京师范大学出版社. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2015.
- Huang, Yanpei (黄炎培). 延安归来, 重庆: 国讯书店. Chongqing: Guoxun Book Publishing, 1945.
- Hucker, Charles O. *The Censorial System of Ming China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966.
- 'Interview with Liu Zaifu.' November 15, 2015. Accessed September 17, 2016. <http://culture.ifeng.com/niandaifang/special/liuzaifu2/>.
- Isaacs, Harold R. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. 2nd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- Jessop, Bob. *The State: Past, Present, Future*. Cambridge: Polity, 2016.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Kim Dae Jung. 'Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-democratic Values.' *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 189–94.
- Kissinger, Henry. *World Order*. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.
- Kroncke, Jedidiah. 'An Early Tragedy of Comparative Constitutionalism: Frank Goodnow & the Chinese Republic.' *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal* 21 (2012): 533–89. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1997423.
- Kuhn, Philip A. *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Lary, Diana. *China's Civil War: A Social History, 1945–1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Li, Hua-yu. 'The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948–1954.' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 2 (2001): 28–47.
- Lin, Justin Yifu. 'The Needham Puzzle: Why the Industrial Revolution Did Not Originate in China.' *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 43, no. 2 (1995): 269–92. doi:10.1086/452150.
- Ma, Ping'n (马平安). 清末变局中的袁世凯集团. 福州: 福建教育出版社. Fuzhou: Fujian Education Press, 2016.
- Macartney, George. *An Embassy to China; Being the Journal Kept by Lord Macartney during His Embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung, 1793–1794*. Hamden: Archon Books, 1963.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals. *Mao's Last Revolution*. Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Maddison, Angus. *The World Economy*. Paris, France: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006.

- Manion, Melanie. 'Taking China's Anticorruption Campaign Seriously.' *Economic and Political Studies*, 4, no. 1 (2016): 3–18.
- Mao, Tse-tung. 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship.' June 30, 1959. Accessed September 17, 2016. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/msww4_65.htm.
- Marx, Karl, James Ledbetter, and Francis Wheen. *Dispatches for the New York Tribune: Selected Journalism of Karl Marx*. London: Penguin, 2007.
- McCord, Edward Allen. *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Mehta, Uday Singh. *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-century British Liberal Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- Mitter, Rana. *Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937–1945*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013.
- Pagden, Anthony. *The Enlightenment: And Why It Still Matters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Pantsov, Alexander, and Steven Levine. *Mao: The Real Story*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2013.
- Pitts, Jennifer. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Platt, Stephen. *Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China*. Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Qin, Hui. *Zou Chu Di Zhi: Cong Wan Qing Dao Minguo De Li Shi Hui Wang*. Beijing: Qun Yan Chu Ban She, 2015.
- Rawski, Evelyn Sakakida. *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Rawski, Thomas G. *Economic Growth in Prewar China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Rhoads, Edward J. M. *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000.
- Rowe, William T. *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Sheridan, James E. *China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949*. New York: Free Press, 1975.
- Sih, Paul K. T. *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-building Efforts, 1927–1937*. Jamaica, NY: St. John's University Press, 1970.
- Silberman, Bernard S. *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- Smith, Richard J. *The Qing Dynasty and Traditional Chinese Culture*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.
- Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search for Modern China*. New York: Norton, 1990.
- Taylor, Jay. *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Teiwes, Frederick. 'Establishment and consolidation of the new regime.' In R. MacFarquhar and J. K. Fairbank (eds.). *The Cambridge History of China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987: 49–143.
- The 1954 Constitution. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. September 1954. Accessed September 17, 2016. http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content_4264.htm.

- Thornton, Patricia M. *Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State-making in Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007.
- Tien, Hung-mao. *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992.
- Tsou, Tang. *America's Failure in China, 1941–50*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Tsou, Tang. *The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Tsou, Tang. 'Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?' *The China Journal* 34 (1995): 95–156. doi:10.2307/2950135.
- Tsou, Tang. 'Interpreting The Revolution In China: Macrohistory and Micromechanisms.' *Modern China* 26 (2000): 205–38. doi:10.1177/009770040002600205.
- Vogel, Ezra F. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Walder, Andrew. *Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Waldron, Arthur. *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Weber, Max, Hans Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Wedeman, Andrew. *Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China*. Cornell University Press, 2012.
- Weng, Youwei (翁有为). '中华人民共和国第一部宪法制定考论,' 史学月刊, November 2007, pp. 62–68.
- Westad, Odd Arne. *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- White III, Lynn T. *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- White III, Lynn T. *Democratization in Hong Kong – and China?* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016.
- Whyte, Martin King. 'Who Hates Bureaucracy?: A Chinese Puzzle.' In Victor Nee and David Stark (eds.), *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe*. Stanford University Press, 1989, pp. 233–77.
- Wu, Silas H. L. *Communication and Imperial Control in China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System, 1693–1735*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Xiao, Shu (笑蜀). 历史的先声: 半个世纪前的庄严承诺. 汕头: 汕头大学出版社, 1999. Shantou: Shantou University Press.
- Xin Ziling (辛子陵). '毛搞家天下五个证据,' March 9, 2010, http://www.open.com.hk/old_version/1004p56.html. Accessed October 3, 2016.
- Xu, Zhuoyun. *Shuo Zhongguo: Yi Ge Bu Duan Bian Hua De Fu Za Gong Tong Ti*. Nanning: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2015.
- Yang, Dali. *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Yang, Dali. *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Yang, Dali. 'China's Troubled Quest for Order: Leadership, Organization and the Contradictions of the Stability Maintenance Regime.' *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26, no. 103 (2017a), pp. 35–53. doi:10.1080/10670564.2016.1206279.

- Yang, Dali. 'China's Illiberal Regulatory State in Comparative Perspective.' *Chinese Political Science Review*, 2, no. 1 (2017b): 114–33.
- Yang, Dali, Huayu Xu, and Ran Tao. 'A Tragedy of the Nomenklatura? Career Incentives, Political Loyalty and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Forward.' *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 89 (2014): 864–83. doi:10.1080/13603116.2014.882560.
- Yang, Jisheng. *Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012.
- Yao, Nianci (姚念慈). 康熙盛世与帝王心术. 北京: 三联书店. Beijing: Sanlian Book Publishing, 2015.
- Ye, Yonglie (叶永烈). 陈伯达传. 北京: 作家出版社. Beijing: Writers Press, 1993.
- Young, Arthur N. *China's Nation-building Effort, 1927–1937; the Financial and Economic Record*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971.
- Yu, George T. *Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
- Yu, Ying-shih (余英时). 中国思想传统及其现代变迁, 余英时文集第二卷. 桂林: 广西师范大学出版社. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2014.
- Zhao, Dingxin. *The Confucian-Legalist State: A New Theory of Chinese History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Zhao, Liewen (赵烈文). 能静居日记, II. 长沙: 岳麓书社. Changsha: Yuelu Book Publishing, 2013.
- Zhao, Suisheng. *A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Zhao, Ziyang. (1982), '关于国务院机构改革问题的报告' (Report on the institutional reform of the State Council), 8 March 1982, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/26/content_5328235.htm.
- Zheng, Shiping. *Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.



Nationalism and the Nation-state

Prasenjit Duara

INTRODUCTION

The study of nation and nationalism in China complicates the standard debates about nationalism in several ways. The debates include issues of whether nations are:

- historical versus modern;
- primordial versus constructed/imagined;
- formed indigenously or by circulatory forms;
- as imperialistic as national;
- ethnic versus civic;
- produced from the top-down or bottom-up;
- instrumental versus substantive.

While every expression of territorial nationalism qualifies the binary terms of these debates, there is reason to think that the Chinese case is unique in that it is among the most sustained and centralizing administrative powers in world history. As such, by examining the phenomenon in the Chinese context we also gain a general understanding of nationalism and its kinship with related identities and power structures that are both historical and contemporary.

My goal is to show that each position in the antinomies listed above can explain Chinese nationalism only in part and only when viewed within a wider

spatio-temporal framework of analysis that I develop here. In other words, these positions refer to a partial understanding of nationalism largely because they are analyzed within the national unit itself. Across the world, nations and nationalisms operate in/as multi-layered processes of continuity and change. These different temporalities are underpinned and intersected by various institutional and cultural – discursive and psychological – forces at different spatial scales.¹

The layering or imbrication of these temporalities – for example, the rhythm of seasonal changes layered by ritual cycles or the disruption of the investment cycle by the political cycle – is crucial to grasping the functional significance of various aspects of nationalism. While some of the most fundamental and enduring processes, such as the global circulation of the nation-form, are constitutive elements of every nation in the world, the latter are mediated by other more culturally or geo-specific temporalities. It is in these mediations of deeper temporalities that we can uncover the complexities of the debates about Chinese nationalism. This chapter thus begins with a discussion of the temporalities of nationalism; it goes on to examine its growth in the late-Qing and republican eras. Next, it explores the extent of continuity in its fundamental features in the PRC and concludes by discussing the nature and extent of change in the post-Mao era.

The term *nation* can be thought of as a group of people who are said to have collective bonds – produced by one or more cultural phenomena such as race, language, religion, lifeways and homeland. However, it is a term of popular usage that is too loose to have much analytical purchase. Nationalism and the nation-state are more serviceable. *Nationalism* is the valuation of the national bond over all other ties and is expressed as the identification of the national collective with a present or anticipated nation-state. The *nation-state* is the sovereign authority representing the people of the territorially bounded nation and demanding their ultimate loyalty. Two other less familiar but necessary terms for understanding the phenomenon of nationalism are the *nation-form* and the *nation-state system*. Their roles will become clearer as we proceed in the analysis.

Scholars of Chinese nationalism have often claimed that China has historically had collective bonds expressed through a written language, culture and history; that Chinese people have often sought as a nation to resist foreign invaders – such as the Mongols and Manchus, albeit unsuccessfully – and that China has had a long tradition of a centralizing state. This is a historical rather than a primordialist argument, and each of these claims can be backed by historical evidence. As we shall see, these factors certainly shaped the transition from empire to nation in China. However, what is often ignored by both historical and ‘imagined communities’ arguments is how the *nation-form* and the *nation-state system* authorized the nation-state across the world and no less in China. Nationalism was a global phenomenon before it became national.

Turning first to the system: having evolved from the Westphalian-Vatellian system of territorial states in Europe, the imperialist nation-states of the West

achieved world domination by the late 19th century. As the world's most technologically and militarily powerful political players, they ensured that all who sought to resist, compete with or challenge them would first have to transform themselves into comparable nation-states. Thus emerged what we can call the ideal-type of the *nation-form*, so nominated first by Etienne Balibar.² To be sure, this nation-form has evolved several different models – such as the civic, ethnic, linguistic and religious models – which were developed, circulated and adapted in different states and societies, but the nation-form itself has experienced significant continuities for about two hundred years. The continuity of the nation-form as well as its modular developments were institutionally secured by the system of nation-states which in its present incarnation is represented by the United Nations (dominated by an asymmetric power structure) and its various agencies. The circulatory condition of the nation-form – being diffused among and adapted by different societies – represents the most basic temporality.³

Let us consider the fundamental elements of the nation-form, established by the time it emerged as a possibility in Asia in the late 19th century. A state is seen as having a monopoly of power over a circumscribed territory and the people and resources within it, and the sovereignty of the territorial state is claimed to derive from representing the will of the people. However, the people themselves are constituted as a national people by the efforts of the state and nationalist elites. The national people are distinguished from other national peoples and cultures and often in competition or opposition to them. Thus, a self–other identity distinction is basic to the nation-form and can be understood to have emerged from the role of nations in capitalist and imperialist competition from the 19th century. Although this is not the place to enter into a global history of the relation between capitalism and nation-states,⁴ it should be recalled that the *system* of nation-states emerged primarily as a means to regulate the competition between nation-states for the pursuit of global resources and markets. Indeed, it was the inadequacies of the earlier means of regulation that led to two world wars and the emergence of the UN. Nonetheless, the self–other or identitarian dimension of nationalism continues to serve the goal of national competition, although it is not its only function.

From this perspective, Chinese nationalism and the nation-state had to undergo massive transformations to approximate the nation-form and win admission into the system of nation-states, even though it possessed important cultural and political characteristics that facilitated the transition. First, the radical overhaul of the state apparatus took half a century. From the Qing reforms in the late 19th century, and certainly from the Republican revolution of 1911, Chinese regimes tried strenuously to make Chinese laws fully compatible with the general expectation of ‘civilized’ nations through, for instance, the Revised Law Codification Commission, so that they could revise the Unequal Treaties that had been imposed upon them by imperialist powers. But because the political situation was beyond real control, these regimes could not implement this legal and

political system which, according to the 1926 Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, would make it a civilized nation.⁵ The revision of the 'unequal treaties' which took place during World War II, as Dong Wang has shown, required the establishment of educational institutions of international law, a team of highly skilled legal specialists, the implementation of new laws which often involved de-valuing the old order (e.g. removing filiality as a principal legal value) and nationalist mobilization of the population to pressure domestic and foreign governments to annul these humiliating treaties.⁶

Second, the populace which Sun Yat-sen likened to 'a loose sheet of sand' had to be transformed into the sleek body of a national citizenry capable of mobilization for global competition. This entailed a cultural and social revolution built upon a new historiographical foundation of a linear history. The statesmen and intellectuals of the early 20th century, such as Liang Qichao, noted that without a forward-looking, progressive sense of history, China could not begin to think of itself as a nation with a future.⁷ I have argued that modern historical writing and the nation were co-eval: such writing frequently served to plant a concept of the nation, instill a love for it – and hatred for its enemies – and create citizens who would serve the nation in this new world. In this new conception of history, the nation – its people and culture, not the dynasties and aristocracies – was the collective agent or subject of history. The linear, evolutionary movement of the nation itself had a propulsive effect since the goal of much historical writing at the time was to recover the very idea of a common, or potentially unified, people who could progress and realize their modern destiny. This effect was catalyzed by the contemporary social Darwinist vision circulating in the world in which a country was doomed to colonization and extinction if it did not become a strong nation-state (with colonies of its own).⁸

Thus, a second temporality is associated with the construction of a linear national history. This too is a fairly deep temporality underpinning the sovereignty of the nation and legitimizing many institutions and cultural practices, such as the movements and constitutional provisions against the alleged 'superstitious and feudal practices' that dominated and continue in important ways to pervade and provision the cultural life of the populace. The famous May 4th (1919) movement, which has been seen as the foundational event for both nationalism and communism in China, represented the repudiation of China's past and the institutionalization of the new vision of national history among the educated youth of China. While social Darwinism no longer serves as its underpinning, the comparison and competition among nations *via* the narrative of modernization continues to serve as the lever of progress. The narrative *form* of national history – one which creates and renews the national self (in relation if not always in opposition to the Other) – continues. The historical narrative of the nation-form represents a basic temporality and is secured by globally circulating modes of constituting nations.

Thus, national histories were cast in a common mold of a linear progressive history of an emerging national subject that joined an ancient past to a modern future, often by overcoming a dark middle age of disunity and foreign contamination. The new historical consciousness synthesized ideas of progress and popular sovereignty with claims to territorial sovereignty, three basic assumptions of nationalist thought. This relationship became the means of creating a historical agent or (often juridical) subject capable of making claims to sovereign statehood. A 'people' with a supposed unified self-consciousness developed a sovereign right to the territory they allegedly originally and/or continuously occupied. Until a few decades ago, much professional history was also shaped by this paradigm.

While retaining the narrative form, the details of the narrative, including the actors or even periodization, may undergo changes. Thus while in the second half of the 20th century the revolutionary classes and their heroic representatives in China constituted the subject of history, there has been a shift to statist reformers and their representatives, reflecting political changes in the regime and the type of society that the nation-state wishes to nourish.⁹ For example, the narrative of history exemplified by Prof. Hu Sheng's 'three revolutionary climaxes,' namely the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Uprising and the 1911 Republican Revolution,¹⁰ has been replaced by the 'reformist' narrative of history which emerged full-blown in the 1990s. It substitutes three other events from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, namely, the Self-Strengthening movement; the 100 Days Reform movement of 1898, and the Bourgeois Revolution of 1911.¹¹ Popular uprisings are noticeably missing in this narrative, and many of the targets of the revolutionary narrative, such as Zeng Guofan and Kang Youwei, appear in an increasingly favorable light. Interestingly, as can be seen in the 2003 TV series, *Towards the Republic*, watched by hundreds of millions of viewers, this reformist narrative has become more statist. Thus, the Empress Dowager Cixi and President Yuan Shikai, *de facto* heads of state between 1900 and 1916 and long regarded as bitter opponents even of reform, are treated with great sympathy and shown to be devoted to the greater interests of the nation-state.¹² The revolutionary narrative has been overturned and the reformist nation-state itself has emerged as the subject of history.

