

Volker Küster | Robert Setio (Eds.)

# Muslim Christian Relations Observed

Comparative Studies from Indonesia and the Netherlands



Contact Zone



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Muslim Christian Relations Observed

# *ContactZone*

Explorations in Intercultural Theology

edited by

Prof. Dr. Volker Küster  
(Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)

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Comparative Studies from Indonesia and the Netherlands



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## Introduction

*Volker Küster and Robert Setio*

The Indonesian Dutch Consortium on Muslim-Christian Relations is in a certain sense a grass root initiative. Its foundations were laid at a meeting between representatives of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PKN) under the leadership of its mission organization *Kerk in Actie* (KIA) and the Indonesian Council of Churches in Kaliurang, the retreat center of Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW) in the vicinity of Yogyakarta (6-8 October 2010). During the discussions about future cooperation Muslim-Christian relations were identified as one of the target areas if it comes to theological issues. PERSERTIA, the umbrella organization of the theological schools in Indonesia, chaired by Robert Setio, was co-opted on the spot. In the Netherlands the Protestant Theological University (PThU) as the official body of theological training for the pastors of the PKN was invited for cooperation. Finally colleagues from the Free University in Amsterdam (VU) and the Radboud University in Nijmegen (RUN) came aboard.

In some preliminary meetings between the editors in Yogyakarta and later with some of the Dutch participants in Utrecht, five sub-themes were agreed upon: *Identity, Religion and State, Gender, Hermeneutics* and *Theology of Dialogue*. A first consultation was held in Kampen on May 23-24, 2011 bringing together most of the Dutch participants in the research project with an Indonesian delegation. A crucial issue at this meeting was the controversial Islam nota that had recently been discussed at the synod of the PKN and was supposed to be revised in the light of the reactions of international partner churches. The major conference again took place in Kaliurang (March 26-30, 2012). The opening ceremony was celebrated on the UKDW campus

in Yogya. The exhibition “Dialogue through the Arts” that was held in conjunction with the consortium meeting in the university court yard bringing together Christian and Muslim artists also inspired the music and dance performance prepared by lecturers and students of Duta Wacana. A cultural exposure program further introduced the participants to the rich cultural life of Java. The Indonesian hospitality alone made the conference an unforgettable experience.

The genuine feature of the consortium is that it brought together not only Christian academics from the Netherlands and Indonesia, which is already an accomplishment in itself but also Muslim academics from both countries as well as social activists, Christian and Muslim alike. While what is published here is the academic output, the impact of the conference has therefore been much broader. The present publication is organized into five parts following the subthemes identified at the very beginning of the journey. Each section has an individual introduction by its chair person. The book has attracted attention already before its publication. It is hoped that this initiative will be carried on.

While reading the last proofs of the manuscript the editors were reached by the sad news that Prof. Dr. Henk Vroom, one of the founding members of the consortium, passed away. Many of his colleagues in the Netherlands and Indonesia will remember his tireless engagement for interreligious dialogue.

The editors, who have had the pleasure of coordinating the endeavor since its inauguration, wish to sincerely thank Corrie van der Ven from KIA for her support not only in financial matters. The PThU has covered logistic costs like airfares and hosted the preparatory consultation. The other participating Dutch Universities have also supported their representatives financially. Locherfonds and Stichting Zonneweelde have made this publication possible. We finally thank Dr. Annette Weidhas from the *Evangelische Verlagsanstalt* in Leipzig for the fast and uncomplicated realization of our first common project.

## **Introduction to the Second Edition**

*Volker Küster and Robert Setio*

The contour of Muslim-Christian relationships has undergone compelling changes in the short time since the first publication of this volume in 2014. The case of the Christian Governor of Jakarta Basuki (Ahok) Tjahaja Purnama (\*1966) and the recent bombings of three churches in Surabaya shall be briefly analyzed to illustrate this.

### *Politics and Religion*

In 2017 Ahok, a politician of Chinese descent who is non-Muslim, was running for reelection as governor of Jakarta (capital city of the country). After having served as Vice-Governor under Joko (Jokowi) Widodo (\*1961) for a few months, who soon won the presidential election, Ahok became governor himself in October 2014. During his reelection campaign he was opposed by other candidates with Muslim background and, as popularly identified, indigenous people. The Chinese-Christian politician, on the basis of a twisted posting on Facebook was accused of insulting Islam. As a matter of fact Ahok had criticized the misuse of the Quran by his political opponents to discredit him because of his Christian faith. He was then brought to court and accused of trespassing under the notorious blasphemy law. Before the incident many survey results indicated his popularity was above his competitors (almost 60%). It turned quite abruptly after the incident. Ahok was then defeated and his competitor who comes from an Arab family won the election. There is no doubt that religion played a significant role in changing the electability of the candidates which led to the defeat of the non-Muslim and non-indigenous politician.

The popularity of Ahok as anti-corruption leader who had inspired not only the people of Jakarta but also the whole country, does not

have any meaning anymore since he was portrayed as insulting Islam. While the country is entering the so-called political years when there will be simultaneous regional elections across 171 regions in the middle of 2018, then the legislative and presidential elections in the following year, there is a fear that the use of religion for a practical political purpose such as in the case of Ahok will reoccur.

However, the incident has aroused the spirit of moderate Muslims who disagree with the use of religion to denigrate a leadership candidate. They argue that Indonesia is not a religious country, not to mention an Islamic country. Despite the fact that Muslims are the majority of the population, the Constitution does not deny the right of non-Muslims to be elected as a regional or national leader. These moderate Muslims who come from every level and group in the society are concerned that the increasing intolerant attitude towards non-Muslims should be balanced or countered more openly. They cannot accept ignorance in this respect because the intolerant people are few in number. The mass demonstrations from October to December 2016 against Ahok nevertheless show that these intolerant people and groups can be influential. Their number does not reflect the force they can build up from the people. When there is a good political momentum their hard rhetoric can easily incite the emotions of the people that would damage the popularity of a non-Muslim.