A third temporality concerns the territoriality of the nation-state and the accompanying narrative that determined inclusion and exclusion within the national community. This narrative is closely tied to the historical narrative but is separate from it. Liang Qichao once suggested that the idea of periodization in history could be understood by likening the boundedness of periods to the boundedness of territory, both novel ideas in the early 20th century. The Qing empire was a multi-cultural empire that included not only the Han Chinese region (or inner territories of China) but a federated alliance with the Mongols, Tibetans, Muslims and the ruling dynasty's own Manchuria (which was kept off limits to the Han Chinese). These latter territories comprised over two-thirds of the Qing empire and were managed differently from China proper. During the

revolutionary process to overthrow the Qing, a fierce dispute broke out between the reformists (including Manchu reformists) and the revolutionaries over the extent of territories and populations that would be included in the new Republic dominated by the Han Chinese.

The reformists, especially the Manchu reformists, argued that the new Republic could extend territorially over the breadth of the old empire, but could reasonably do so only if there was a 'federated' version of the new state where the various minorities had equal status with the Han majority. Most of the anti-Manchu revolutionaries, including Sun Yat-sen, were inspired by the prevailing social Darwinist theory of racial superiority and not inclined to share power with the minorities in these areas. But when in 1911 they had to negotiate for the abdication of the Qing, the revolutionaries were forced to compromise with the many different interests in the political system. They were also unable to press for too much from the Manchus because of the fear of foreign imperialist intervention. Moreover, the Mongol princes (from today's Mongolia) had already declared their independence from the newly established Republic, announcing that they had only been affiliated with the Manchus and not the Chinese. Under these circumstances, the revolutionaries had to agree to treat the four nationalities – Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims – on an equal basis with the Han. To be sure, the peripheral nationalities here referred principally to the aristocracy and banner community and their privileges, which had been preserved through the Manchu control of the recently developed national assembly (the right to freedom of worship, however, was granted to entire communities).¹³ Even so, the Republic was declared in the name of 'five nationalities,' a rhetorical development with great historical consequences.

The historical principle involved in this dispute and the enduring tension is at core the debate in nationalism between the civic and ethnic/racial models of territorial nationalism. Will the territory be dominated by a single ethnic/racial group or will there be equal (and later affirmative action) rights for minority groups? These positions have typically been associated with the French revolutionary model of the civic nation versus the Germanic model of the ethnic or racial nation. Most nationalisms represent an uneasy mix of the two principles, with the ethnic/racial or the civic dominant depending on circumstances. In other words, the territorial community of the nation-state has a relatively unstable temporality with the emphasis fluctuating between one or another.

Within the ethnic understanding of the national community, several mediating sub-principles have also appeared in different places, including language and religion, which gives the ethnic community a different shape. In China, linguistic unification (of regional and ethnically distinct languages) has been an important dimension of Chinese nationalism, but it is relatively understudied.¹⁴ More attention has been paid to the more distinctive sub-principle of Han nationalism, viz., the narrative of lineage ancestry. The clan or lineage principle of the organization of imperial society was extremely important and derived doctrinal sanction from

Confucian principles and the pervasive rituals of ancestor worship and patrilineal descent. The Republican revolutionaries of the early 20th century were extremely creative in transforming the doxic and quotidian ideas of patrilineal descent into the notion of the Han people as descended from a common ancestor. Zhang Taiyan and other revolutionaries greatly influenced by social Darwinism used the Han lineage system to construct a Han nation from a putative ancestral link to the mythical Yellow Emperor and called on the Han to struggle against the inferior Manchu race with their alien surnames.¹⁵

After the Republic was established in 1912, the revolutionaries agreed to a Republic of Five Nationalities and settled on the appellation of *zhonghua minzu* (the Chinese nationality) for the nation. Although the loyalty of the different peoples to the Republic was never fully settled – with the Mongols establishing their republic in Outer Mongolia and Tibetans and Muslims seeking independence – the Chinese nation-state has more or less retained the borders of the Manchu empire. Nonetheless, the relationship between the Han and the other nationalities is a changing and troubled one. During the Republic, from 1912 to 1949, the Han-Chinese-dominated government sought to take away in reality what they offered in theory. Apart from a single statement of support, Sun Yat-sen often denounced the idea of autonomous nationalities.¹⁶ In *China's Destiny*, Chiang Kai-shek declared that the five peoples were ‘originally of one race and lineage.’¹⁷ Certainly, the KMT administration tried to assimilate (*tonghua*) the ‘frontier peoples’ by Sinicizing language, customs, and even clothing and hair-styles.¹⁸ As we will see below, the idea of the dominant ethnic majority as the basis of the nation has returned in many ways in Chinese nationalism today.

More interesting is the Chinese idea of the multi-national state, which may be thought of as the Chinese idea of the civic nation. While scholars of the Republic and even the contemporary PRC often regard the idea as more rhetorical than substantive for reasons we have outlined above, the force of the doctrine has had important consequences not necessarily reducible to the intentions of the Chinese state. Globally, the modern multi-national state has a history that is not much over one hundred years. This form represented an effort to overcome the problems of transitioning from empire to nation in the 20th century. China was one of the first political systems to develop this solution to address the empire-to-nation problem in the world. As such it was responding to a global problem, but it did so by adapting imperial Qing conceptions of the ‘federated empire’ to the requirements of a modern polity. Soon after the Chinese revolution, several other major states also sought to respond to the common global requirement of the nation-form by adapting their imperial legacies to new approaches.¹⁹

Although reformists and revolutionaries in the first decade of the 20th century in China were discussing the globally incipient ideas of the multi-national state, particularly as developed by the Swiss theorist Johann Bluntschli, and we have seen how they arrived at the idea of the Republic of Five Nationalities, globally, the prominent version of this idea is associated with the later Soviet theory

of nationalities developed by Stalin in response to socialist debates regarding the transition in the Hapsburg empire.²⁰ To simplify, the Bolshevik position on national self-determination entailed territorial autonomy without party autonomy. Communist parties in the non-Russian territories were not particularly nationalized and the Soviet goal was to subordinate national loyalties to ‘proletarian’ interests. It is interesting to see a Japanese report in the puppet state of Manchukuo (1932–1945) that was built upon the rhetoric of the Five Nationalities Republic of 1912 in China but which took its lessons from the Soviet model. Tominaga Tadashi, the author of *Manshūkoku no minzoku mondai*, notes that the Soviet policy on nationalities fulfilled the goals of federalism and protected minority rights, while at the same time it strengthened the power of the Soviet state and the military in relation to separatism in the Tsarist empire and British influence in the region. Thus, he notes admiringly, nationalism was not suppressed but utilized positively for the goals of the state.²¹

In the Chinese Communist Party, the idea of the multi-national state, its means of inheriting the Qing empire, came to be influenced by Bolshevik ideas of anti-imperialist nationalism. It was also forged at the time when the CCP needed the assistance of the minority peoples during the revolutionary struggle and the war against the Japanese imperialists. By 1936, however, in Communist documents the nationalities were denied the right to secede from the nation-state, and in 1949 the PRC developed not a federal, but a unitary ‘geobody’ with autonomous minority regions or territories. As in the Soviet Union, the nationalities had special rights but political control was maintained by keeping the party under central control. Today, minorities constitute about 9–10% of the Chinese population (about 100 million) but, as in the Qing, their historical homelands occupy about two-thirds of the territorial expanse of China.²²

During much of the 20th century, nationalism and the nation-state in China emerged in response to outside forces. By this I mean not only the imperialist exploitation of the Chinese empire, the undeniable argument made by nationalists, but more subtly by the absorption and adaptation of the very building blocks of the nation-form from a circulatory and evolving system of nation-states. The nation-form, which has become hegemonic over the last two centuries, has had an enduring temporality secured by the parallel temporalities of linear, national histories and the principle of territorialized sovereignty.

Globally, these temporalities have become deeply embedded in the psyche of modern national citizens, although they should be seen not as structural givens in a society, but historical. Aspects of these long-lived creations change as well, but less rapidly than the second order of temporalities I have identified with the mediatory factors that are subject to change and disputation. These factors, such as language, religion, rituals, food taboos, and state and political traditions, are important because they are part of the environment of human experience and generate deep feelings among people. Thus, they are not only subject to disputation and change, they are representable and available for popular mobilization.

There is no debate in the public sphere about whether nations should have boundaries, states, and histories and should move towards national progress, although there is much debate about what these boundaries and histories, languages and religions should be.

Methodologically, a couple more points need to be made about the mediatory temporalities. These practices and institutions typically belong to the cultural and political sphere because they are representable and available for mobilization. But that is not to say that they emerge only from within the nation as presently constituted. The space of culture is much wider or smaller than the nation. I have tried to show that it was circulatory elements within East Asian cultures, viz., Japan, Korea and China, that ironically contributed to the creation of (antagonistic) national cultures in this sphere.²³ Common texts and a common lexicon of modernity circulated in all three societies. Many new texts, on international law for instance, were first translated into the Chinese language by Western missionaries and their Chinese associates in the 19th century using classical Chinese terms. This vocabulary was frequently appropriated, adapted and systematized by modernizers in Meiji Japan and then re-imported into China and Korea to create radically new meanings that, however, still appeared traditional and indigenous.

Nationalism in the region during this period was shaped both by Japanese imperialism and cultural influence and by opposition to it. Japanese adventurers, soldiers, advisors, businessmen and teachers pursued economic, cultural and imperialistic projects in China and Korea, while Chinese and Korean students, businessmen, professionals and political exiles learnt lessons about the virtues and evils of modernity in Japan. Many of the early, modern histories of China and Korea were also fashioned from Japanese understandings of both enlightenment national history and *tōyōshi* (eastern seas history). Fu Sinian noted that it was not until 1918, after the first major protests against Japanese imperialist activities took place, that Chinese historical texts stopped following the Japanese periodization of Chinese history.²⁴ Even in the realm where East Asian national histories evoke their distinctiveness, they often do so in a common mode. Just as Chinese nationalists sought to derive (invent) the Chinese nation from the mythical Yellow Emperor and the Japanese from Amaterasu, so did Shin Chae-ho (1880–1936) and other Korean nationalists seek to raise Tangun to the same status.²⁵

Ironically, each of these societies sought to distinguish the authenticity of their nation by re-signifying symbols and tropes from a common cultural historical reservoir. One such symbolic role was of the ‘self-sacrificing woman’ (Ch. *xianqi liangmu*, J. *ryōsai kenbo*, K. *hyōnmo yangch’ō*) upon whose sacrifices for the home and nation the new citizen and modern society would be built. Similarly, historical practices of self-cultivation and discipline were evoked from Confucianism and Buddhism to produce new habits of citizenship, for instance in the New Life movement of KMT China and later in Korea. Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in northeast China (1932–1945), exemplified an all too transparent effort to build a nation-state from this East Asian repertoire.²⁶

Thus, even while some of these mediatory factors can embed deep sentiment, they too are often shaped by circulatory forces. At the same time, these cultural practices and institutions are not mere putty that can be freely shaped to fit the deep national structures; they have vested interests and path dependencies built into them that can endure and in turn re-shape. But they possess a different temporality in that their frequency of change and adaptability exceed those of the nation-form and its sustained circulations. In the next section, where I discuss nationalism in the PRC, we will see that broadly speaking the relationships between deeper and mediatory temporalities can still be viewed. However, there are important changes in those relationships – frequently occurring in response to global changes – that will allow us to reflect upon any fundamental changes in the nation-form.

NATION-STATE AND NATIONALISM IN THE PRC

The Communist Party of China came to power riding on the crest of a massive revolutionary movement that promised social justice and egalitarianism, and equally, national liberation and nation-building. Apter and Saich have elegantly shown how in Mao's Republic in Yenan, a system of three nested narratives was inculcated in the youth and party members that revealed a necessary and logical link connecting national liberation to the role of the Communist Party and finally, and particularly, to the great leader, Mao Zedong.²⁷ Many decades ago, Chalmers Johnson revealed that the communists would not have come to power if they had not mobilized anti-Japanese nationalism among the peasantry and the youth.²⁸ Some of the most interesting subsequent work on the relationship between socialism and nationalism in the PRC, including that of Ann Anagnost, dwells on new communist rituals such as the 'speak bitterness' stagings that replay the drama of the revolution and national salvation in the PRC and are modeled on the revolutionary rituals of the Yenan period.²⁹

Continuities: Nation-Form, History and Territoriality

From the perspective of the nation-form, there were more continuities than differences between the Republic and the PRC. Despite the communist ideal of a borderless proletariat dominating society and the world (or at least the socialist world), the CCP anticipated a period of national development, described by Mao in his 1940 essay on New Democracy, in which he called on the majority of the Chinese people, whom he regarded as a progressive force, to unite against imperialism and gradually transition to a socialist society. Just as the PRC was beginning to transition to a socialist *economy* in the mid- to late-1950s, however, the Sino-Soviet split turned the political compass back to nationalism and Chinese communist nationalism now became directed not

only against the US-led capitalist camp, but also against those who came to be called Soviet revisionists. The peak of this trend in the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s saw fierce expressions of Chinese revolutionary nationalism that almost led to a war between the Soviet Union and China, two nuclear powers. The Self (state-people)–Other identitarianism of the nation-form had come to stay, albeit through the expression of China as the embodiment of revolutionary utopianism.

Linear history became even more pronounced because of the Marxist theory of stages of economic and social development. Aided by Maoist voluntarism of the ‘people’s will,’ the Chinese communists sought to telescope the transition from a semi-feudal to a socialist and even communist society. During the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao declared that the will of the people could be mobilized to overtake steel production in Britain and France in 15 years. Thus, although China was at the time an anti-capitalist nation, it was still motivated by competitiveness in its ability to increase production and conquer nature. Competition is of course the principal lever of the modern theory of linear progress. Competition was also an ingredient in relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet ‘Big Brother’ frequently patronized the Chinese as having a mode of production – the so-called Asiatic Mode of Production – which was even more backward than the Slave Mode of Production. In response and despite the rigid stagist framework in which they were working, Chinese historians undertook to show how the sprouts of capitalism and great technological advancements flourished in their historical society of which they could be justifiably proud.³⁰

With respect to the temporality of territory, the communist nation-state was just as determined to maintain the borderlands of the Qing empire as part of the new territorial nation-state as the KMT. Despite the granting of minority nationality status to the peoples of the borderlands, the powerful unitary drive of the state brought these regions under state control and undertook the transformation of the culture and landscape more strenuously than ever before. This has been aptly discussed in a recent study of contemporary Tibet by Emily Yeh. Describing the *territorialization* process of the Tibetan landscape that had been characterized by mixed modes of cultivation and pastoralism, Yeh notes that the military and political occupation authorities saw this terrain as barren (*huang*) and empty (*xu*) wastelands that had to be converted into efficient and productive resources. Simultaneously, territorialization meant the naturalization of Tibetans’ association (if not identification) with the Chinese state and the production of the sense that China’s borders represent the natural container for Tibet. At the same time, this process also produced Tibet and Tibetans as the periphery of the nation: ‘Tibetans are simultaneously excluded from the nation as an internal other always in need of improvement.’³¹

From a strategic point of view, the vast hinterlands continue to be important to the Chinese state and, as we have seen, the granting of minority nationality benefits (reflected mostly in granting of state aid) was explicable from this logic of

the modern state. Classification of the minorities that had begun under the KMT was fully developed by the PRC. Fifty-five minority nationalities were officially recognized and, together with the Han nationality, they comprised the Chinese nationality. As Thomas Mullaney says, this is a formula that may be rendered as $55+1=1$, a way of folding in the minority nationalities into a more unitary conception of the nation-state.³² At the same time, the distinctive representation of minorities, Dru Gladney suggests, has a way of transforming the image of the culturally and linguistically differentiated Han groups into a united, mono-ethnic and modern Han majority, which is part and parcel of the homogenizing force of nationalism.³³ All the same, the peripheral nationalities remained objects of evolutionist ideology and economic exploitation. During the Maoist period from 1949 to 1979, one might say that Marxist evolutionist thinking of backward and advanced peoples dominated the period, but the assimilationist urge was balanced by the need to celebrate the unity of nationalities.

The territorial concern with maximizing and defining borders became even more prominent and entrenched under the Communists, who engaged in a number of disputes and wars over borders with China's neighbors. The most well-known of these are with the Soviet Union (1969), Vietnam (1979), India (1962) and three conflicts with the Republic of China over the Taiwan Straits (1954, 1958 and 1996).³⁴ To be sure, such border warfare was common to many new nations that emerged in the post-World War II period, principally because the older colonial empires annexed and divided regions and spaces, drawing boundary lines without regard to the social, cultural and political connections and differences in these regions. But equally, the new nation-states inherited the principle of territoriality and sought to maximize their territories and territorialize – militarize and homogenize – these distant and often alien borderlands. Although many of these territorial conflicts involving China have been resolved, there are several outstanding ones (notably with India). The PRC has also recently publicized its claims aggressively in the East and South China Seas.

Mediatory Temporalities in the PRC

With regard to the mediatory temporalities, an important change may be observed in relation to the principle of community formation within the PRC over the last thirty years or so. A subtle but recognizable change has occurred in emphasis of and attitudes towards the principle of ethnicity (or nationality in Soviet terms) as the social foundation of the nation-state. This change presents a challenge to the socialist model of the civic nation-state, which was built, however rhetorically, on the fraternity of nationalities within and socialist and third-world internationalism without. As mentioned above, the Maoist state had emphasized the 'unity of nationalities' despite practical departures from the ideal. From the late 1980s and 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and as China became increasingly integrated with the capitalist world economy, the older

civilizational and cultural hierarchies and the ethnic model of privileging the culture of the Han majority began to emerge. In practice, this shift was also facilitated by the need to attract powerful overseas Chinese capitalist networks based on Chinese culturalism and Confucianism.

With the increasing participation of China in the global economy, the priorities of the national development agenda have also shifted in practice, if not in theory, to coastal cross-border spaces and to non-territorial sources of economic power; the most conspicuous of these are, of course, the overseas Chinese. In turn, this has led to a kind of trans-territorialization of nationalist ideology in China. Until 1999, roughly 60% of the foreign investment of over 40 billion dollars pouring into China annually had come from ethnic Chinese outside the mainland, from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia and the Americas.³⁵ Although the size of the Chinese diaspora equals about 4% of the population of the PRC, it is a huge economy in its own right; in 1999 the resources controlled by the Chinese diaspora equaled around two-thirds of the Chinese national GDP.

The economic linkages established between the overseas Chinese and the mainland have been accompanied by shifts in the spatial imagination of the nation. The ideologies of ethnic nationalism have tended to flourish at the cost, frequently, of the territorially integrated nation of the People's Republic of China (*zhonghua*). Such ideologies seek an alternative ethnic or cultural integration which may be found in the form of identification as the children of the divine ancestors Shennong and the Yellow Emperor (*yanhuang zhizi*) or the new attention to Confucianism or notions of Chinese values and Asian values. These may be seen as new formats for both identity and alliance with the diasporic communities (as well as other Asian allies) in the pursuit of global competitiveness and counter-hegemony to the West.

The breathtakingly rapid development of the south and eastern coastal regions and urban areas of China had for several decades left behind the vast hinterlands, particularly in the West, which were seen to have become objects of exploitation for natural resources.³⁶ These effects have been compounded by irredentist and nationalist movements in the West (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet) and (among the Korean population) in the northeast. The relative weakness of development in the western regions and among the ethnically marginalized communities also fostered the ethnic minority nationalism that we are witnessing on a daily basis today.

A second, if not novel at least more prominent, mediatory factor with a volatile temporality has appeared more recently – public outbursts of nationalism that may arise from popular or state initiatives. Sinologists are today debating whether nationalism represents a state policy that is top-down and instrumental in seeking to enhance state power or whether nationalist episodes and upsurges, for instance against the Japanese or the Belgrade bombings or African students in China, are popularly initiated and followed through. To be sure this need not

be an either/or debate; the two are dialectically interactive. While it becomes difficult to pinpoint the source and hence controllability of these nationalist simmerings or outbursts, we can nonetheless gain a good understanding of this volatility when we examine them together.³⁷

In the first place, the context of this kind of nationalist expression is somewhat different from earlier periods because the state control of education at all levels in the PRC means that the nationalist narrative has been thoroughly inculcated in the populace. As nationalist identity and sentiment penetrate society at large, particularly in China where it is one of the few realms of permissible political expression, it can be enunciated and inflected in a variety of ways, whether as culturalist, racist, localist, Maoist or Confucianist among others. These mediations, or what I also call nation-views, can be volatile and changeable and sometimes conflict with the interests of the state. Thus, for instance, the environmental movement in China, which has spread like wildfire over the last fifteen years or so, often counters state-owned corporations seeking to build gigantic dams or industrial complexes by couching its espousal of ecological conservation and preservation – of forests or of the famed Qin dynasty weir in Sichuan called the Dujiangyan – in the language of Chinese national traditions of Daoism and ecological civilization.³⁸

Another example reveals how popular nationalism can exceed the restraints the state might want to impose. In 2006–2007 there was a raging controversy in the Chinese press regarding the new Shanghai high school history textbooks produced by the municipal government in 2006, most probably in response to the anti-Japanese riots of 2005 in the city. Presumably to enhance the status of Shanghai as a global city, the textbooks played down not only class struggle and Mao Zedong but also material central to nationalist discourses, for instance, the Japanese invasion. But the idea that historical education needed to get away from ideology was fiercely criticized by a majority of those who wrote about the texts. Much more than the abandonment of revolution, these critics were particularly incensed by the abandonment of nationalism. They suggested that Shanghai, which had always been a lair for foreign lackeys, ‘can now expect to see its women sport Japanese names.’³⁹ In the summer of 2007, the new Shanghai textbooks were withdrawn from the schools.

What I am trying to suggest here is that, while the pedagogy of the nation-state does produce a loyal citizenship committed to the nation-state, it also produces the moral criteria with which to judge whether the ‘true’ goals of the nation have been achieved. As such the state too becomes subject to the judgment of its achievements. When the gap between the claims in state progress reports and citizens’ assessment of state performance widens, the nation-state has to react to the nation-views of its citizenry or perhaps even deflect this dissatisfaction by appealing to other or new expressions of state-led nationalism. Some may wonder if the new military and state aggressiveness in the South China Sea as well as the increasing clampdown in recent years on freedom of expression is not the effect of such a gap. Certainly the examples from Taiwan and Hong Kong in recent years reveal that popular nationalism (in this case directed against the PRC state) in those societies is not ready to accept a state-dominated ideology of the nation.

CONCLUSION

This essay on Chinese nationalism is informed by a methodological framework which interrogates the assumptions about temporality and scale that inform existing theories of nationalism. I approach nationalism as a historically dynamic or processual formation that is shaped and transformed by the interaction of different scales – the global, the regional and the ‘domestic’ – with different temporal rhythms. I have thus identified these scalar temporalities: of the nation-form constituted by an identitarian polity, territoriality and a national historical narrative, all forms that have basically been adopted from a circulatory system of nation-states, global and regional. The temporality at this scale has been more enduring than the mediating factors that are connected to and shape the on-the-ground nation-state and nationalism in any one place. Given the relative volatility of the mediatory factors, is it possible to develop explanatory categories at this level? Perhaps, but only in relation to the external factors. For instance, I have tried to explain the civic to ethnic transition of national community formation in China in relation to global political economy and the identity allegiances that it produces. But is there a way in which one might understand how the more enduring temporality of the nation-state system itself may be transformed?

In other words, given the increasing entrenchment of the system of nation-states over the last centuries, is there no possibility for it to change its basic colors? I believe that the possibility of change lies within the contradictions of the system. The rapid erosion of economic borders in recent decades has produced the globalization of the production system as well as the collective ravaging of the global environment. Interdependence has become increasingly necessary to manage the continued production of wealth (the global supply chain), but, much more importantly, the survival of the planet. China has finally begun to recognize the importance not only of national but also of collective arrangements to manage this survival. It has signed and will be pressured to sign many more agreements to contain the effects of climate change. These agreements also signify incremental modifications to the notion of national sovereignty as we have known it. What kinds of changes these might make to the bed-rock system of nation-states remains to be seen.

Notes

- 1 By temporality I refer to time as it appears and impacts social activity – or the phenomenology of time – such as the seasons, ritual or sacred times, business cycles, demographic generations or some other social or institutional complex registering patterns or velocities of change.
- 2 Etienne Balibar, ‘The Nation Form: History and Ideology’, in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, pp. 86–106. London: Verso Press, 1991.
- 3 Perhaps the most important condition underlying circulation in modern times is the capitalist system of exchange and the drive for capital accumulation. However, global circulation and exchange

- existed before capitalist accumulation became the driver and continued even in the socialist bloc during much of the 20th century.
- 4 See Prasenjit Duara, *Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future*. Boulder, Co.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
 - 5 Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 157.
 - 6 Dong Wang, *China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History*. Boulder, Co.: Lexington Books, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
 - 7 Tang Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*. Stanford University Press, 1996.
 - 8 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
 - 9 Edward Q. Wang, 'Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese historiography and the Soviet influence, 1949–1963', *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 9, no. 23 (2000): 95–111. See also David E. Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
 - 10 Hu Sheng, 'Zhongguo jindai lishide fenqi wenti' (The question of periodization in modern Chinese history) in *Lishi yanjiu* no. 1 (1959): 5–15.
 - 11 Lei Yi, 'A Review of Research on the Late Qing Dynasty – on the "Main Threads" of Modern Chinese History', in Steffie Richter, ed., *Contesting Views on a Common Past: Revisions of History in East Asia*. Campus (Frankfurt/M., Germany, and NY), 2008.
 - 12 Mathias Niedenfür, 'Historical Revisions and Reconstructions in History Soaps in China and Japan', in Steffie Richter, ed., *Contesting Views on a Common Past: Revisions of History in East Asia*. Campus (Frankfurt/M., Germany, and NY), 2008.
 - 13 For an excellent discussion of the politics of constitutionalism, see Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Manchus and Han Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2000, and Murata Yujiro, 'Sun Zhongshan yu Xinhaigemingde "wuzu gonghe" lun', *Guangdong shehui kexue*, 2004.
 - 14 An introduction to the literature on language reform may be found in Jing Tsu, 'Introduction: Sounds, Scripts, and Linking Language to Power,' *Twentieth Century China*, special issue on National Language, Dialect, and the Construction of Identity, vol. 41, no. 3 (October 2016): 210–216.
 - 15 Zou Rong, translation in John Lust, *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*, Paris, Mouton, 1968. See also Kai-Wing Chow, 'Imagining boundaries of blood: Zhang Binglin and the invention of the Han "race" in modern China', in Frank Dikötter, ed., *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1997, pp. 34–52.
 - 16 Kazutada Kataoka, 'Shingai kakumei jiki no gozoku kowaron o megutte' (Regarding the theory of five races in the 1911 revolutionary period) in Tanaka Masayoshi sensei taikan kinen ronji ed. *Chūgoku Kindaishi no shomondai*. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankoku, 1984, p. 294.
 - 17 Chiang, *China's Destiny*, translated by Wang Chung-hui. New York: Macmillan, 1947, pp. 4, 12, 239 n. 1. This was made possible by Xiong Shili's rather pseudo-scientific paleontological argument associating the theory of common ancestry of the different peoples of the national territory to branch families of a common ancestor: Peking Man.
 - 18 Fang Qiuwei, *Feichang shiqizhi bianwu* (Frontier affairs during the emergency period) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1937, 1938), 63–74. Siu-woo Cheung, 'Subject and Representation: Identity Politics in Southeast Guizhou' (PhD dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle, 1996), pp. 108–120.
 - 19 Prasenjit Duara, 'The Multi-National State in Modern World History: The Chinese Experiment', *Frontiers of History in China*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2011): 285–295.
 - 20 J. V. Stalin, 1913, 'Marxism and the National Question', first published in *Prosveshcheniye*, Nos. 3–5, March–May 1913; Transcribed by Carl Kavanagh. <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/index.htm>.
 - 21 Tominaga Tadashi, *Manshūkoku no minzoku mondai* (Shinkyō, 1943).

- 22 For 'geobody' see Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation*, University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
- 23 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004.
- 24 Fu Sinian, 'Zhongguo lishi fenqizhi yanjiu' (Researches in the periodization of Chinese history) in *Beijing Daxue Rikan*, April 17–23, 1928 (Re-printed in *Fu Sinian quanji*, vol. 4: 176–185).
- 25 Andre Schmid, *Korea between Empires, 1895–1919*. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 183.
- 26 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*.
- 27 David E. Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*.
- 28 Chalmers A Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- 29 Ann Anagnost, *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.
- 30 Q. Edward Wang, 'Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese historiography and the Soviet influence, 1949–1963', *Journal of Contemporary China* (2000), vol. 9, no. 23: 95–111.
- 31 Emily T. Yeh, *Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese Development*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013, p. 265.
- 32 Thomas Mullaney, 2004. 'Introduction', *China Information*, vol. 18, no. 2: 197–205. See also James Leibold, *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- 33 Dru C. Gladney, 'Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 53, no. 1 (February, 1994): pp. 92–123.
- 34 Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin, Clive Schofield, eds., *Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia*. Routledge: New York, 2013.
- 35 Huang, Yasheng, Li Jin, and Yi Qian. 'Does Ethnicity Pay? Evidence from Overseas Chinese FDI in China', *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 95, no. 3 (July 2013): 868–883. The MIT Press, p 868.
- 36 Kenneth Pomeranz, 'Introduction: Moving the Historiography West', *Twentieth Century China*, special issue on West China, vol. 40, no. 3 (October 2015): 168–180.
- 37 See Allen R. Carlson and Anna Costa, eds., 'Nations and Nationalism roundtable discussion on Chinese nationalism and national identity', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 22, no. 3 (2016): 415–446.
- 38 James Miller, *Monitory Democracy and Ecological Civilization in The People's Republic of China*. http://www.jamesmiller.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2013-monitory-democracy.indd_.pdf
- 39 学了这样的教科书，上海女人要改日本名就不奇怪了。 See the author 'Grindstone' in 2006-09-04 11:09:20 in <http://forum.xinhuanet.com/detail.jsp?id=34364297>. See this website for other criticisms also.



Continuity and Change: The Economy in the Twentieth Century

Chris Bramall

INTRODUCTION

The story of Chinese economic growth in the twentieth century is one of continuity and change. The central analytical challenge is to identify the respective roles of each, and to determine if either 1949 or 1978 was a true climacteric.¹ As far as the ‘liberation’ of 1949 is concerned, some see China as poised on the verge of take-off in the late 1930s, only for that take-off to be aborted by war and the introduction of an alien economic model after 1949 (Brandt 1989; Rawski 1989). Only after Mao’s death could the journey along the pre-Revolutionary growth path be resumed. For the others, the Chinese economy was going nowhere: the poor performance of agriculture was a binding constraint on growth (Riskin 1975; 1987). The 1949 Revolution was therefore the critical factor in allowing China to embark upon the process of modern economic growth. As for 1978, the conventional wisdom sees it as a clear turning point: Mao’s death and Deng’s accession ushered in an era of market-orientated economic policies which generated miraculous growth. For others, however, post-1978 policy changes were less important than the impact of the Maoist era, which laid the foundations for the rapid economic growth of the late twentieth century (Bramall 2000; Zhu 2013). In the words of Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping: ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics was opened up by the new period of reform and opening, but it was opened up on the foundation of the socialist fundamental system that had already been established and the more than 20 years in which construction had been carried out’ (cited in Fewsmith 2014: 4).