Attempts to counter the intolerant attitude have been on the increase since the incident of the Jakarta gubernatorial election which involve the two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, as well as national Islamic leaders such as the former Muhammadiyah chairman, Buya Syafii Maarif, and many Nahdlatul Ulama influential figures. Young scholars from Islamic state universities and from youth organizations under Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are also very active in intercepting intolerant speeches in social media and in mosques all over the country. The government through the Religious Affairs Ministry and other institutions, especially, the Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education, has also worked hard in spreading tolerant messages and educate people to block intolerant ideas. On the side of civil society, the role of NGOs in countering extreme ideology particularly the one that relates to religion is also significant.

*Destruction of Christian Churches*

The religious harmony law of 2006 requires Christians who want to build a church to gather 60 signatures from Christians in the area and 90 from believers of other faiths, with the names in support being made public. As a consequence many churches have not been built or have been torn down because of lack of a proper permit. Churches have been torched by radical Muslims in Aceh, Bekasi (Jakarta), Poso and Ambon. The most spectacular terrorist incident since the Bali bombings (2002) however were the recent bomb attacks on three Christian churches in Surabaya on Sunday May 13th 2018, carried out by the members of one family, including their children. Even though Muslim organizations are regularly criticizing such events they are signs of a radicalization of Indonesian Islam and a growing threat for the Christian minority.

Robert Setio originally comes from one of the three churches attacked in Surabaya himself, the GKI Diponegoro, belonging to the Protestant denomination of Indonesians of Chinese decent. He visited Surabaya a week after the bombings and talked with the people there including the janitor who got a serious injury when he tried to stop the terrorist mother and the two daughters from entering the church. After meditating and observing the reactions of the bombing, he wrote the following personal account.

The attack on three different churches with three different denominations (Catholic, Protestant, and Pentecostal) in Surabaya, East Java, may come as a surprise, but, may also not be that surprising. It was not surprising because some days before the event there was a riot at the National Police's Mobile Brigade (Mako Brimob) headquarters Depok (nearby Jakarta) in which some terrorists were detained – it is also the same prison where the former governor of Jakarta, Ahok is confined. The riot was conducted by the terrorist detainees who felt that they had been treated unfairly by the guards, and they could not get the food their families brought for them. The detainees were able to occupy the headquarter for a few days before they surrendered and were moved to Nusa Kambangan, the highest security prison in the country. Since then, there was a fear that there would be a retaliation from their supporters. This fear is reasonable since there are more than 500 hardliner groups who have been identified by the police as potential terrorists. But, the police cannot catch them because there is no law supporting such a preventive action. Only after the Surabaya bombing, the House of Representatives passed an anti-terrorism law

that could be used for such action. This House did it after a long delay. The President has given an ultimatum to the House that if they did not pass the law yet in a few months, the Government would pass a rule that would allow the police to detain a potential terrorist. Consequently, the House seems not to have a choice but to agree to pass the Anti-terrorism Law.

While on the side of security, the Law can be seen as a progress in confining terrorist acts, on the side of civil society there has also been some progress. Various organizations, religious and non-religious alike, have collaborated in sending a clear message from the moderates. In Surabaya, banners and posters hang in every corner of the city expressing anger towards the terrorists. They also use typical guttural of Surabayan people. This reaction shows that the suicide bombing has disgusted the people of the city, known to be open, frank, expressive, yet, very egalitarian. Seeing the character of the Surabayan people, nobody expected that such brutal and inhumane act could take place in Surabaya. It is more astonishing that the bombers of the three churches were members of one and the same family. The father blew up a car bomb in the Pentecostal (GPPS Arjuna) church, the mother and their two daughters blew up themselves in the Protestant church (GKI Diponegoro), while their two sons blew themselves up at the gate of the Catholic Church (Santa Maria Tak Bercela, Ngagel). The neighbors of the family testified that they never had a suspicion about the family as they lived just like normal people. They were friendly to their neighbors and always said hello. Their children also went to normal schools. This was different from other terrorist actors who usually did not stay for a long time in one specific area and did not really mingle with their neighbors. The terrorist bombing in Surabaya has offered a new lesson for understanding the profile of the terrorists. They are not always as different as normal people in their daily lives. They do not live exclusively, or, in a secluded area. They can also be a family, including children, even though - the young ones may not entirely be ready to undergo all the suffering as a consequence of their action as proven by the case in GKI Diponegoro when before the third blast that ended their lives, one of daughters screamed for help, unfortunately, the mother grasped her and triggered the third bomb.

We are still cautious in judging that the May terror in Surabaya is going to be the last one. The police has done some significant moves since then under the new Law. The civil society has acted quite significantly through common vigils in many cities. The attacked churches



were delivering prayers which were attended by non-Christian groups. People and government officials have come several times to the churches to express their supports. These are real signs of hope. The moderate people are now more seen in public with their balanced voices with regards to religion. The ministry of religious affairs even circulated a list of preachers who should be invited by government offices. This act has been met the criticism that the number of preachers is too limited (only 200 names for the whole country). But, many are behind such kind of decision. In short, people want more strict action from the government to contain radicalism. Besides, all of these actions and expectations, we are still facing a huge task in promoting a moderate view of religion. The challenge comes from the fact that it has been so long that radical teachings have been given room in the society. The moderates also kept silent for too long a time. With the help of social media, many radical preachers reached the largest audiences. The moderate preachers have not been as successful. It happens in all religions that the most attractive religious messages are those that have a "black and white" character, blaming, ridiculing others, and so on.

Having said all of this, we also should be critical toward any reaction that has a "black and white" character as well. Perhaps it sounds too much, or, too theoretical, but, dialogue among religions should also address the radicals, if it wants to be genuine. Intra-religious dialogue is necessary as well to confront the radicals. Women have a particular role in this by already going back to the religious founding figures and scriptures to oppose patriarchy.