GROWTH IN THE REPUBLICAN ERA, 1911–1949

Assessing the performance of the Republican economy is problematic because we have only poor data. China's first reliable population census date was in 1953, and it is hard to back-project to the first half of the century given the devastating impact of the twelve years of war and – the key economic sector – until after the establishment of the National Agricultural Research Bureau, which published data in its *Crop Reports* from 1931 onwards. These *Reports* can be used in conjunction with the data published in Buck's (1937) well-known agricultural survey, and with data collected in Japanese-occupied territory during the war years. Even so, there is no generally accepted time series for something as basic as grain production. As for industry, the first and only general survey of factory industry was conducted in 1933 by the National Resources Commission of the Nanjing government. We have a range of estimates of industrial production made for the provinces of 'free' China in the 1940s (especially for Sichuan), as well as much detail on industrialization in Manchuria (Chao 1983; Duus et al. 1989; Myers and Peattie 1984). All this has been put together to create a time series for modern industry (Rawski 1989) but handicraft industry remains problematic; heroic efforts have been made to assemble data for key industries, notably cotton (Xu 1988; Köll 2003; Grove 2006) and silk (Bell 1999), but the statistical base is extremely fragile.

For all that, a number of attempts have been to estimate Chinese GDP growth in the Republican era. The best-known is Maddison's (1998) study, which has been used extensively for comparative work. However, Maddison was not a China specialist, and relied instead on others, not least the pioneering and exhaustive study of Liu and Yeh (1965), who estimated GDP for the 1930s and in the 1950s. Yeh (1979) later estimated GDP in 1914–18 to give us a GDP time series for the first half of the twentieth century. Subsequent work by Rawski (1989) has led to improved estimates of industrial production and alternative estimates of agricultural output.

These GDP estimates show that China was underdeveloped in the 1930s. Maddison's (1998; 2010) PPP-based estimates put per capita Chinese GDP at 10 per cent of US GDP in 1934–36 and at 26 per cent of Japanese GDP. A more detailed study by Fukao et al. (2007) placed China's per capita GDP at a similar position relative to the USA (11 per cent) but at 35 per cent of that of Japan. China's relative backwardness is therefore clear, and unsurprisingly, recent work continues to contrast Chinese stagnation with the transformative growth experienced across Europe and north America in the two centuries up to 1945 (Pomeranz 2000; Allen et al. 2011). As for broader measures of development, it is undeniable that Chinese literacy rates rose in the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, the post-1949 population censuses – which show literacy rates in the early 1980s by year of birth – indicate high illiteracy rates for those born before 1949; female

illiteracy was 95 per cent for those born before 1923, and 70 per cent even for those born in the late 1930s (Bramall 2008: 194). And life expectancy may have been as low as 25 years at birth in the Chinese countryside during the early 1930s (Barclay et al. 1976).

Whilst there is much agreement about the *level* of backwardness in the 1930s, there is more debate about the rate of *change*. Much of this centres on the pace of GDP growth (Table 3.1). The traditional view, founded on the estimates of Liu and Yeh (1965) and Yeh (1979), has Chinese GDP growing at around one per cent per year in the Republican era. With population growth running at 0.5 per cent per year, the implication is that the Chinese economy was growing at a glacially slow pace. For Huang (1990), China in the 1930s offers a classic example of involution in which continually rising inputs of labour into agricultural production allowed the population to survive at a subsistence level but offered little more. In the absence of real change in agriculture, the Chinese economy was far from the point of Rostowian ‘take off’ on the eve of the war with Japan in 1937.

Three main reasons have been advanced to explain this poor performance. First, basic infrastructure was lacking; for example, China’s railway network was thin and did not reach beyond the eastern provinces. Second, the Chinese economy was only shallowly integrated into the world economy. This protected it during the Depression of the 1930s (Wright 2000), but it also meant that only the coastal region reaped much benefit from foreign trade and investment. However, and thirdly, the main reason for Chinese stagnation was the unproductive use of the surplus, the difference between output and ‘necessary’ consumption (Lippit 1974; Riskin 1975). This was blamed on parasitic landlords, who extracted a surplus via high rents and interest rates but failed to re-invest it; the classic account is offered in Tawney (1932). The upshot was persistent poverty and glaring inequalities in income and wealth, which undermined the legitimacy of the Chinese state. From this perspective, the only solution was land reform, and it was the historic role of the Chinese Communist party to carry this out in conquered territory in the late 1940s, and across the rest of the Chinese mainland in the early 1950s. At root, then, the problem was state failure, partly in terms of a failure to invest in infrastructure but also, and more fundamentally, an unwillingness on the part of the Republican government to embrace the cause of land reform.

Table 3.1 Estimates of Chinese GDP growth, 1914–36

	<i>Real growth rate (per cent per year)</i>
Maddison	1.0
Yeh	1.1
Rawski	1.9

Notes: to approximate per capita growth, subtract 0.5 from the figures in the table.

Sources: Rawski (1989: 330); Yeh (1979: 126); Maddison database at <http://www.ggd.net/maddison/oriindex.htm>

The revisionist view provided in the writings of Brandt (1989), Rawski (1989) and Kirby (1990) offers a more positive view. Although the difference in the growth rates shown in Table 3.1 appear slight from an early twenty-first century perspective, Rawski's revisions suggest an altogether more optimistic view of performance in the 1930s because they imply strong parallels between Republican China and Meiji-era Japan. For Brandt and Rawski, the Chinese economy was on course to emulate Japan because rural institutions (especially markets) were functioning well. This was evident from the correlation in price movements across regions, extensive long-distance trade and the taking-up of opportunities for non-farm work by migrant workers (Benjamin and Brandt 1997; Kung et al. 2011). Rural markets may have functioned less well than they had in (say) the high Qing (c. 1800) because of political instability (warlordism), but the Nationalist regime was gradually restoring the authority of the central government and developing infrastructure during the 1930s.

From this revisionist perspective, the success of the Communist party in bringing about the 1949 Revolution was due more to its cultivation of anti-Japanese nationalism than to resentment over rural poverty and inequality. In fact, rural growth was considerably faster than suggested by Liu and Yeh, and led to rising rural wages. Meanwhile, fledgling industries in coastal cities were growing quickly and, although the world depression of the early 1930s delivered a blow to the treaty port economy (notably Shanghai), its overall impact was relatively modest. The whole process was facilitated by the Nationalist government, which had created an effective system of indicative planning presided over by the National Resources Committee (established in 1932) and largely based on the German economic model of the 1930s. According to Wu (2011: 10): '... China ... [had] ... already developed a physical and human capital foundation by 1949 that was capable of accommodating the state-driven heavy industrialization under the new regime'. By implication, China would have experienced take-off but for Japanese invasion in 1937.

Distinguishing between these rival viewpoints is rendered more difficult by the differing performance of Chinese regions. Manchuria, a Japanese colony in the 1930s, grew quickly and established a range of heavy industries which were at the heart of Chinese industrialization after 1949 (Myers and Peattie 1984; Wright 2007). Whether, however, that growth would have been self-sustaining outside the Japanese empire is moot. There is some evidence of rapid growth across the lower Yangzi provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang in the 1920s and 1930s based around rural industry and commercialized agriculture (Fei 1939; Ma 2008). And war was a catalyst for economic development in some parts of western China, notably Sichuan and parts of the Yunnan provinces. In all these cases, however, it was the industrial sector which demonstrated signs of dynamism. The rural sector by contrast was universally vulnerable to flood and drought; two of many examples are the 1936–37 drought in south-west China – which halved rice production in parts of south-west China between 1935 and 1937 (Department of Agricultural

Economics 1941) – and the Yangzi valley flooding of 1931, which killed over 200,000 people (Major Disasters 1993: 258–59). Given this backcloth of poor agricultural performance, the case for take-off in the 1930s is hard to make. Nevertheless, the revisionist case cannot be wholly dismissed. The very fact that Taiwan grew so quickly in the 1950s and 1960s under Nationalist rule suggests that China might have introduced land reform, and might have embarked upon a process of take-off, but for Japanese invasion.

What is not in doubt is that the war with Japan had devastating consequences, especially for eastern China. The industrial stock of Manchuria, the heart of what modern industry China possessed, was heavily depleted by Soviet removal of much of the plant and equipment after 1945, and some of China's most productive agricultural centres were laid waste by the impact of warfare; the best demonstration of this is the famine which hit Henan, very much a border province between Nationalist- and Japanese-occupied territory, and which led to perhaps 1.5 to 3 million excess deaths out of a provincial population of 30–40 million (Garnaut 2013). It was an inauspicious inheritance for the CCP in 1949.

THE MAOIST ERA, 1949–78

There is as much disagreement about China's growth performance during the Maoist era as about growth during the Republican period.² Three competing narratives are identifiable. The traditional narrative distinguishes between (good) economic performance in the early Maoist era (1949–56), and (poor) economic performance thereafter; see for example Walder (2015). This discourse has been challenged by some on the right – for instance Dikötter (2013) – who argue that the entire Maoist era was a period of failure. A third view is offered by New Left scholars such as Gao Mobo (2008), who offer a more positive appraisal of the economic impact of Maoism.

The central difference between these competing narratives on Maoism lies in their different interpretations of the role of the state. For those on the right, it was the heavy hand of the state which explains the disastrous famine and the damage done by the Cultural Revolution. Only when the grip of the state relaxed – in the mid-1950s and after 1971 – did growth occur, and even then the Chinese state served to hinder rather than help economic growth. By contrast, the view of the state offered by the left is more benign. To be sure, the state played a role in the famine and in abetting the violence of the Cultural Revolution. But ordinary Chinese were as much agents as victims. Where peasants and local cadres resisted excessive procurements, famine deaths were few. Where ordinary Chinese participated enthusiastically in handing over grain to the state, the number of famine deaths was much higher. Similarly, the violence of the Cultural Revolution was driven as much from below as it was by central government. More significantly, those on the left see the Chinese state as laying the foundations for growth by

developing education, infrastructure, health care and rural industry during the Maoist era.

The Conventional Wisdom: Early versus Late Maoism

Much western and Chinese scholarship distinguishes between early (1949–56) and late Maoism (1956–78); a recent example is Walder (2015). The CCP also played a key role in framing this narrative, with its famous 1978 statement ‘On Questions of Party History’ (Chinese Communist Party 1981). In this account, the early 1950s was a period of great success, and the Party’s mistake was to launch a ‘premature transition’ to socialism in 1955–56. As a result, ‘... there were serious faults and errors’ during 1956–66, and the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) were a disaster: ‘The cultural revolution negated many of the correct principles, policies and achievements of the 17 years after the founding of the People’s Republic’. From this perspective, collectivization (1955–56) and the launch of the Great Leap Forward (1958) together mark a clear turning point.

In explaining the difference in China’s growth record between the two eras, the conventional wisdom focuses in part upon policy mistakes. These included the attempt to accelerate growth in the late 1950s by developing rural iron and steel production, which was premature and was a key factor in causing the devastating famine of 1958–62, which killed over 30 million people. Similarly, the political instability associated with the Cultural Revolution was harmful for industrial production. Other policy errors included high levels of defence spending, especially on Third Front enterprises established in western China between 1964 and the late 1970s (Naughton 1988), and over-emphasis on grain production at the expense of cash crops (Shapiro 2001). For Walder (2015: 315), much of the blame for these failures lies with Mao Zedong himself: ‘Almost every one of Mao’s interventions after 1956 put his initial accomplishments in jeopardy’.

However, conventional wisdom advances systemic failure as the primary cause of poor performance between 1956 and 1978. More precisely, the late Maoist economic system was flawed because it was highly centralized and allowed little role for markets. By contrast, the economy was more market-orientated and open to foreign trade in the 1950s, albeit primarily with the Soviet bloc; this combination of planning and markets contributed positively to growth. Legacies from the Republican era were also important. State planning began in the 1930s as noted above, and there were also significant rural industrial legacies, which facilitated industrialization post-1949 across the Yangzi delta (Bramall 2007; Gates 1996; Grove 2006). It was, however, the economic system which provided the crucial growth dynamic. All this changed in the mid and late 1950s. The nationalization of industry was completed in the late 1950s, and that put paid to technical progress. The growth of agricultural production, carried out primarily by the private sector in the early 1950s, was halted in its tracks by collectivization in 1955–56 and the creation of large communes in 1958 (Lin and

Wen 1995). International trade was negligible after China's break with the Soviet Union in 1960, and did not really resume until the late 1970s. The introduction of a system of internal passports (the *hukou* system) limited labour mobility. As a result of these measures, and save for a brief period of liberalization in the countryside in 1961–62, the Chinese economy after 1956–57 was very similar in terms of its economic system to that of the Soviet Union, and this stifled innovation and growth. According to Walder (2015: 324): 'A wasteful industrial system was literally sucking resources away from infrastructure, housing, wages, and consumer goods production'. From a growth-accounting perspective, these late Maoist systemic failures were reflected in the declining rate of growth of total factor productivity (TFP), which is often used as a proxy for efficiency. For example, the calculations of Perkins and Rawski (2008: 839) show TFP rising by 4.7 per cent per year during 1952–57, but declining by 0.5 per cent per year between 1957 and 1978.

Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom: Continuities between Early and Late Maoism

Now there is no doubt that the period 1958 to 1968 was a period of crisis in the Chinese economy. The famine which followed the Great Leap Forward not only caused a devastating loss of life but led to a collapse in industrial production. And the Chinese economy was badly disrupted at the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966–68), even if the number of deaths from violence was small compared with the mortality toll of the great famine.

Nevertheless, the economic data suggest that the differences between early and late Maoism are far less dramatic than the conventional wisdom would have us believe. First, there was a clear trend increase in life expectancy in both periods. Between 1953 and 1957 it rose from 40 to 50 years at birth; between 1962 and 1978, it rose by a further 12 years to reach 65 years (Banister 1987: 352). Life expectancy was of course very low during the famine (falling to around 25 years in 1960) but thereafter the upward trend resumed. Secondly, if one takes out the crisis period of 1956–68 and compares growth *trends* between 1952–56 and 1968–76, the contrast is not very sharp (Figure 3.1). Maddison (1998) has GDP per head growing at 3.2 per cent per year during 1952–56 and 3.1 per cent during 1968–78. For Wu (2014), the growth rate is an identical 2.7 per cent per year in both periods. In other words, 1956–68 is an aberration; thereafter, growth resumes at about the same rate as in the mid-1950s. The official data compiled in the 1980s by China's State Statistical Bureau (now the National Bureau of Statistics) show more of a contrast – 4.8 per cent per year for the 1950s compared with 3.5 per cent for 1968–78 – but even this is not a large difference. This is especially so when we recognize that the official data inflate performance during the 1950s. Even if (as is the usual practice) the years between 1949 and 1952 are regarded as a recovery period, and therefore excluded from growth calculations,




Figure 3.1 Per capita GDP, 1952–78 (1990 prices)

Notes: population growth averaged around 2.1 per cent per year in both 1952–56 and 1956–78, so the difference in per capita growth reflects differences in GDP growth itself.

Sources: Wu (2014: 90–91); Maddison database at www.ggd.net/maddison/oriindex.htm

a significant part of recorded growth between 1952 and 1956 was mythical. It simply reflected more complete reporting of output as the new regime gradually introduced a more comprehensive system of data reporting. The under-reporting problem was particularly acute in agriculture, where sown area was consistently under-estimated before 1950.

It is also worth dwelling on the fragility of the widely used concept of total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is estimated as a residual; accordingly, estimates are reliable only if there is accurate measurement of capital, human capital and labour inputs. Any measurement error in these inputs reveals itself in the residual. One problem for Maoist China in this respect is the absence of plausible data on physical capital (especially for defence-related industries) or on hours worked. Even more crucially, the estimation of GDP, and aggregate labour, capital and human capital, requires the use of prices, and the methodology requires that the prices used are equilibrium prices – that is, prices which bear some resemblance to value. The prices which prevail on world markets or within market economies are not equilibrium prices. Capital markets are distorted by speculation, and labour markets are distorted by discrimination so that wages are not a good measure of labour productivity. For Maoist China the valuation problems are even more acute because of the absence of market prices. Accordingly, the use of TFP to assess Chinese productivity during the Maoist era make little sense.