### *The Work of the consortium continues*

In the meantime, the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations (NICMCR) under which this volume is published has also conducted several programs which promote good relationships between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia as well as in the Netherlands. Its work is not limited to the two countries, as the readers of this book come from other countries as well. One of the projects that is worth mentioning is research on so-called de-radicalization. Despite the much debated word radical / radicalism / radicalization, the research seeks a deeper understanding of how radicalism is depicted by agencies for whom it appears and the responses that follow. The agencies do not only belong to the government, but, include institutions from diverse backgrounds, for example religious organizations,

NGOs, schools / universities, and even businesses. Most of them aim to maintain and develop a good relationship among different religious followers, especially Muslims and Christians so that radicalism is not given a chance to grow. But, among the agencies there are those who also deal directly with de-radicalization, or, disengagement programs. They approach terrorists while still in prison, or, when they are just being released. Regardless of the different approaches used by those who handle religious extremism the research wants to learn how ideology plays in forming the idea of extremism / radicalism, either in the minds of those agencies, or, according to the extremist / radicals themselves. It is also important to learn the dynamic of the ideas as the people who own them meet each other directly, or, indirectly. With the help of self-dialogical theory initiated by Hubert Hermans who at one time offered a consultation to the researchers about the many ways that de-radicalization is critically scrutinized and, at the next level, developed.

Volker Küster has left the consortium due to his return to Germany, as Professor of comparative religion and missiology at the Johannes Gutenberg-University, Mainz. Yet he continues to be active in the field and has published a book in German entitled *Between Pancasila and Fundamentalism. Christian Art in Indonesia*<sup>1</sup> which further explores the ideas behind the interreligious art exhibition held in conjunction with the consortium conference in Yogyakarta in 2011. The book argues that art can serve not only as a dialogue-bridge but even help to overcome conflicts and trauma.<sup>2</sup> The future will show whether the hopes and visions for a multi-religious yet harmonious country of Indonesia can be achieved. In any case, it is certain that serious efforts from all groups and from walks of life will be necessary to reach this goal.

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<sup>1</sup> Volker Küster, *Zwischen Pancasila und Fundamentalismus. Christliche Kunst in Indonesien*, Leipzig 2016.

<sup>2</sup> See his contribution in this volume.

**Identity**



## Introduction

*Frans Wijzen*

Muslim-Christian relations are often studied in terms of identity. For example, Singgih Nughoro and Nico Kana write about the role of the *pajatan* celebration in the resolution of potential or real conflict in the context of divisive elections in a multireligious location. They analyzed political dynamics as an arena that provoked people to express their identities as different from one another. The competition between political parties was related to an effort to build social identities in contrast to others. After the divisive elections, the *pajatan* ritual was a means to return to their daily routines.<sup>1</sup>

However, the way ‘identity’ is conceptualized and translated into operational terms is highly contested. Sue Widdicombe distinguishes ‘traditional’, ‘social constructivist’ and ‘postmodern’ models of identity.<sup>2</sup> According to Pierre Bourdieu, the confusion about the concept ‘identity’, whether ‘identities’ are understood in a ‘primordial’ (essentialist) or ‘circumstantial’ (constructivist) way, stems in part from the fact that scholars tend to forget that “cognitive classifications are always subordinated to practical functions and oriented towards the production of social effects”.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Singgih Nugroho and Nico Kana, The Easter *pajatan* celebration. Identity differences and efforts to restore harmony, in: Ananta Kuma Giriet et al. (eds), *The development of religion – The religion of development*, Delft 2004, 163-169, 167.

<sup>2</sup> Sue Widdicombe, Identity as an Analysts’ and a Participants’ Resource, in: Charles Antaki and Sue Widdicombe (eds), *Identities in Talk*, London 1998, 191-206. Cf. also Ad Borsboom and Frans Jespers (eds), *Identity and Religion. A multidisciplinary approach*, Saarbrücken 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge 1992, 220.

The way scholars conceptualize and operationalize ‘identity’ has huge consequences for the way they study intergroup relations, and conditions of the possibility for inter-religious (e.g. Muslim – Christian) communication and understanding. Whereas Singgih Nughoro and Nico Kana conceptualize identity in terms of group boundaries which potentially lead to clashes that can be reconciled by rituals, Jacqueline Knörr studies group identities in terms of creolization. She defines creolization as

a process whereby people of different ethnic backgrounds develop a new collective identity which gradually substitutes their respective identities of origin. The process of creolization includes interdependent processes of ethnogenesis and indigenization.<sup>4</sup>

According to Knörr “Creolization is likely to take place in environments where people of different – mostly foreign – origins come to live in close proximity to one another”.<sup>5</sup> However, this is not necessarily the case as we know from various instances in Indonesia where people define narrow-minded boundaries excluding others.<sup>6</sup> One of the challenges of studying identities is to acquire insight into conditions that explain why interrelatedness leads to retribalization in one case and to creolization in another case.<sup>7</sup>

The authors in this section study construction of religious identities in the plural context in Indonesia and in relations between Muslims and Christians of Indonesian descent in The Netherlands. They use various methods of data collection (questionnaire, semi structured and open interviews, focus group discussion) and data analysis (statistics, contents analysis and discourse analysis). Together these contributions show that identity negotiation is crucial in maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict in Indonesia.

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<sup>4</sup> Jacqueline Knörr, Creolization and Nation-Building in Indonesia, in: Robin Cohen and Paola Toninato (eds), *The Creolization Reader. Studies in mixed identities and cultures*, London and New York 2010, 353-363, 353.

<sup>5</sup> Op. cit., 353.

<sup>6</sup> Carl Sterkens, Muhammad Machasin and Frans Wijzen (eds), *Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia*. Münster 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Frans Wijzen, *Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion and Conflict. Studying Muslim-Christian Relations*, Oxford 2013.

## **“This is how we are at home.” Indonesian Muslims in The Hague**

*Frans Wijsen and Jennifer Vos*

In his doctoral dissertation *The Open Society*, Paul Scheffer defines the multicultural society as a drama.<sup>1</sup> He says that the Dutch government policy of “integration retaining the own identity” has failed because it assumed that “society was a collection of subcultures” (317). and thus promoted a “segregation” of society (69) and a “ghetto culture” (75). In his dissertation Scheffer urges the Dutch to move “beyond multiculturalism” with its “us” and “them” divide and to strive for “a new ‘us’ (217 and 318), not an “us” against “them”, but an “us” that includes “them” (223).<sup>2</sup>

However, the need for a new ‘us’ applies also to immigrant communities. In the past there was too much emphasis on the majority group of Dutch citizens opening up to ethnic minority groups. This is one-sided, says Scheffer. There is also a lot of prejudice within the immigrant communities, e.g., between ethnic groups such as Creoles and Hindustanis from Surinam (223), and between “Berbers” and “Arabs” from Morocco. Scheffer quotes at length a city councilor of The Hague who says that “there is no communality” among the immigrant groups and who appeals for a “greater involvement in public affairs” (318). Moreover there is also “a strong polarization between a

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Scheffer, *The Open Society. A Story of Avoidance, Conflict and Accommodation*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Tilburg, 2010 (Pagereferences in the text). The commercial edition was published as Paul Scheffer, *Immigrant Nations*, Cambridge 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Scheffer refers to Sumner’s ethnocentrism theory and the in-group versus out-group classification which seems to inspire his thinking.

new middle class and a sizeable underclass” (195) within these immigrant communities.

Scheffer maintains that “international conflicts can have direct consequences for relations between immigrant groups and native population” (172). International conflicts can lead to “hostility” and “conflict of loyalty”. For example, the Kurds’ struggle for independence in Turkey led to an attack on a Kurdish family in The Hague (157).

That is why many well-to-do immigrants don’t show sympathy for and solidarity with their compatriots. According to Scheffer, “members of the second generation often want to free themselves from their fellow countrymen or fellow believers” (147). And, “Many have only just created a place for themselves in a new land and for perfectly understandable reasons they don’t want to be equated with disadvantage” (61).<sup>3</sup>

Against the background of the assumed lack of communality among immigrant groups and the appeal for their greater involvement in public affairs the authors conducted a research project on migrants as mediators in Dutch multicultural society, focussing on post-colonial migrants, particularly Muslims and Christians from Surinam and Indonesia. They seek to answer the following main questions: How do Muslim and Christian immigrants from Indonesia and Surinam remember Muslim-Christian relations in their country of origin? How do they identify and position themselves and others? How do they relate to and communicate with each other in the Netherlands? And how do they contribute to the debate on multicultural society in the Netherlands?

An underlying issue concerns the relation among national, ethnic and religious identities. It is often said that religion is a Western construct, hence non-Westerners are primarily Africans or Asians, and only secondarily Muslims or Christians. So national identity outweighs religious identity. Even if this is true for their country of origin, does it also apply to the diaspora situation? Or does religion become the overriding determinant of identity in that context? The research project consists of four case studies of Surinamese Christians, Surinamese Muslims, Indonesian Muslims, and Indonesian Christians in The Hague.

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<sup>3</sup> More or less the same analysis and evaluation is given by Philip Jenkins in his *God’s Continent. Christianity, Islam and Europe’s Religious Crisis*, Oxford 2007.



For the purpose of this article we focus on Indonesian Muslims only.<sup>4</sup> The material for this contribution is generated by collecting naturally occurring data through Indonesian organizations and by conducting interviews with eight key informants, all of whom were first generation migrants. Four of them were over fifty years old and four were younger than fifty. Four respondents were male and four female. Two respondents came to the Netherlands as embassy personnel, one respondents is an imam, and one is a student. Two came to the Netherlands due to marriage-migration, one came for work, and one came to study and never went back to Indonesia. The data is analyzed using the socio-cognitive model of discourse analysis developed by Norman Fairclough, among others.<sup>5</sup> In this model, the cognitive refers to the ideational unit of analysis and the social refers to the relational unit of analysis. The relational unit is subdivided into subject positions and social relations. Subject positions are also called social identities. For the purpose of this article we focus on identities.

First, we make an analysis of the linguistic practice (description). Next, we analyze the discursive practice (interpretation) and the social practice (explanation). As interpretation and explanation go together, we combine these two steps. We explain the levels and stages of analysis by doing, and end with conclusions and discussion.

## 1. Analysis of linguistic practice

The first method is description – the analysis of the formal features of the text.<sup>6</sup> “It is sometimes useful for analytic purposes to focus upon a single word” or on “culturally salient keywords”, says Fairclough.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> To the best of our knowledge, this group has not been extensively studied by others. There are a good number of studies of Indonesian Christians and Churches in The Netherlands, such as that by Mechteld Jansen, Indonesian and Moluccan Churches in The Netherlands, in: *Journal of Reformed Theology* 2, 2008, 168-187. A first report of our research was published (in Dutch) as Jennifer Vos and Sandra van Groningen, Islam en Burgerschap sluiten elkaar niet uit. Indonesische Moslims in Nederland, in: *Tijdschrift voor Religie* 3, 2012, 14-26.

<sup>5</sup> Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge 1992. For a more elaborate explanation of socio-cognitive discourse analysis, cf. Frans Wijzen, “There are radical Muslims and Normal Muslims”. An analysis of the discourse on Islamic extremism, in: *Religion* 43, 2013, 70-88; and Frans Wijzen, *Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion and Conflict. Studying Muslim-Christian Relations*, Oxford 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 76f.

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit., 185f.

Another focus for analysis is “alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance”.<sup>8</sup>

*I feel very sad about it*

To begin with it is helpful to summarize the life history of one of our interviewees, just to show the complexity of the situation that some Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands experience. Our interviewee narrated how she came to the Netherlands for further studies twenty years ago. She came to the Netherlands because her brothers worked here as cooks in an Indonesian restaurant. “They just came as adventurers”, as so many Indonesian men and women did.