The overall conclusion that differences in economic performance between early and late Maoism have been overplayed has been developed in some of the literature. For Friedman et al. (1991), for example, agricultural performance was

poor throughout the 1950s; collectivization in 1955–56 had no decisive effect. Perhaps the best example of re-thinking performance in the 1950s is provided by the writings of Frank Dikötter (2013; 2016), who argues that the Maoist era should be seen as a unified whole. Performance was generally poor across the *entire* Maoist era; in particular, Dikötter's reading of the evidence for the 1950s is that it was a tragedy, rather than a golden age. For him, the key constraint on economic performance was the Chinese state. Prior to 1956, state encroachment was gradual and space was left for the private sector to grow. The same was true in the 1970s, especially after the death of Lin Biao (1971) led to a discrediting of the Maoist state apparatus and thence to the re-emergence of private sector activity (Dikötter 2016: 255–84). Nevertheless, economic performance was not good in either the 1950s or the 1970s.

The CCP also took an increasingly critical view of the 1950s as the 1980s and 1990s wore on. As a result, the very notion of a Leninist golden age in the 1950s, a view very much associated with veteran Party leader Chen Yun, came under increasing attack as the market-orientated policies introduced by Deng Xiaoping after 1978 gathered momentum and were seen as successful. By the time of Deng's death in 1997, the tide of Party opinion had swung so much against state-led industrial planning that Jiang Zemin was able to launch a programme of sweeping privatization.

The New Left: Reappraising the Cultural Revolution

The distinction between early and late Maoism has also been challenged from the left. On the one hand, left-leaning scholars in China and the west have long accepted the proposition recently articulated by Dikötter that economic performance in the 1950s was quite poor. In fact, performance before 1955–56 was heavily criticised within Party circles themselves at the time; led by Mao, many officials argued that the rate of growth in the rural sector prior to 1955–56 was too slow and imposed a binding constraint on industrial growth. The underlying reason – and here the view of the left deviates from that Dikötter and others – was the excessively *slow* pace of systemic change. For the left of the CCP, the rich peasant economy was preserved for too long, and this delayed collectivization – which in turn delayed both the effective mobilization of the labour force for farmland and irrigation construction, and farm mechanization (which required large farms). This case for collectivization, and by implication the rejection of the rich peasant model of the early 1950s, has been frequently put by western scholars as well, most famously so by William Hinton (1990; 2006). For Hinton, the transition to socialism during the 1950s was not premature but was far too slow.

More recently, the left has shifted its attention away from the 1950s to highlight what it sees as good economic performance in the late Maoist era. This re-thinking of late Maoism is very much associated with the New Left in China,

which numbers amongst its ranks scholars such as Wang Hui, Wang Shaoguang and Cui Zhiyuan. A number of western-based scholars have also played a significant role, notably Gao Mobo, Li Minqi, Han Dongping and Lin Chun. The same is true of some western scholars who are not China specialists, but who contrast the experiences of China and India; Amartya Sen is the most obvious example.

Several concrete arguments have been put forward in defence of the late Maoist development model. One strand has highlighted China's impressive human development record. The arguments here are relatively well-known (Sen 1989). Despite the human cost of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Chinese life expectancy rose impressively in the long run, especially when juxtaposed against that of India, the obvious comparator (Drèze and Sen 2013). Similarly, China's record in improving mass education, especially in rural areas, was also very good, albeit at the cost of a lower-quality tertiary education (Peterson 1994a, 1994b). Moreover, it is unlikely that these achievements would have occurred without the late Maoist development model. First, China was far more successful in disseminating vaccines and improvements in basic hygiene (which focused on the importance of clean water) to rural areas than almost every other developing country in the 1960s and 1970s. The very fact that China regressed during the 1980s when Maoist structures were demolished testifies to the important role played by local government before 1978. Second, the educational system of the 1950s was unashamedly elitist (Pepper 1996); it was explicitly designed to limit access to secondary education, let alone tertiary education. It was the Cultural Revolution that broke with this model and ushered in an era of mass education.

A second element in the re-thinking on the left attributes many of Maoist China's economic failings to unavoidable external shocks rather than to systemic problems. For example, high levels of military spending in the late 1960s and 1970s were effectively forced upon China by perceived Soviet and American military threats. This spending could only be financed by squeezing China's rural sector via the manipulation of the internal terms of trade, which crowded out rural investment and consumption alike (Bramall 1993). One can of course argue that China did not need to spend as much on military spending, or that the threat was more a figment of the Maoist imagination than a clear and present danger. However, given US support for the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war, and some of the public utterances by the US military in relation to the war in Vietnam, it is clear that there was some basis for the Chinese response.

The third element in the critique of the conventional wisdom emphasizes the key role played by Maoist legacies in promoting post-1978 growth (Gao 1999, 2008; Han 2000, 2001; Bramall 2000, 2008). Much of China's inherited industrial capital may have been of low quality, but crucial elements in post-1978 growth were the late Maoist introduction of indigenous green revolution technology such as hybrid rice (Stone 1988); the completion of an array of ambitious irrigation projects begun in the 1950s and 1960s (Nickum 1995); and the acquisition of

skills in the newly established rural industries of the 1970s (Riskin 1978). These industries may have been loss-making in the short run (Wong 1991), but they were classic infant industries; over time, the growing participation of the population in rural enterprises led to a process of learning and capability enhancement that made possible the explosive growth of township and village enterprises in the 1980s (Bramall 2007). Recent research also suggests that the returns post-1978 to supposedly low quality rural education during the Cultural Revolution were actually quite high; according to Sicular and Yang (2015), the financial return was in the order of 11–20 per cent by the 1990s. In sum, the Maoist era was a process of learning-by-doing, and the gains manifested themselves powerfully after Mao's death. The death of Mao is therefore less of a climacteric than usually argued, and the continuities across the 1978 divide need far more recognition.

These sorts of argument are controversial. According to Sachs and Woo (1994), for example, the only important Maoist legacy was surplus labour; growth was most rapid in those areas where Maoism had least impact. Thus Manchuria grew slowly after 1978 because it closely resembled the Soviet Union in having little surplus labour and an outdated capital stock. By comparison, they claim, the Yangzi delta or the south-eastern province of Guangdong, where special economic zones were established to attract foreign investment, are best thought of as greenfield sites. Dongguan, an agricultural county in the late 1970s, offers the classic example of the transformative impact of inward investment (Yeung 2001). Sachs and Woo do exaggerate. Rural industry was already well-established across the Yangzi delta before 1978 (Whiting 2001). In fact, industrial output was growing at around 21 per cent per year in real terms in Zhejiang, and 30 per cent per year in Jiangsu, during the period 1971–78 (Bramall 2007: 23). Take the famous example of Zhejiang's Wenzhou municipality. Often hailed as the exemplar of the impact of market forces on virgin soil, Wenzhou actually has a long history of industrialization, much of it based around rural handicrafts (Bureau of Foreign Trade 1935), but some of it state-led (Nolan and Dong 1990). Furthermore, China's famous special economic zones would not have been successful without either massive state investment or the skilled labour that they drew from state-owned enterprises. Defence industrialization in Guangdong also left important legacies (Bachman 2001). Nevertheless, the Sachs and Woo arguments present a challenge for the New Left: if Maoist legacies really were so important, why did Manchuria not grow faster after 1978?

GROWTH DURING THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

There is no doubt that economic growth accelerated after 1978 (Figure 3.2). Even during the years of slowest growth – 1989–91, the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre – real GDP rose by over 3 per cent per year. During the cyclical peaks of the mid-1980s, the mid-1990s and 2006–7, the growth rate was




Figure 3.2 Real Chinese GDP growth, 1979–2015

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics (2015); 2015 Statistical Communique (2016)

well over 10 per cent. These official data probably exaggerate the growth rate; Wu's (2014) alternative estimates put the average rate of growth at 7.2 per cent per year for 1978–2012 compared with the official rate of 10 per cent (Wu 2014: 90–1). However, even accepting Wu's re-estimates, no qualitative reappraisal of China's remarkable post-1978 growth is implied.

The best-known explanation for the post-1978 growth surge centres on the role played by market forces in producing intersectoral labour re-allocation, which served to exploit comparative advantage. The work of Justin Lin (2012) epitomizes this approach. For him, China's success reflects a market-driven shift towards a comparative-advantage following development strategy: China exploited its abundant supply of labour and abandoned the capital-intensive development strategy that had been the leitmotif of Maoism. In Lin's terminology, China moved from defying comparative advantage to following comparative advantage. In concrete terms, China's comparative advantage was not in either land-intensive agriculture or capital-intensive industry; the best use of labour was in township and village enterprises in rural areas, and modern labour-intensive industries in urban areas. Such industries were competitive both at home and in export markets. Over time, China's industrial sector has become increasingly capital- and technology-intensive, but this merely reflects its changing comparative advantage; Lin's point is simply that comparative advantage is there to be exploited, not defied.

This market-based explanation of post-1978 Chinese growth is appealing and accords with some of the evidence. Chinese labour is relatively free to move

between occupations (the *hukou* system continues to impose some fetters on the rights of rural workers resident in urban areas), and many of the industries which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s were relatively labour-intensive. This fits the notion of a comparative-advantage-following strategy. Nevertheless, it is an incomplete explanation. For one thing, a key element in China's success was its slow transition from a planned to a market economy. The best examples of this gradualism are the slow rate of privatization (which had barely begun even as late as 1996), and China's limited integration into the world economy (tariff barriers were high even in the early 1990s, and capital controls remained firmly in place). It is not difficult to argue that it was China's gradualist approach that made its economic transition more successful than the 'big bang' approach adopted by Russia after 1990 (Naughton 1995; Nolan 1995). China grew gradually out of the plan, and that allowed it to combine growth with an avoidance of mass unemployment and big falls in living standards.

Second, it can be argued that the state sector has helped to promote growth during the transition process, rather than being an obstacle. Lin himself has argued that the state has played a key role in allowing China to shift resources as its comparative advantage has changed. Reliance solely on market forces to facilitate structural change would have been much less effective. Moreover, it is not difficult to find examples showing that the state was growth-promoting; for instance, the thriving rural industries of the 1980s were in many cases under local state control (Oi 1999). One can argue about whether these industries were state-owned (as distinct from controlled), and about the precise size of the private sector (Huang 2003), but the positive role played by the local state is hard to gainsay.

A third weakness in the market-led hypothesis is that the degree of state control increased, rather than diminished, after Jiang Zemin left power in 2002 – without any collapse in growth. Part of this expansion has been in the realm of welfare, especially health. However, state investment has also gone into China's national champions, a group of firms selected for support in the hope that they will emulate the success of Japanese *keiretsu* and South Korean *chaebols* (Sutherland 2003). As a result, the share of state-controlled enterprises in industrial output (somewhere between 20 and 30 per cent) has not diminished over the last 15 years. At a local level, some have credited the growth of Chongqing to the state intervention presided over by Bo Xilai, its now disgraced former Party leader (Bo and Chen 2009). In short, China is an example of *state* capitalism, and this helps to explain the distinction drawn by Ramo (2004) between the Chinese (the Beijing consensus) and American (Washington consensus) models of capitalism.

The response of the Chinese state to the global financial crisis of 2008–9 was to increase further its level of intervention in a bid to sustain growth. This Keynesian-style intervention focused on a massive programme of reconstruction in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, the development of new high-speed railways to integrate the Chinese interior, and a vast programme of house-building in the rapidly growing cities. As part of the programme of infrastructure

construction, the railway network was extended to reach Lhasa, previously the only provincial capital not linked to the railway system. It is of course perfectly legitimate to point out that China was only able to intervene on the scale that it did because of its relatively small national debt. But what is not in doubt is the continuing scale of state intervention.

The jury is out on whether China's high degree of state intervention continues to be growth-promoting. From a purely accounting perspective, GDP growth has undoubtedly slowed since 2007. The challenge is to identify the reasons for that slowdown. One approach is to portray the slowdown, the 'new normal', as an inevitable concomitant of success; China no longer enjoys the advantages of backwardness and therefore slow growth is a sign of maturity. However, others have argued that slow growth reflects economic failure. State projects have been accused of fuelling corruption and property speculation and, although China's national champions have clearly modernized quickly, rival multinational companies may have modernized even faster (Steinfeld 2010). This hypothesis of state failure is lent some support by Wu's (2014: 64) estimates of total factor productivity growth, which are negative between 2007 and 2012, compared with positive growth of four per cent per year during 2001–7.

Important though these debates are, we also need to recognize that luck played its part in China's success. For one thing, the anti-war movement in the USA ultimately forced the Nixon administration to end its involvement in Vietnam, and that in turn meant rapprochement with China in 1972. This set in train a gradual improvement in relations between the two countries, culminating in the restoration of full diplomatic relations in 1979. From China's perspective, this made possible big reductions in defence spending, notably the abandonment of the Third Front programme. The demise of the Soviet Union was equally important in lifting the military threat that had shackled the Maoist regime. Improved international relations also, of course, allowed Chinese exporters to gain access to US markets, and paved the way for the export-led growth that drove success in many of China's coastal regions. More generally, the post-1978 Chinese regime was lucky that it liberalized in an era in which barriers to international trade were diminishing; the Chinese growth strategy would have been far more difficult to implement in (say) the protectionist 1930s. In short, we do well to remember the interplay of internal and external factors in making the Chinese economic miracle.

CONCLUSION: THE STATE AND CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT PATH

This chapter suggests that the importance of the multiple Chinese revolutions of the twentieth century – the 1911 Revolution, the 1949 Revolution, the Cultural Revolution and the coming of Deng Xiaoping – is easily overstated. The continuities in recent Chinese economic history are at least as important as the changes.

The principal continuity has been a high degree of state intervention in the economy. Begun under the auspices of the National Resources Commission in the 1930s, it expanded in the Maoist era, reaching its apogee in the late 1970s. Thereafter it has diminished, but even now the state continues to exercise a pervasive presence. A strong case can also be made for the proposition that successive regimes have built upon, rather than abandoned, the legacies of previous eras. To be sure, China enjoyed the advantages of backwardness in the early 1950s and again in the early 1980s; its very under-development ensured that the rate of return to investment was high. Nevertheless, China's economic capabilities progressively expanded in each era. Modern education expanded during the Republican era, and a railway infrastructure of sorts had been established in the eastern provinces by the mid-1930s. The Maoist era extended this railway network, and brought mass literacy to the rural population. Since 1978, China's efforts have increasingly focused on improving educational quality, and rural industrialization has played a key role in developing the industrial skills and capabilities in the countryside. Maoism may have been characterized by urban bias – certainly the per capita income gap remained high in the 1970s – but the pace of growth in the 1980s and 1990s would not have been so rapid without that prior rural industrialization.

If there is a development 'lesson' from all this, it is that economic modernization is a slow and painful process. Capability – in terms of education, skills and infrastructure – needs to be developed prior to economic take-off, and that implies stagnant material living standards during the capability-building process. The pay-off only comes in the long run. So it was for Industrial Revolution Britain, and so it has been for China.

This emphasis on continuity does not mean that change has been unimportant. Property rights remain uncertain, but they are more secure than they had been in either the 1930s, or during the 1960s and 1970s. And markets have played an important role in providing incentives and in guiding resource allocation. It is therefore hard to conceive of China growing at the pace that it has in recent decades had the Maoist command economy remained in place. But just as state intervention was not the root of all Maoist China's ills, so too the miracles of the 1980s and beyond are about much more than the play of unfettered market forces. Recognizing this interplay of continuity and change in driving growth across the century since 1930 does not make for a simple narrative, but it is more in line with Chinese realities than any other.

There is much research which remains to be done on all these questions. One challenge is to come up with better estimates of economic performance before 1949. When one thinks of how the history of Britain's industrial revolution continues to be re-written – see for example the re-interpretation offered by Broadberry et al. (2015) – it is evident that work on China in the 1920s and 1930s has barely begun. This is even more true of the Maoist era. A vast array of material has been released since China opened up in the early 1980s, but until the Chinese

government encourages genuine debate within China and, equally importantly, opens up its archives, much of what we think we know about the Maoist era remains conjecture. The same is true of the era since 1978. The Chinese party-state is keen to impose a narrative and that limits the scope for a proper analysis of economic performance and its drivers. In a very real sense, research on the Chinese economy has barely begun.