Our interviewee met her husband here. He is a Dutch man whose father was Indo Dutch. His father was born in the Netherlands but his grandfather was an Indonesian Muslim. He fought in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. “I know many Indo Dutch”. Our interviewee feels affinity with them. “They had a hard time”. She said that these Indo Dutch feel so happy when they can talk about Indonesia in the past. “It is nice to chat with them, about food or language”.

Our interviewee’s husband converted to Islam, as did several other Dutch men who married Indonesian Muslim women. The Dutch converts have their own Dutch group in the Indonesian mosque in The Hague. Our interviewee’s children have been raised in an Islamic way. “I am Indonesian”, she says, “and I am very happy to remain Indonesian”. “I have an Indonesian passport, and I will never take a Dutch passport”. “It is a feeling”, she says, “just a feeling”.

Our interviewee misses her family at home. Visiting the Indonesian mosque gives her the feeling of being in Indonesia for a short while. Her family-in-law is Catholic. Faith was not mentioned until they got married. Then her husband decided to convert to Islam. At independence his grandfather was given the choice to stay in Indonesia or to leave for the Netherlands, just like other Indonesians who fought with the Dutch. He chose the Netherlands because he thought that his children would have a better future there.

Our interviewee was raised as a nationalist. The story of her husband’s grandfather was very painful for her. He was homesick and never felt at home in the Netherlands; the fact that he was a Muslim was kept secret. He married a Catholic woman. Our interviewee’s family at home in Indonesia knows that she is married to an Indo

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<sup>8</sup> Op. cit., 77.

Dutch man. They do not know the life history of her husband's grandfather, and according to her, it is "not their business". To them it is important that she married a Muslim.

*This is mini Indonesia*

The Indonesian Muslim community in The Hague and the Netherlands in general is *very diverse*, and the criteria for belonging and not belonging are fluid and depend on the social position that is taken by the speaker. For employees of the Indonesian embassy Indonesians are Indonesian passport holders. But there are Indonesians who have been here for forty or fifty years, whose Dutch language is very poor and who still hold an Indonesian passport because they dream of going back some day. There are others who consider themselves to be Indonesians but who have a Dutch passport because they have a Dutch spouse. And there are descendants of the Indo Dutch, some of whom converted to Islam, who celebrate their Indonesian roots but who are not considered to be Indonesian, at least not by embassy officials.

Also those who are considered to be 'real' Indonesian Muslims are very diverse in terms of social position and ethnic background, Sundanese, Javanese, Madurese, and so on. "Besides being Indonesians, we are also members of our ethnic group". Some came here for study or work a long time ago and stayed here because of their children and grandchildren. Others are students or Indonesian government employees who are here for a short period of only four or five years. There are people from Jakarta, and people from Surabaya, Bandung or Malang. They all may have their private reasons for staying or leaving.

Despite their diversity and individuality there is a common feeling or affinity among them, which is "difficult to describe". As one of them said, "Our customs do not disappear overnight". Family ties are very strong. "We are all here as guests ... This is not our homeland, so to speak ...". And "This mosque ... this is a little piece of Indonesia. This is how we are at home". An employee of the Indonesian embassy says, "This is our Indonesian philosophy ...unity in diversity".

*We are more flexible*

Asked to describe further "how we are at home", the Indonesian Muslims say that they are "not like Arabs", or Muslims of Moroccan or Turkish descent. They are different. Indonesian Muslims describe themselves as "moderate Muslims". They are "more flexible", "more

tolerant”, “and more open”. “Other Muslims”, who come from Turkey or Morocco, “are a bit strict” – for example in terms of food restrictions and gender relations. Indonesian Muslims say that they are “less strict”, “more modern”.

An imam of the Indonesian mosque, Al Hikmah, and the chairman of the Association of Muslim Youths in Europe (PPME) say, “We are the most accessible mosque ... of the Netherlands”. “No scary things happen here”, “we don’t want to promote ourselves”. And they continue, “There is no coercion here”. “People come themselves”. “There are many Dutch men here. They marry an Indonesian woman, they meet us here, they talk, and then ... [they convert]”. But “we do not propagate ourselves”. “It comes about quite naturally, through face-to-face contact”. In the past, when “women came in miniskirts, we did not say anything. We did not confront them”. These things “need time”.

An employee of the Indonesian embassy, who also is the vice chairman of the Indonesian mosque, says, “We are mild”, “very peaceful”, “open for everybody”, “it is a very loose organization”, “very informal”, “very individualistic”. And he continues, “What we have in this mosque here in The Hague is just a reflection of what we have in Indonesia”. “This is mainstream [Islam]”.

With respect to *halal* food, “as long as it is not pork, for example beef or chicken, it is okay to eat, [even] if it is not slaughtered in the right way”. And, “we don’t separate men and women. In our mosque we are always mixed; it is just that the males are in front and the females are at the back [of the mosque]”. There are just differences in interpretation. Some are Muhammadiyah members; others are members of Nahdlatul Ulama.

### *We don’t walk fast*

Asked how they relate to Dutch society, and if life has become more difficult for them as Muslims since 9/11, the Indonesian Muslims in The Hague say that this is not the case. Maybe for Christians it was and is easier to find their way here, as there were many Churches to help them. “Christians have good connections”. “There were churches everywhere”.

In a certain way, life has even become easier for Indonesian Muslims. In the beginning, everything was strange. When we [Indonesian Muslims] came here, “There were no mosques”. And, “There were no shops that sold *halal* meat. We had to go to a village, to a farmer and

slaughter the animals ourselves". The interviewees say that "now there are mosques everywhere" and "you can get *halal* food easily".

Thus, "Life has changed, yes, but in a positive way". "Maybe we are a bit more reluctant to talk openly since 9/11", says an interviewee, "But we don't talk about politics [in the mosque] anyway". Yes, "The media puts us in a box [with others]. Then they have something to write about. But in fact, we are not so different [from the Dutch]".

If some Indonesian Muslims long to go back to Indonesia, this has nothing to do with the situation in the Netherlands becoming worse for Muslims. On the contrary, the Netherlands is better [than Islamic countries] as far as human relations are concerned. In the Netherlands "the treatment of the people is fair and just". If Indonesian Muslims long to go back to Indonesia, this is "pure feeling", "purely individual". "The situation [in the Netherlands] has nothing to do with it". Some send their children to Indonesia to study.

Asked why Indonesian Muslims are invisible or silent in Dutch society they say, "This is Indonesian culture". "It is not our character to be outgoing". "The Indonesian is a bit reserved by nature". "We avoid confrontation". The Indonesian Muslims describe themselves as "quiet" people. "We don't walk fast". We say, "Don't hurry, take it easy". Or "We are calm, imperturbable".

[Indonesian] Islam is "rather individualistic" and it has a "loose organization", it is "informal" and "inward", not concerned with [*halal*] food or clothes [headscarves]. "We don't care [about these things]. Some other (non-Indonesian) Muslims say, "We are a group and thus we speak on behalf of the group; we form a block". "This is not what moderate Muslims say".

"The Dutch are more direct [than the Indonesians]." "We are not afraid of Mr. Wilders".<sup>9</sup> "I can blame him [for accusing us] but then I am in the newspaper tomorrow". "We don't look for the media" and "we don't practice politics anyway". The imam said "This happens also in Indonesia", and "This is not new". "Even the family of the prophet [Muhammad] wanted to kill the prophet". Thus, "This is not so strange for us". "If we behave in a decent way", and "if we do not feel offended by this person [Mr. Wilders], we do not need to be scared", and "we should just continue quietly".

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<sup>9</sup> The interviewee refers to Geert Wilders, chairperson of the Freedom Party, who is accused of promoting Islamophobia.

“We are not afraid”. “Just be patient and wait”. “Don’t react emotionally”. A Muslim student said, “The tension has become much greater than before”. “We discussed it in the Muslim community” and we said, [we should] “Just, take it easy” and, [we] “don’t take it personally”.

*We don’t talk about religion*

Asked how they relate to Indonesian Christians they say that relations are “good”, “flexible”, and “harmonious”. But relations between Muslims and Christians are more social than religious. Indonesian Muslims say that if they are at a marriage or a funeral [with Christians], they “celebrate together”, they “eat together”, as human beings. But “We do have certain boundaries”, says an imam of the Indonesian mosque, “We do not pray together”.

For some interviewees, religion is not so relevant, or may not be important at all in everyday life. For other interviewees, religion is “dangerous” and “too sensitive” to talk about. “We watch television and we see a lot of terrorism. We don’t talk about that”. “We don’t want to hurt each other”. Some people tend to think, “My belief is better than yours”. The interviewees feel uncomfortable with this thought.

A member of the Association of Indonesian Students (PPI) says that they “decided not to talk about religion”. “We just want to meet each other [as students] and we respect each other’s religion”. “We have members from all religions” and “we visit each other’s homes”. “It is not a big problem”. “We respect each other; this is my religion, this is your religion; that’s it”. “We don’t really care about different religions”. This is because: “We are from the same country. Only our religion is different”.

Thus, relations between Muslims and Christians are “harmonious”, “very harmonious”, just as in Indonesia. For Indonesian students, being an Indonesian is more important than being a Muslim or a Christian. Relations are spontaneous, natural. Interfaith dialogue is something that is organized by the embassy.

*Indonesia has Pancasila*

Asked how the situation in Indonesia affects Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands, some interviewees say that their experience of a mild and tolerant Islam in Indonesia makes them different from other Mus-

lims. In Indonesia, “The Mosque stands next to the Church, as is the case in Jakarta.”

Asked if there were no problems, an imam of the Indonesian mosque answered that problems were “influenced by political interests”. But in the mosque, “we don’t talk about politics”, “we leave politics out”. Thus, “problems are not caused by religion” because “Islam as religion is peaceful, very peaceful”.

One of the interviewees is married to an Indonesian Christian woman. He describes his family as ‘*chrislam*.’ Both of the partners kept their own faith, although their daughters were raised as Christians. The respondent said that “Islam is good, Christianity is good. The important thing is how you do the things you do and how you behave”.

Asked if tensions between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas affected Indonesians in the Netherlands, an employee of the Indonesian embassy answered that he had been “too short a time in the Netherlands” and that he had “no experience of tensions”. But, “We know that there are groups of Indonesians here who come to us to cope with that situation”. In this case, “We offer dialogue”. “This is the only thing we can do”. “We don’t take an active role in that kind of tension”. “Our role is to serve and to protect our citizens living in the Netherlands”.

The interviewees say that in Indonesia they were used to celebrating Christmas or Id-ul Fitri together, and that they went to each others’ marriages and funerals without any problem. And they still do that here. But relations between Muslims and Christians are on the interpersonal level, from human being to human being, not in the sense of interreligious dialogue, organized by the embassy.

Asked how they promote interfaith dialogue, an employee of the Indonesian embassy answered: “We invite an expert to give a speech”. “If we have a mild individual, we can have a very peaceful discussion.” And when the board of the mosque invites preachers and teachers they try to be balanced. “Sometimes we have a hardliner”. Then we have to discuss “how to control that”. “We need to bring someone with a very soft and peaceful kind of talk, not with a different view” [different from the mainline view].

“Our founding fathers said that even though the majority is Muslim we don’t base our nation on the teaching of Islam. The philosophy is based on diversity”. *Pancasila* means five principles: belief in God, respect for humanity, unity, prosperity and justice.

Some interviewees said, “it is a bit different here. People are more open-minded here” [in the Netherlands]. A Muslim student said, “When I first came here I thought that men and woman can’t shake hands”. I was told, “No, it is okay, it is normal here”. “Even in Indonesia they do it”. “The school I came from, though, was a Muslim School”. But, “finally I got used to it”.

The student, who was born on Sumatra but raised in Surabaya, also said that it depends on where you come from and how you were raised in the family. “People who are from Jakarta are more open ... The way they live is too open, I think. They were smoking and drinking alcohol until they were drunk. I was surprised”.