Notes

- 1 Mao's death in September 1976 led to little immediate change in economic policy. Those who argue in favour of a late 1970s climacteric therefore focus more on the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of December 1978, which marked the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping's power and the beginnings of significant policy change.
- 2 For a range of literature, see Riskin (1987), Bramall (2008), Walder (2015) and Lin (2012).

REFERENCES

- Allen, R. C., Bassino, J.-C., Ma, D. B., Moll-Murata, C. and Luiten van Zanden, L. (2011) 'Wages, Prices and Living Standards in China, 1738–1925'. *Economic History Review*, 64 (S1): 8–38.
- Bachman, D. (2001) 'Defence Industrialization in Guangdong'. *China Quarterly*, 166: 273–304.
- Banister, J. (1987) *China's Changing Population*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Barclay, G. W., Coale, A. J., Stoto, M. and Trussell, J. (1976) 'A Reassessment of the Demography of Traditional Rural China'. *Population Index*, 42 (4): 603–35.
- Bell, L. S. (1999) *One Industry, Two Chinas*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Benjamin, D. and Brandt, L. (1997) 'Land, Factor Markets, and Inequality in Rural China: Historical Evidence'. *Explorations in Economic History*, 34 (4): 460–94.
- Bo, Z. Y. and Chen, G. (2009) 'Bo Xilai and the Chongqing model'. *East Asian Policy*, 1 (3): 42–49. At www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/Vol1No3_BoZhiyueChenGang.pdf
- Bramall, C. (1993) *In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bramall, C. (2000) *Sources of Chinese Economic Growth, 1978–1996*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bramall, C. (2007) *The Industrialization of Rural China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bramall, C. (2008) *Chinese Economic Development*. London: Routledge.
- Brandt, L. L. (1989) *Commercialization and Agricultural Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Broadberry, S., Campbell, B., Klein, A., Overton, M. and van Leeuwen, B. (2015) *British Economic Growth 1270–1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buck, J. L. (1937) *Land Utilization in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bureau of Foreign Trade (1935) *China Industrial Handbooks – Chekiang (Zhejiang)*, Ministry of Industry, Shanghai (re-printed in 1973 by Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, Taipei).
- Chao, K. (1983) *The Economic Development of Manchuria*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Chinese Communist Party (1981) 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China'. At www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpcd/history/01.htm (accessed 06.06.2010).
- Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Nanking (ed.) (1941) 'The Rice Problem', April, repr. in Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Nanking (1980): *Economic Facts*, ii, London: Garland.
- Dikötter, F. (2013) *The Tragedy of Liberation*. London: Bloomsbury.

- Dikötter, F. (2016) *The Cultural Revolution*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Drèze, J. and Sen, A. (2013) *An Uncertain Glory*. London: Allen Lane.
- Duus, P., Myers, R. H. and Peattie, M. R. (eds.) (1989) *The Japanese Informal Empire in China*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fei, X. T. (1939) *Peasant Life in China*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Fewsmith, J. (2014) 'Mao's Shadow', *Chinese Leadership Monitor*, no. 43. At www.hoover.org/research/maos-shadow (accessed 25.05.2015).
- Friedman, E., Pickowicz, P. G. and Selden, M. (1991) *Chinese Village, Socialist State*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fukao, K., Ma, D. B. and Yuan, T. J. (2007) 'Real GDP in prewar East Asia'. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 53(3): 503–37.
- Gao, M. B. (1999) *Gao Village*. London: Hurst and Company.
- Gao, M. B. (2008) *The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution*. London: Pluto Press.
- Garnaut, A. (2013) 'A Quantitative Description of the Henan Famine of 1942'. *Modern Asian Studies*, 47(6): 2007–45.
- Gates, H. (1996) *China's Motor*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Grove, L. (2006) *A Chinese Economic Revolution*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Han, D. P. (2000) *The Unknown Cultural Revolution*. New York: Garland.
- Han, D. P. (2001) 'The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Rural Education and Economic Development'. *Modern China*, 27 (1): 59–90.
- Hinton, W. (1990) *The Privatization of China*. London: Earthscan.
- Hinton, W. (2006) *Through a Glass Darkly*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Huang, P. C. C. (1990) *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta 1350–1988*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Huang, Y. S. (2003) *Selling China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kirby, W. C. (1990) 'Continuity and Change in Modern China: Economic Planning on the Mainland and on Taiwan, 1943–58'. *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 24: 121–41.
- Köll, E. (2003) *From Cotton Mill to Business Empire*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kung, J. K. S., Bai, N. S. and Lee, Y. F. (2011) 'Human capital, migration and a "vent" for surplus rural labour in 1930s China'. *Economic History Review*, 64(51): 117–41.
- Lin, J. Y. F. (2012) *Demystifying the Chinese Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lin, J. Y. F. and Wen, G. Z. (1995) 'China's Regional Grain Self-sufficiency Policy and its Effect on Land Productivity'. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 21 (2): 187–206.
- Lippit, V. D. (1974) *Land Reform and Economic Development in China*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science Press.
- Liu, T. C. and Yeh, K. C. (1965) *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ma, D. B. (2008) 'Economic Growth in the Lower Yangzi Region of China in 1911–1937'. *Journal of Economic History*, 68 (2): 355–92.
- Maddison, A. (1998) *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run*. Paris: OECD.
- Maddison, A. (2010) 'World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2003 AD'. At www.ggdc.net/Maddison (accessed 25.03.16).
- Major Disasters 1993 – Guojia keweì quanguo zhongda ziran zaihai zonghe jianjiuzu (Research Group for the National Scientific Committee on Major Chinese Natural Disasters) (1993) *Zhongguo zhongda ziran zaihai ji jianzai duice* (Major Chinese Natural Disasters and Strategies to Prevent Them). Beijing: Kexue chubanshe.
- Myers, R. H. and Peattie, M. R. (1984) *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- National Bureau of Statistics (2015) *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2015* (Chinese Statistical Yearbook). Beijing: zhongguo tongji chubanshe.

- National Bureau of Statistics (2016) 'Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2015 National Economic and Social Development'. At www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201502/t20150228_687439.html (accessed 01.03.16).
- Naughton, B. (1988) 'The Third Front'. *China Quarterly*, 115: 351–86.
- Naughton, B. (1995) *Growing Out of the Plan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nickum, J. E. (1995) *Dam Lies and Other Statistics: Taking the Measure of Irrigation in China, 1931–1991*. Honolulu: East-West Center.
- Nolan, P. (1995) *China's Rise, Russia's Fall*. London: Macmillan.
- Nolan, P. and Dong, F. R. (eds.) (1990) *Market Forces in China*. London: Zed.
- Oi, J. C. (1999) *Rural China Takes Off*. Berkeley: California University Press.
- Pepper, S. (1996) *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th Century China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Perkins, D. H. and Rawski, T. G. (2008) 'Forecasting China's economic growth to 2025'. In L. Brandt and T. G. Rawski (eds.), *China's Great Economic Transformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peterson, G. (1994a) 'State Literary Ideologies and the Transformation of Rural China'. *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 32: 95–120.
- Peterson, G. (1994b) 'The Struggle for Literacy in Post-Revolutionary Rural Guangdong'. *China Quarterly*, 140: 926–43.
- Pomeranz, K. (2000) *The Great Divergence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ramo, J. (2004) *The Beijing Consensus*. At <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>
- Rawski, T. G. (1989) *Economic Growth in Prewar China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Riskin, C. (1975) 'Surplus and Stagnation in Modern China'. In D. H. Perkins (ed.), *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Riskin, C. (1978) 'China's Rural Industries'. *China Quarterly*, 73: 77–98.
- Riskin, C. (1987) *China's Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sachs, J. and Woo, W. T. (1994) 'Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union'. *Economic Policy*, 18: 101–46.
- Sen, A. K. (1989) 'Food and Freedom'. *World Development*, 17 (6): 769–81.
- Shapiro, J. (2001) *Mao's War Against Nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sicular, T. and Yang, J. (2015) 'The returns to schooling in rural China'. *CIBC Working Paper*, no. 2015-2. At <http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=economicscibc> (accessed 21.03.16).
- Steinfeld, E. (2010) *Playing Our Game*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stone, B. (1988) 'Developments in Agricultural Technology'. *China Quarterly*, 116: 767–822.
- Sutherland, D. (2003) *China's Large Enterprises and the Challenge of Late Industrialisation*. London: Routledge.
- Tawney, R. H. (1932) *Land and Labour in China*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Walder, A. G. (2015) *China under Mao*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Whiting, S. H. (2001) *Power and Wealth in Rural China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wong, C. P. W. (1991) 'The Maoist Model Reconsidered'. In W. A. Joseph, C. P. W. Wong and D. Zweig (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wright, T. (2000) 'Distant Thunder: The Regional Economy of Southwest China and The Impact of the Great Depression'. *Modern Asian Studies*, 34 (3): 697–738.
- Wright, T. (2007) 'The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression'. *Modern Asian Studies*, 41 (5): 1073–1112.
- Wu, H. X. (2011) 'Rethinking China's path of industrialization', *WIDER Working Paper* no. 2011/76. At www.wider.unu.edu/publication/rethinking-china's-path-industrialization (accessed 02.02.16).
- Wu, H. X. (2014) *China's Growth and Productivity Performance Debate Revisited*. At www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/workingpapers/EPWP1401.pdf (accessed 27.2.16).

- Xu, X. W. (1988) 'The Struggle of the Handicraft Cotton Industry against Machine Textiles in China'. *Modern China*, 14 (1): 31–50.
- Yeh, K. C. (1979) 'China's National Income, 1931–36'. In C. M. Hou and T. S. Yu (eds.), *Modern Chinese Economic History*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Yeung, G. (2001) *Foreign Investment and Socio-Economic Development in China: The Case of Dongguan*. London: Palgrave.
- Zhu, J. M. (2013) 'Historical materialism is still the guide for studying CPC history'. At www.csstoday.net/Item/82298.aspx (accessed 10.11.2015).



Geographic and Environmental Setting

David Pietz

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the environmental and physical geographical context of contemporary China. With an emphasis on current dynamics, the chapter assumes a China bounded by an enduring territorial expanse established in the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Contemporary realities are indeed shaped by long-run realities of place. The chapter will examine some of the defining features of climate, and land and water resources, and how these regional dynamics have shaped, and continue to shape, broad currents in China's historical and contemporary experiences. The chapter will combine data and descriptive narrative melded with narrative elements that give cultural meanings to the environmental and geographic settings. The chapter will avoid overwrought environmental/geographic determinism, instead seeking to suggest the broad historical implications of these dynamics. To be sure, any attempt at exploring the complexity of the geographic and environmental setting of a country like China will necessarily mean making choices among a range of potential thematic concerns. Thus, the choice of themes is guided by what the author views as a set of the most critical issues in China's geographic and environmental settings. Before discussing a range of environmental challenges during the contemporary period, the chapter explores China's geographic setting in its spatial setting – from global, regional, national, and sub-national perspectives.

THE GEOGRAPHIC SETTING

A simple look at a world map suggests the enormity of China's territory. Stretching from the Pacific Ocean to beyond the Qinghai/Tibetan plateau in the west; from the border of Vietnam in the south to the border with Russia's far east, China is the fourth largest country by land mass (9.6 million square kilometers), behind only Russia, Canada, and the US. And similar to all these countries, China achieved this size as a result of intentional continental expansion during the 18th and 19th centuries. Although widely known as China's last dynasty, the Qing dynasty was also the administrative force that pushed China's political authority to territorial extent beyond that which any previous Chinese government had achieved. Expanding mostly to the west, Qing armies conquered the territory that is demarcated in contemporary maps of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and more. By the late 18th century Qing lands included present-day Mongolia, which declared 'independence' with Soviet assistance in the early 20th century, as well as smaller bands of territory in northern frontier areas. Indeed, subsequent Chinese political administrations have considered the maintenance of this Qing-era territorial bequest as one of their principle national missions. One need only observe the determination to counter any outside interference in questions of Chinese autonomy over Tibet and Xinjiang (or Taiwan for that matter) as evidence of this perceived historical mandate.

At the same time, China shares a border with sixteen other countries, more than any single country in the world. By and large, China has resolved most modern border disputes with neighboring countries, but questions of autonomy remain as some 22,000 kilometers of border remain in dispute.¹ At the same time, issues of China's sovereignty implicate regional and international interests as the government of the People's Republic continues to claim political authority over the island of Taiwan (Republic of China), as well as over an extensive swath of the South China Sea, which has bumped against completing claims from the governments of Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines, among others. Unresolved questions of geography will likely continue to be one critical factor in shaping China's international relationships for some time into the future.

From this sheer size comes an extraordinary diversity of peoples, landforms, and climate. Although Han Chinese are the dominant ethnic group in China by far, roughly 90 percent of the total population, China's human geography is anything but simple. As suggested above, the legacy of territorial expansion in the late Qing era was a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural empire with a broad array of non-Chinese populations in the western regions of the country. This new identity was layered atop a human geography of 'China proper' where significant groups of non-Han communities existed in the northeast, central, southern, and southwestern regions of China. Since the mid-20th century there has in fact been a lively debate about what constitutes Chinese identity. The impulse to inculcate a strong sense of Chinese identity by political elites

has necessarily impelled the construction of ethnic classifications in China that sharpened the categories of Han and other ethnic groups in China (of which there are now officially 55 ethnic categories or ‘national minorities’). In either event, community identity and the range of associated cultural practices of these communities were very much shaped by physical geography and by climate. That is not to say that we should view geography and climate in any strictly deterministic way, particularly in the contemporary period. It is probably fair to say that during this period there are a variety of forces that shape the lives of individuals and communities in China, not least of which are politics and other cultural phenomena. Nonetheless, even the outcomes of these myriad processes are critically conditioned by the physical realities of place.

China’s Regional Geographic Setting

China’s location on the eastern edge of the Eurasian sub-continent has important characteristics that have shaped its historical and contemporary experiences. To the west and north, mountains and deserts rim the country, while to the east China has a lengthy Pacific coastline. A common trope among China historians and other observers was that these features induced long-term cultural isolation. Certainly, Chinese history has witnessed alternating periods of relative cosmopolitanism and provincialism, but a continuing theme in Chinese history is the complex interplay between Han cultural patterns and patterns of the myriad non-Han Chinese groups at the western and northern frontiers. Exchanges across frontiers of economic practices, technology, and governing institutions between the more sedentary civilization of China and the pastoralist, semi-nomadic groups to the west and north could be contentious, but present a persistent political theme in Chinese history – a theme grounded in the profound differences in the physical landscape of these regions. Indeed, to the present day the government of the PRC continues the challenging negotiation of effectively integrating, for example, Tibetan and Uighur cultural areas into China’s political system.

At the same time, the vast expanses of ocean directly to the east of China and the archipelagic region to the south have presented both opportunities and challenges to China’s statecraft. An early example of China’s ‘going out’ strategy, at least in the maritime realm, were the great voyages during the early Ming Dynasty when Chinese ‘treasure ships’ plied the waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans with a combination of diplomatic, military, and economic objectives. The shutting down of these voyages of discovery, and subsequent careful state management of maritime trade, likely contributed to the complexities that China encountered in managing external relationships when European (and later US and Japan) traders, gunboats, and diplomats arrived in China through the ‘back door’ in large numbers beginning in the early 19th century. At perhaps a more informal level, throughout the late imperial period (1500–1911), large swaths of southeast China experienced a degree of social and economic integration with a

variety of regions in Southeast Asia ranging from Vietnam, through the Indonesian Archipelago, extending to the Philippines. These ‘overseas Chinese’ communities maintained kinship ties with the mainland, and conducted a vibrant regional trade. The legacies of this regional geography of maritime exposure – a sort of interaction that might be termed ambivalent – resonates in China’s contemporary setting. The Janus-like attitude toward civilizational linkages through maritime routes is reflected in China’s management of international trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. The on-again, off-again receptivity to engage international networks has been a recognizable pattern over the past six decades. The careful state management, or at least consciousness, of these relationships is certainly a legacy of patterns of statecraft that necessarily were shaped by the geographic realities of China’s regional setting. At the same time, we might suggest that the very recent claims of autonomy over the islands in the South China Sea are premised in large measure by the historical presence of Chinese cultural actors and trading activity in that region.

Country Scale: Land, Climate, and Water

China’s landmass can be described as a series of topographic steps running from the eastern coastal lowlands up to the Tibetan Plateau. Five major mountain ranges demarcate each step as elevation rises from east to west culminating in the highest elevations on the Tibetan Plateau. China’s continental shelf is the first topographic step. Most of China’s coastal sea regions are above broad continental shelves that range from a few meters to slightly more than 100 meters deep. Of particular importance to China’s economy has been the fishing industry in these regions as well as significant off-shore oil and gas resources that have been developed over the past fifty years. Moving inland there are jagged lines (described elsewhere as more checkerboard patterns) of mountain ranges, between which are hills, plateaus, basins, and plains areas. Much of the iconic landscape of southern and central China is easily conjured in these regions. In the western areas of these ranges the Sichuan Basin is located – one of China’s key agricultural producing regions. Generally speaking, these middle topographic regions, along with the North China Plain, are where China’s agricultural production takes place – in valleys and plateaus with little extended plains regions (with the exception of the North China Plain and northeast China). The challenge of these landforms throughout Chinese history down to the present day has been to generate sufficient food from limited agricultural land to feed an expanding population. Throughout its history, China has done a quite remarkable job in meeting its dietary needs. Indeed, as a whole, China is a mountainous country. Nearly 70 percent of the land mass rises 900–1,000 meters above sea level, with 60 percent above 1,800 meters.. At the western terminus of the ascending topographic staircase then is the Himalayan Mountains, which form the ‘backbone’ of the Tibetan Plateau region.²




Figure 4.1 China's physical geography

Source: Weiping Wu and Piper Gaubatz, *The Chinese City* (New York: Routledge, 2012). By permission.

Operating at the same regional level as China's borders, climate regimes influence China on a broad, sub-continental scale. China's climate is impacted by patterns emanating from continental and monsoonal systems. Each system has a distinct seasonality. During the winter months, most of western and northern China is dominated by continental weather patterns that render these regions cold and dry. During the summer months, monsoon systems from the Pacific Ocean dominate the weather of south China. During July and August, these monsoonal systems push their influence into the North China Plain region when heavy downpours can quickly generate flash floods. Indeed, the majority of total annual rainfall in this important agricultural region is generated during these summer months. The demarcation between the warm, humid sub-tropical environment of the south with the cool, dry continental climate of the north lies roughly along the Qingling Mountains, which roughly parallel the Huai River in central China, between the Yellow River to the north and the Yangtze River to the south.

A critically important corollary to this north-south climate divide is the water supply differential between these two regions. To the south of the Huai River the supply of water reaches between 2,000–3,000 cubic meters per capita,

sufficient to meet consumption needs. By contrast, on the North China Plain there are six administrative regions that have per capita renewable internal water resources below 1,000 cubic meters – a supply considered by the World Bank to be the ‘water poverty mark.’³ From a different perspective, water supply per unit of farmland in North China is roughly 15 percent of the national average.⁴ The other distinguishing feature between north and south China is the total supply and variability of rainfall. As stated above, the vast majority of rainfall in North China falls during the summer months. But total annual rainfall remains well below that of the south. Consequently, the comparatively low annual amounts of precipitation, combined with summer months when massive downpours can occur, has resulted in a long history of droughts and floods. These climatic events have proved a critically important challenge for Chinese statecraft, right down to the contemporary era, of maintaining ecological equilibria in a region that is one of China’s main agricultural producing regions (see below for more on the environmental challenges of domestic food production).

In south China, favorable climatic conditions led to the development of agricultural and social patterns centered on wet rice cultivation. A combination of sufficient rainfall and the diffusion of agricultural technology, including irrigation practices and early maturing rice, led to development of commodity production that transformed the south, particularly the Yangtze River valley, into the breadbasket of China. Indeed, during much of the imperial period, the state reallocated surplus agricultural production of the south to feed administrative and military centers in north China, as well as to alleviate famine on the North China Plain. In addition to the contemporary importance of agricultural production in south China, the region’s water surplus has been appropriated by the state to support water-deficit areas of North China, including the large urban areas of Tianjin and Beijing. The long-term implications of this attempt to override climatic conditions will be of critical importance to maintaining continued agricultural, urban, and industrial growth in North China.

Western China presents a startling contrast in climatic conditions, with important implications for domestic political stability, China’s overall water supply, and for international relations. Virtually all of China’s northwest region is arid, with average annual rainfall in Xinjiang of 514 mm per year.⁵ This step climate has induced lifeways quite different from those of the dominant Han ethnic majority of China proper. At various moments in imperial and post-imperial history, Chinese states have sought to implement environmental management regimes developed in the more humid regions of east and central China. Irrigation systems and other water management schemes have altered local ecosystems that have complicated the efforts of Chinese states in the recent several decades to promote Han migrations and broad efforts to address regional economic disparity between east and west China through a variety of economic development schemes.

Similar tensions have expressed themselves in the Qinghai and Tibetan plateau regions of China's western and southwestern regions. Continental weather patterns generate mostly cold and dry conditions, but of particular importance that extends well beyond these regions is snowpack in the towering mountains and valleys of these plateau regions. Two of China proper's most important waterways, the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, have their respective sources in western China. At the same time, the Himalayan Plateau is the 'water tower' of Asia. Most of the principle waterways of South and Southeast Asia begin in China's southwest. The Irawaddy, Ganges, Mekong, and the Brahmaputra are just a few of the aquatic lifelines that downstream communities in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India rely upon for resources. China's determination to capture the energy potential of these rivers in the upstream have generated political tensions as downstream riparian countries seek to maintain sufficient water supply for agricultural, municipal, and industrial purposes. Managing these transnational waterways will continue to shape China's relationships with South and Southeast Asian countries for many years to come.

Regional (or Sub-national) Scale: Topography, Resources, Land Cover, and Land Use

In the mid-1930s, Hu Huanyong, considered the father of population geography in China, conceptualized a China with two main regions. The two regions were demarcated by the Aihui–Tengchong Line (also referred to as the Heihe–Tengchong line) extending from Heilong Province in northeast China to southwest Yunnan Province. East of the diagonal line was territory that comprised 35 percent of China's land mass, but accounted for over 90 percent of the country's population. To the west, the ratios reversed: 65 percent of China's territory, with only 4 percent of the population.⁶ This 'geo-demographic line' largely holds true today to differentiate two very distinct regions in terms of population density, topography, grain production, and industrial capacity (see Figure 4.2). The eminent China scholar G. William Skinner put forth a regional approach to Chinese history based on marketing systems, but in order to achieve a broader sense of regional diversity in China, we can roughly divide China into four large regions: northeast (NE), southeast (SE), southwest (SW), and northwest (NW), with the bisecting lines running roughly at 110° longitude (East) and 35° latitude (North).⁷ This division artificially segregates a number of spatial patterns and processes that operate at a larger scale as explored above, but the demarcation serves to differentiate unique geographic identities.

The Northeast

China's northeast region is largely dominated by plains, with distinct variations in soils, land cover, and land use. To the north, the region was traditionally



Figure 4.2 China's population distribution

Source: Weiping Wu and Piper Gaubatz, *The Chinese City* (New York: Routledge, 2012). By permission.

forested, with moderate temperatures in the summer and frigid conditions in the winter months. This region, formerly known as Manchuria and home of the conquering Manchus of the Qing dynasty, was an engine of China's economic growth during the 20th century. Endowed with resources like coal and oil (in addition to timber), the region was considered strategic by Russia and Japan. After 1949, the area continued to be an industrial center, as well as an agricultural producing region with soils and climate suitable for dryland farming.

Climate and soils change considerably in this region as one enters the North China Plain bounded by the Huai River to the north, the Yangtze River to the south, with the Yellow River running between. Indeed, the Yellow River has largely governed the geography of this region. As stated earlier, climate patterns on the North China Plain have frequently generated periods of famine as alternating episodes of drought and flooding have challenged agricultural communities. In a region on the margin of both continental and monsoon weather patterns, rainfall is generally limited, but can occur in downpours that can generate drainage problems, particularly in the lower reaches of the Yellow River basin. Indeed, a major challenge for the state is to maintain the Yellow River within its dikes. Historically, the Yellow River has indeed burst through defensive structures and has ranged from north to south creating a broad alluvial plain. With the proper application of fertilizers, these alluvial soils of the North China Plain make it one of the breadbaskets of China. But the entire ecological balance in the region was

precarious. When the rains did not arrive, drought could hit hard. During such events the state had a long tradition of easing inflationary pressures by releasing state-stored grain into the market. In contemporary China, the challenges of maintaining an ecological balance in North China is critically important to political and economic security in the region and beyond. One fundamental component of this calculus from the state's point of view is maintaining sufficient agricultural output in this region to circumvent undue reliance on imported food – a situation that China's leaders feel compromises Chinese autonomy. As suggested by these challenges of climate to agricultural production, one of the most significant features of the geographic setting of Northeast China, particularly the North China Plain, is access to water resources. Although two of China's mightiest rivers, the Yellow River and Yangtze River, flow through the region, allocating adequate quantities of clean water to maintain contemporary industrial growth, expansion of agriculture, and urbanization will continue to be a challenge for China's political elites for decades to come.

The Southeast

Combined with the northeast region, southeast China formed the eastern one-third of China dominated by Han Chinese and forming the heartland of Chinese society, economy, and culture. This eastern region is the locus of agricultural and industrial production, is the center of political authority, and is where the majority of China's large urban areas are located. When one conjures perhaps more traditional images of China, one is likely to be thinking of eastern China, particularly southeast China, where the landscape is marked by hills and mountains with lush green valleys of intensive agriculture watered with ample rainfall. Indeed, throughout history this verdant and mountainous landscape inspired rich cultural traditions in painting and poetic expression.

The southeast region incorporates the provinces of the Yangtze River valley, the southern provinces including the economic powerhouse of Guangdong Province, and the culturally and economically rich Sichuan basin on the western edges of this region. There are two rather remarkable features of the physical landscape that have shaped contemporary realities in China: first, high population densities on limited arable land; and second, the coastal areas of this region that have been engines of economic growth after 1978. Southeast China has the highest population densities in all of China. When considering the limited land resources available for extensive and large-scale agriculture, the capacity to maintain sufficient output to sustain high population densities in the contemporary period is no small achievement. By and large these successes have been due to agricultural inputs such as new strains of rice, fertilizer, and chemical pesticides/herbicides. Persistent conditions of over-employment in the rural sectors in the southeast, hastened by the accelerated demographic growth after 1949 (and all of eastern China), have been relieved in the Post-Mao era as investment and trade

policies served to promote extraordinary rates of urbanization in China. Between 1990 and 2014 annual urban population growth ranged from 2.8 percent to 4.3 percent. As large as these percentage values are, the absolute numbers of people engaged in urban migrations in China during this period is unprecedented.⁸ Much of this demographic transition in the early post-Mao period began in the southeast, with Shenzhen the iconic example of how new investment and trade regimes transformed urban spaces in China. Designated as one of four Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in 1980, all of them in southeast China, Shenzhen was established as a laboratory of sorts to experiment with novel forms of foreign investment and trade policies, all designed to expand economic growth. Shenzhen boomed, and served as a model for similar investment regimes in a variety of coastal and interior spaces by 2000. As shall be explored below, this profound shift of the economic and social landscape of southeast China has generated concerns for the physical landscape as the growth of urban areas, in all of China, has impacted the availability of agricultural land, the allocation of water across economic sectors, and of course, the quality of water and air resources.

The Southwest

For China's political elites perhaps the fundamental contemporary geographic challenge for China's southwestern region is how to exploit the resources of the region to spur economic growth (for the region and country) and integration, while maintaining firm autonomy over a region with contrasting cultural traditions with those of Han China. These challenges are shaped by the distinctive topography of the Tibetan Plateau. Since the late 1990s, the state has expended increasing resources to better integrate the southwest region into the national economy. Perhaps the iconic project designed to achieve this goal is the impressive engineering accomplishment of the Qinghai–Tibet Railroad, inaugurated in 2006. As the world's highest railroad, traversing passes of heights of 5,000 meters, trains connect Lhasa with Xining in Qinghai Province, where lines connect to points all over the country. This particular initiative was part of a broad thrust begun in the 1990s referred to as the 'develop the west' campaign, which was designed to transcend the challenges of geography by developing the resources of the western regions in order to incorporate these regions into the national web of economic production and consumption. A corollary was, of course, the hope that economic growth and integration would promote political passivity.

There has long been speculation on the potential mineral and carbon resources on the Tibetan Plateau, but one Tibetan Plateau resource that is very much on the minds of state leaders is water. The plateau region is the source of many rivers that, because of their steep gradient flowing off the plateau, have substantial hydroelectric capacity. During the past twenty years Chinese state firms have aggressively developed water resources with a variety of hydroelectric dam projects on many of the region's major rivers, including, as referenced above,

many transnational waterways. Some leaders see electricity advancing the cause of Tibetan economic growth, but much of the electricity generated by these Himalayan rivers is transported by long-distance transmission lines to other areas of the southwest (e.g., Yunnan Province), and beyond – all the way to industrial centers in Guangdong Province. Thus, the tensions that the state has to negotiate with developing the water resources of the Tibetan Plateau region necessarily implicate a cost–benefit analysis. How can the resources of the ‘water tower of Asia’ be further balanced while maintaining a positive relationship with downstream riparian countries in South and Southeast Asia whose economies are dependent on river resources?⁹

The Northwest

Although the physical setting of most of northwest China is quite distinct from southwest China, there are similar challenges to the state in effectively incorporating this region into the Chinese political sphere. The overriding geographic and climatic feature of the northwest is aridity. In terms of human geography, the region has traditionally been dominated by non-Han communities, the most important being the Uighurs, a Turkic ethnic group that practices Islam.¹⁰ Similar to the broad dynamics pertaining on the Tibetan Plateau, political leaders in China continue to negotiate the difficult physical and social challenges of this region.



Map 10 China's transnational Waterways

Figure 4.3 The ‘Water Tower of Asia’

Source: *The Yellow River: The Problem of Water in Modern China* by David A. Pietz, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2015 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted with permission.

Since 1949, there have been concerted efforts to bring sedentary agricultural practices to the northwest. Inspired by the Soviets, and by historical patterns of Chinese rule in the northwest, the critical goal was bringing water to the parched and sandy soils to cultivate crops like cotton. Beginning in the 1950s the state mobilized military and civilian constituencies to build an irrigation infrastructure that diverted surface water to the newly mapped and prepared fields. As in the Soviet experience, there was immediate success in growing cotton in the desert, but the long-term outcomes included river desiccation, and in some locations, soil salinization, as insufficient attention was brought to drainage in irrigated areas. These continuing battles to maintain some semblance of agricultural production, as well as to provide water for industrial and growing urban demand, is evidenced by discussions between China and Russia in early 2016 on a plan to divert water resources from the Russian far east to China's thirsty central Asian region.¹¹

Oil and minerals also feature strongly in the economic geography of China's northwest. Again, similar to the situation in the southwest region, China has invested considerable financial and moral resources in the campaign to develop the economy of western China, in part to better integrate the region in economic, and political, terms. Oil and gas reserves have yet to be evaluated definitively, but current estimates suggest significant reserves. The critical issues to further development include an effective distribution infrastructure to transport to refining and consumption centers in the east, coupled with as yet insufficient nodes of demand closer to these reserves in the western portion of the country, and a complicated geology that makes production only profitable in an environment of high global crude prices. The exploitation of significant coal and other mineral resources faces the same challenges of investment. Implicit in state and private investment in extractive industries in China's northwest is its impact on non-Han communities in the region. There is a strong sense that such investment has limited benefits to local communities, and this sentiment adds fuel to resentment of a range of cultural policies designed and enforced by Beijing that have sought to weaken the ethnic and religious identities of these indigenous communities.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING

The fact that China's profound economic restructuring and growth during the past several decades has been accompanied by significant environmental change is widely recognized. Images of sooty air and murky waters are perhaps just as prominent in the narrative of China's transformation as are gleaming office towers and bullet trains. A cursory glance at several metrics lend empirical support to the impressions of China's environmental change that images and personal and journalistic accounts impart: twenty of the world's thirty most polluted cities are located in China; the North China Plain has one-tenth the per capita supply of water deemed sufficient for normal livelihood; and the leading cause

of death of children under five is diarrhea from dirty water.¹² Indeed, the narrative of environmental destruction and constraints facing contemporary China are clearly connected with the transformative economic changes that have occurred during the past several decades. And there is much truth to this perception. The pace and nature of economic, social, and institutional change in post-Mao China has had equally rapid qualitative environmental consequences. While recognizing important dynamics of the contemporary period that have clearly influenced environmental changes in China, there are also longer-term historical forces within which these more contemporary dynamics operate. In other words, contemporary environmental challenges are embedded in historical patterns of social, economic, and institutional change in China.