Employees of the Indonesian embassy say that the Indonesian mosque in The Hague is just a reflection of how mosques are in Indonesia. It is “open to everybody as long as they don’t have their shoes on”.

### *We don’t talk about politics*

There used to be one Moluccan imam in The Hague. But there are very few Moluccan Muslims in The Hague. Moluccan Muslims have their mosques in Waalwijk and Ridderkerk. The imam in The Hague has monthly contact with his colleagues in Waalwijk and Ridderkerk but they are independent.

According to the employees of the Indonesian embassy, there are three groups of Moluccans, those who consider themselves to be primarily Dutch; those who consider themselves to be primarily Indonesian, and those who consider themselves to be primarily Moluccan. The latter have the ideal of the Free Moluccan State (RMS).

Moluccans are “more direct”. But this is “no problem”. Showing diversity between Indonesians and Moluccans, two interviewees referred to a saying: Some Indonesians “are like rice”; others are like “rice with sambal”.

The mosque in Waalwijk has a reputation as pro RMS. The difference is not Islamic belief but politics. But, “we don’t talk about politics”. The unwritten rule seems to be, “leave politics out”. No politics in the mosque. Students of the PPI say: “We talk about our studies, about going out in the evening, about culture. We don’t talk about politics”.



*They are Dutch*

Asked how they relate to the Indo Dutch, participants' answers depend on their social position and duration of stay in the Netherlands. For those who have been in the Netherlands for a long time, these relations are ambiguous. On the one hand, the Indo Dutch share a common history with the Indonesians and many share family ties. On the other hand, confronted with the need to choose between the Netherlands and Indonesia, they chose the Netherlands. "This is difficult"; "very painful".

For young people, colonial history seems completely irrelevant, and it did not play a role in their decision to come to the Netherlands. They are simply adventurers who tried their luck in Australia or the United States, as so many Indonesians do, and ended up in the Netherlands by chance, due to availability of sponsorships, and the pervasiveness of the English language, or just because of job opportunities.

For Indonesian embassy employees, the Indo Dutch "are Dutch". Although they have a common history, and some of them long to return to Indonesia, they are not Indonesians. There is a desire to remain "pure" Indonesian. This is also reflected in the separation between Tong Tong Fair and Pasar Malam,<sup>10</sup> the latter now being organized at the Indonesian School by the Indonesian embassy. "The Tong Tong Fair is no longer purely Indonesian". According to the Indonesian embassy employees the Tong Tong Fair had become more broadly Asian, no longer purely serving Indonesian interests.

## 2. Analysis of discursive and social practice

The second and the third methods are interpretation and explanation. Although Fairclough sees them as different stages, he sometimes treats them together.<sup>11</sup> When participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) texts they draw on their "cognitive apparatus" or "members' resources"<sup>12</sup> stored in their long-term memory.<sup>13</sup> These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in people's heads; they are social in the sense that they are socially generated and social-

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<sup>10</sup> Pasar Malam refers to the evening markets which are quite popular in Indonesia and which are also organized in The Netherlands.

<sup>11</sup> Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Harlow 2001, 117-139.

<sup>12</sup> Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 133 and 118.

<sup>13</sup> Op. cit., 8f.

ly effective.<sup>14</sup> When participants draw on their mental model they are reproduced or transformed.<sup>15</sup> For the purpose of this contribution we look at ideational and relational transformations, particularly concerning subject positions or social identities.

### *Indonesia*

Various interviewees remember harmonious and friendly relations between Muslims and Christians at home. They used to visit each other at Id-ul-Fitr or Christmas and celebrate together at marriages and funerals. But these relations were interpersonal in nature, from human being to human being, rather than interreligious.

This common background makes them different from Muslims of Moroccan or Turkish descent who used to live in more mono-religious countries where they hardly met non-Muslims. "This mosque in The Hague is just a reflection of what we have in Indonesia". Indonesian Muslims position themselves as "moderate", "mild", "flexible" and "tolerant". This makes them different from "Arabs" who are stricter.

In relation to Dutch society, Indonesian Muslims identify themselves as "quiet", "silent", "a bit reserved by nature", "not outgoing". As one interviewee says, "this belongs to Indonesian culture".

Despite diversity, there is a common feeling. "Our customs do not disappear overnight". But "Besides being Indonesians, we are also members of our ethnic groups". Thus, apart from national identity there is an ethnic identity. But, "this is not *adat*. *Adat* is too complex". "People [nowadays] want simple rituals". *Adat* are unwritten pre-Islamic traditions in Indonesia.

Some informants draw on the *pancasila* concept, the five principles and the Indonesian philosophy of national unity, or unity in diversity. Other informants draw on the experience from the Association of Indonesian Students (PPI). This is not an organization of Muslims, but an organization of students of all faiths. They decided not to talk about religion. As one of them said, "We respect each other. This is my religion, this is your religion", thereby implicitly reproducing a Qur'an verse, "to you be your religion, and to me my religion" (Sura 109:6). Religion is not mentioned at embassy celebrations.

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<sup>14</sup> Op. cit., 20 and 22.

<sup>15</sup> Op. cit., 158-161.

*Islam*

Indonesian Muslims identify Islam as a “peaceful, very peaceful” religion. It is rather “individualistic” and “inward”. Islam has a “loose organization” and it is very “informal”. Thus, Indonesian Muslims not only position themselves as “quiet” and “reserved” people which, according to them, is part of their culture, but also as “moderate” and “flexible” Muslims, which is their definition of Islam.

An imam of the Indonesian mosque draws on Umar to explain why Indonesian Muslims are not afraid of Mr. Wilders. “From the time of the prophet till the end of the world there will always be people who are pro or contra Islam”, says the imam. Even Umar wanted to kill the prophet because he threatened the unity of the family [clan]. But when he heard his own sister reciting a Qur’an verse, he converted to Islam and became the second Caliph”. This example is used to demonstrate that hardliners such as Mr. Wilders are of all place and all times. They come and go. So Muslims need not to be afraid of Mr. Wilders.