Environmental Change in 20th Century China

Any broad overview of environmental change in contemporary China must seek an analytical balance that negotiates the forces of change and continuity. To be sure, a cursory glance at the range of state systems that China ‘experimented’ with in the twentieth century is suggestive of potentially dramatic change when contrasted with the imperial system. But beyond these broad differences in state systems, there was indeed significant change in economic organization, scientific and technical orientation, and political and social organization that had distinctive environmental outcomes – both in kind and degree. Many of these dynamics of change can be placed under the broad rubric of the ‘internationalization’ of China in the twentieth century.¹³

Enduring patterns of human and physical endowments, as well as state patterns, continued to shape the nature of environmental change in China during the twentieth century. The number of people in post-imperial China continued to increase. The pressures to feed this population meant further expectations to increase productivity of land resources. The historical success of increasingly intensified agricultural production to feed an expanding population may have contributed to a reluctance to rely on global grain markets during the second half of the century. In either event, China’s limited tillable land resources and the vagaries of climate continue to shape China’s actions toward the environment. Maximizing agricultural productivity and managing wide disparities in precipitation across regions has perpetuated traditional managerial practices as well as introduced innovation in the modern period (e.g., intensive chemical fertilizers).

China’s pan-twentieth century internationalization included technological innovation and exchange that had distinct consequences for its natural environment. Mark Elvin argues that

it was the West’s provision of China with access to modern techniques of government and communication that made possible the escape from the environmental prison house that late imperial China had, with sophisticated premodern ingenuity, built for itself. But for this western contribution, the huge current population of China ... would not have been possible.¹⁴

The contribution of western science and technology, and the economic and organizational forms it promoted, had a significant effect on the Chinese landscape. The material and intellectual tools of modernity brought forth the capacity in the west to leap forward in the long historical process from adaptation to, control of, the natural world. In China, while always subject to the vagaries of social, economic, and climatic forces, human manipulation of nature was achieved during the imperial period in ways that were unique in global history. Again, it might be argued that such traditions provided a receptive context to more readily accept new technological and organizational regimes from the west in the 19th and 20th centuries that represented new possibilities for manipulation of China's resources that had already deteriorated in the late imperial period.

The statist and technocratic approach to environmental management followed by the Nationalist Government in the mid-20th century continued after 1949, but this developmental approach was punctuated with periods of populist or anti-urban tenor – each reflecting differing paths toward communist modernity that played out in the decades following 1949. The Great Leap Forward was one period that valorized local, rural (anti-urban), and peasant knowledge, organization, and practices. The sending of urban youth to the countryside and the industrialization of rural China were perhaps the two most prominent examples of this celebration of the pastoral.¹⁵ Empowered by direct encouragement from Mao Zedong, local leaders aggressively organized irrigation projects by recruiting massive labor campaigns to rapidly expand agricultural production by employing the rhetoric of 'militarization' (*junshihua*), 'combatization' (*zhandouhua*), and 'disciplinization' (*jilihua*).¹⁶ Throughout the country, millions of farmers were recruited, regimented, and implored to turn the dry plains into lush agricultural lands. By January 1958 'one in six people was digging earth in China. More than 580 million cubic meters of rocks and soil were moved before the end of the year ... they could accomplish in a matter of months what their forefathers had done in thousands of years.'¹⁷ The haste with which many of these projects were completed rendered them short-lived.

Great Leap Forward policies also included mobilizing commune labor for reforestation efforts in the Northwest, rural industrialization, and the 'Grain First' campaign beginning in 1959. The effort to forestall further erosion of the Loess Plateau occurred before the Great Leap Forward, but plans suggesting an intensification of these efforts during the Great Leap Forward were put forth. The outcomes of these efforts are not well known, but there is some reason to believe that initial energy waned rather quickly as enervated farmers quickly abandoned an effort that seemingly did not generate immediate returns. The outcomes of rural industrialization efforts, particularly the so called 'back-yard furnaces,' included a significant destruction of local timber resources – much of which had been planted in and by localities under exhortation by the central government after 1949. Finally, an additional example of Great Leap Forward policies that had a

profound influence on the environment was the 'grain first' policy enunciated in 1959 as a response to reports of famine. After launching the policy of 'taking grain as the key link,' provincial and commune officials attempted to promote a 10 percent increase in grain production by extending advice that included deep-plowing, close-cropping, and additional inputs of irrigation water.¹⁸ The results of the grain-first campaign, indeed the entire matrix of practices that governed the human–environment nexus, were a disaster of unprecedented proportions. The combination of social engineering, environmental management, and agricultural practices led to the Great Leap Famine where a number of 25–30 million deaths lay at the low end of the spectrum of estimates.¹⁹

The Reform Period (1978–)

Perhaps the two most emblematic images in our collective perceptions of China in recent times are gleaming and bustling urban spaces, and defiled air and water resources. And we know there is a clear connection between the two. There are other linkages that we can cite – connections between resource constraints of the Maoist and post-Maoist period as development in the former came at the expense of the latter; between the post-Maoist period and the entire post-imperial period when high modernism justified re-orienting the natural world; and there is a connection between the post-Mao period and the imperial period where historians see parallels with the enormous wealth and population of both eras resting on a precarious ecological balance. But there are important developments in the post-Mao period that give contemporary environmental dynamics a different character (though with both having clear historical roots). The first is China's thoroughgoing integration in global international networks (a consequence of China's long process of internationalization in the twentieth century), and the growth of an explicit environmental consciousness either as a rediscovery of perceived attentiveness toward nature in traditional philosophical/ethical systems and/or a rediscovery of strains of the Romantic notions of nature introduced in China during the late 19th century.

Water Resources After 1978

The post-Mao reforms unleashed economic, social, and political forces that hastened the process of ecological transformations. Industrial growth, urban expansion, and intensification of agriculture further pressured scarce water resources and degraded water quality. Industrial growth in urban and rural areas has represented a significant call on water resources. Of particular consequence was the growth of Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) in the 1990s that inefficiently used water in consumer industries and generally lacked pollution control capacities. The collective effect of such industries was highlighted in the late 1990s as information on conditions in the Huai River became known domestically and

internationally and sparked a massive government clean-up of the river that, in some sections, was deemed by China's Environmental Protection Bureau too polluted for any use.²⁰ There are higher ratios of industrial wastewater in North China since there are lower flow rates than in south China, and because of the existence of an older industrial base in these regions. Thus, modern industrial growth represents a dual threat:

On the one hand there are the problems we expect to find in an underdeveloped and over-populated agricultural society such as soil erosion, deforestation and desertification. On the other hand, the rapidly growing industrial sector means that China is facing widespread pollution problems of a sophisticated nature.²¹

Complementing industrial development is profound urban growth and its impact on water demand. Urban migration has swelled the number of city dwellers equivalent to creating a new city of 1 million people every ten years.²² Urban migration has obvious implications for China's water supply infrastructure. In North China, water diversions to fast growing cities such as Tianjin, Qingdao, and Dalian from regional rivers were common developments in the 1980s and 1990s. Compounding the issue of how many mouths now to hydrate (and provide sanitary services to), is what a growing number of urbanites are putting into their bellies. Changing dietary patterns that have been marked by an increase in meat protein have resulted in significant increases in water consumption to support urban diets. To generate one kilogram of boneless beef requires feed that consumes 15,340 litres of water to grow.

The pressures on China's agriculture to feed an expanding population with changing dietary patterns have increased. Agriculture remains the single largest water consuming sector of the economy by far (75 percent). Until relatively recently China's capacity to feed itself has been impressive. Indeed, the challenges to such success are considerable: population growth, changing consumption patterns, industrial pollution, loss of arable farmland to urban sprawl, and competition from the energy sector (production of fuel crops). China's farmers have managed to increase production through expanded application of chemical fertilizers and water (irrigation). But continued expansion by these means is limited by long-term challenges that China has faced for centuries. First is the endowment of water, particularly on the North China Plain. In the face of surface-water limitations, Chinese farmers have exploited ground water resources to an unusual extent. The enormous boom of tube-wells since the 1960s has reduced groundwater resources in some areas beyond recharge levels and threatens continued exploitation by rural as well as urban users. The steady decline of organic matter and nutrient content of agricultural lands has been countered by intensified use of chemical fertilizers. But agricultural runoff is a major source of surface water pollution and eutrophication of water in China. Erosion and desertification have also quickened as aggressive farmland reclamation and general ineffectiveness of reforestation efforts begun in the 1950s.²³ Compounding the ecological

outcomes of quickened economic forces since 1978 has been the erosion of central government capacity to enforce environmental regulations. China has a fairly well articulated body of environmental law, but the capacity of the central government to compel local governments to enforce these regulations over industries in their respective bailiwick is weak. Elizabeth Economy expands this critique by arguing that resource management practices are inhibited by:

significant corruption and an authoritarian but highly decentralized political economy, which means that directives are issued but often not followed. China also suffers from poor enforcement capacity, weak price signals to encourage conservation and wastewater treatment, and a lack of transparency ... concerning large water-related projects.²⁴

Air Quality Since 1978

The environmental challenge in contemporary China that has perhaps garnered greatest global attention has been air pollution. It is fair to say that virtually every large urban area in China regularly experiences levels of atmospheric pollution considered inimical to public health. Without question, rates of urbanization and industrial growth are the principle forces behind air quality degradation.

China's rapid industrial growth rates over the past several decades have largely been fueled by coal. Coal accounts for roughly 70 percent of China's total energy consumption, and 50 percent of total global coal consumption. During this same period, the number of civilian vehicles in China has jumped from 16 million in 2000 to near 100 million in 2015. Other sectors of the economy also experienced robust growth, such as the chemical, petrochemical, cement, and steel industries. Collectively, these burgeoning economic sectors, combined with inadequate regulation, have produced serious air quality challenges that have generated serious health issues. For example, a recent study argued that particulate matter smaller than 2.5 micrometers (PM_{2.5}) represented the fourth most significant public health threat in China, and is the leading cause of malignant tumors in China. The incidence of lung cancer has also risen nearly 500 percent in the past twenty years. Other studies have suggested that between 350,000 and a half-million people die prematurely in China because of outdoor air pollution.²⁵

Faced with internal and external criticisms that were punctuated by a series of rather embarrassing 'smog outs' beginning in 2011, the government launched in 2012 a National Plan on Air Pollution Control in Key Regions in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–16) that call for meeting the World Health Organization's recommended limitations on fine particles (i.e., less than 2.5 micrometers). Shortly after, in 2013, the state issued the first National Action Plan on Air Pollution Prevention and Control that mandated particulate matter less than 10 micrometers be reduced by 10 percent from 2012 levels, and the number of 'blue sky' days increase year on year during the life of the plan. Similar plans have been announced to aggressively reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. The impulse to decrease these classes of air pollutants has been spurred

not only by domestic health considerations, but also by international pressures as regions in East Asia, as well as the Americas, have increasing evidence of air quality degradation emanating from China. De-sulphurization, catalytic reducers, and electrostatic precipitators are all elements of China's planned investments in controlling polluting emissions.²⁶

At the level of popular discourse, there is a strong undercurrent that environmental challenges like polluted air are an unavoidable concomitant to economic expansion. Thus, as this line of reasoning proceeds, China will clean up its environmental problems once a certain level of development has been achieved (often put in terms of per capita income). The model often cited here is the historical experience of the west. Although one also hears this discourse emanating from policy actors, there is at the same time a widespread recognition at local and central levels that contemporary development need not come at the expense of degraded resources. Such a recognition is reflected in China's environmental regulatory regime of strong guarantees of resource protection. The overriding problem with China's pollution mitigation, in both the realm of air and water, is the state incapacity to compel compliance with these mandates from local governments. Faced with the responsibility for implementation of environmental mitigation, as well as economic performance, local officials often eschew responsibilities of the former in the interests of the latter.²⁷

Land Use Changes Since 1978

Perhaps the single greatest concern related to water in China is food. With just seven percent of the world's arable land, China attempts to feed roughly one-quarter of the world's population. Ensuring grain self-sufficiency requires maintaining sufficient land under cultivation with access to clean surface and sub-surface water supplies. Indeed, over half of China's farmland is irrigated. During the past several decades, estimates of China's agricultural acreage have diverged rather dramatically, but a central concern of state leaders has been to limit the impact of rapid urbanization and industrial development on land resources. But this has been a difficult task. With incessant pressures of economic development, and with the limited reach of the central government in regulating unchecked urban and industrial expansion, central mandates designed to preserve farmland have been compromised. Complicating the food security calculus has been the evolution of consumption patterns that have driven changes in agricultural production. The diets of increasingly affluent urban consumers have diversified, and while farmers have moved up the value-added production chain from grains to fruits, vegetables, and nuts. Second, larger supplies of grain are necessary to feed livestock, as urban consumers increasingly incorporate animal proteins in their diets. With available grain production for human consumption stressed by land and water constraints, and production and consumption patterns influenced by the domestic market, the challenge for China to meet

its oft-stated goal of food self-sufficiency is to maximize grain production by stabilizing agricultural acreage and by maintaining access to clean irrigation water. As late as 2008, Chinese farmers produced roughly 90 percent of the country's staple agricultural products, but the pressures of demographic expansion, as well as industrial and urban expansion continue apace.

Aggressive efforts to expand cultivation, exploit forest resources, and increase livestock grazing in arid and semi-arid areas in the northeast, north, and northwest regions of China (referred to as the Three Norths) have led to desertification. One estimate has calculated that 3.3 million square kilometers has been impacted by desertification, 34 percent of China's total land.²⁸ Desertification is one of the major sources of land degradation in China. Desertification complicates the air pollution problem in major cities as dust storms sweep across the northern belt of the country. After 1949 the government embarked on afforestation campaigns modelled on other mass movements, but similar to these other efforts (e.g., irrigation campaigns of the Great Leap Forward), lack of attention to soils, climate, and geomorphology mitigated the effectiveness of forest shelterbelts. In 1978 the government renewed afforestation efforts with the Three Norths Shelterbelt Program, which sought to increase forest coverage in arid and semi-arid regions from 5 percent to 15 percent. Set to be completed in 2050, the Three-Norths project has been widely recognized as the world's largest land conservation program. Despite recent claims by the state that forest cover has risen 10 percent, there is an increasing literature from China that suggests these claims may be overstated, and perhaps more importantly, massive afforestation efforts have generated negative outcomes. These studies suggest the rate of desertification has not been ameliorated. Indeed, an increasing consensus seems to be emerging that truly effective mitigation of desertification may only be achievable by restoring natural ecological systems to these regions.²⁹

The Potential Impacts of Climate Change

During the past two decades, the state channeled substantial money to research institutions like the Academy of Sciences to forecast the potential consequences of climate change. Of particular concern in this research agenda is the fate of precipitation, glaciers, and snowpack on the Tibet–Qinghai plateau. The melt from glaciers and annual snowfall from the region feed rivers that serve 47 percent of the world's people. There is little agreement on the precise outcomes of climate change, but a growing body of Chinese and international research suggests that the Himalayan region will be substantially affected by rising temperatures. Greater runoff will initially generate increased flows, but over the long term, runoff will decrease and other potential consequences of climate change such as reduced precipitation in the Yellow River valley and North China Plain will intensify water scarcity. According to a 2007 Chinese study, Himalayan glaciers could decline by one-third by 2050, and by one-half by 2090. The