Some informants draw on the experience of the Association of Muslim Youths in Europe (PPME). PPME aims to keep alive and strengthen Islamic faith in the Dutch context. It meets every Saturday in the Al Hikmah mosque, administered but not owned, by the Dutch embassy. According to PPME members, Muslim-Christian relations are disturbed by politics. Therefore, “we don’t talk about politics”; “we leave politics out”.

*Colonialism*

Some Indonesian Muslims draw on colonial history to create a common ground between them and the (Indo) Dutch, or to emphasize differences between them and Moluccans, depending on their social position and duration of stay in the Netherlands.

One interviewee, whose father-in-law was Indo Dutch and whose husband’s grandfather was an Indonesian Muslim, said that “the Indo Dutch had a hard time”. The interviewee, who said that she was raised as a nationalist, said that they did not know what happened in the Japanese Camps. She feels pity for the Indo Dutch who suffered. Yes, it is “part of our common history”.

When asked about the Moluccans, an employee of the Indonesian embassy referred to colonial history. “Yes, the Moluccan people are quite an interesting group”, he said. “They were promised their own free country, and some of them are still waiting for this promise to

come true". But, in his view, Indonesians are Indonesian passport holders. And since most Moluccans and most Indo Dutch are Dutch citizens, they are not part of the Indonesian community.

### *Conclusions*

Looking back at the social identity construction of Indonesian Muslims in The Hague we first notice the huge variety of this immigrant population. As one informant said, this is "mini Indonesia", so all distinctions from within Indonesia are also present in The Hague. But they also have a "common feeling" of being Indonesians and they refer to the national philosophy of unity in diversity to describe "how we are at home".

In answers to the question of how they identify and position themselves, we see that Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands clearly distinguish themselves from Muslims of Turkish or Moroccan descent. They say that they are "more flexible" or "more open" and that they "are not like Arabs" who – according to them – are "a bit strict".

When asked how Indonesian Muslims contribute to the debate on multiculturalism, we first notice that Indonesian Muslims are rather silent. According to one interviewee, "this is part of Indonesian culture". Indonesians are reserved people "by nature". But according to others it is also due to their interpretation of Islam, which is rather individual and inward. "As long as it is not pork, we don't care about [*halal*] food or clothes".

Having experienced extremism in Indonesia, their contribution to the debate on the multicultural society in the Netherlands seems to be: "don't panic"! Hardliners are of all time and all places. They come and go. So, "don't be afraid", just "take it easy", and "go your own way". Moreover they seem to favor "a silent policy", not "interfaith dialogue". Interfaith dialogue is something that is organized by the Indonesian embassy, institutionalized, more top-down than bottom-up. They seem to favor informal face-to-face contact, from human being to human being, thus more interpersonal than interreligious dialogue.

## **“I come from a Pancasila Family.” Muslims and Christians in Indonesia**

*Frans Wijzen and Suhadi Cholil*

Since the Reformation in Indonesia, there has been a return of religion to the public domain.<sup>1</sup> During the New Order regime religion was relegated to private homes and religious institutions and inter-religious conflicts were covered by the *pancasila* ideology of national unity. At present, people speak openly about introduction of *syariah* law and Indonesia becoming an Islamic country, respecting the rights of religious minorities. The authors are involved in a common research project studying this socio-religious transformation process in Indonesia.

Social identity theorists tend to conceptualize and study identity and diversity in objectivist and positivist ways.<sup>2</sup> They write about national, ethnic or religious identities as if identity is based on primordial properties that are shared by the members of a group. They both unite them and distinguish them from others. Consequently, national, ethnic or religious identities are exclusive and differences unbridgeable. This is the “cultured collide”<sup>3</sup> or “clash of civilizations” perspec-

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<sup>1</sup> Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds), *Indonesia in Transition. Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’, and ‘Crisis’*, Yogyakarta 2004; Carl Sterkens, Muhammad Machasin and Frans Wijzen (eds), *Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia*, Münster 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Tajfel, Social categorization, in: Henry Tajfel (ed.), *Differentiation between Groups*, London 1978, 61-76; Henry Tajfel and John Turner, The Social identity theory of intergroup behaviour, in: Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (eds), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Chicago 1986, 7-24.

<sup>3</sup> Jan Blommaert, How much culture is there in inter-cultural communication?, in: Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschuere (eds), *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia 1991, 13-31, 19.

tive.<sup>4</sup> Seen as such, a multicultural society is a tragedy and intercultural communication an illusion. But inter-cultural communication, in a partial sense at least, is possible. Thus this way of looking at and studying identity is inappropriate.<sup>5</sup>

In our research we are interested in alternative ways of theorizing about and studying religious identity and interreligious relations. The main objectives are (1) to acquire insight into the relation between religious discourse and (the absence of) social cohesion (internal objective), and by doing so (2) to contribute to a theory and method of studying interreligious relations (external objective). We want to know whether and why people elevate their religious identities over other, e.g. ethnic, national, economic or gender identities; and whether or not this leads to social conflict. Or is it the other way round, do existing conflicts in the society express themselves in religious rhetoric and vocabulary?

Narrowed down, the main research questions are: (1) How do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others, and (2) What are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and positioning? Sub questions related to question (1) are (a) how do Muslims and Christians speak about each other? And (b) how do Muslims and Christians speak with each other? Sub questions related to question (2) are (a) what are conditions for understanding / misunderstanding? And (b) what are conditions for cohesion (convergence) or conflict (divergence)?

We tried to answer our questions and achieve our aims by conducting a case study in Surakarta. Surakarta has about 750.000 inhabitants, but could count 1,5 million daytime town dwellers. Surakarta's population is mainly Javanese with Chinese and Arab minority groups. 77 percent are Muslims and 22 percent are Christians; others are Hindus, Buddhists or Javanese (indigenous) believers. Surakarta

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<sup>4</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York 1996.

<sup>5</sup> Sue Widdicombe, Identity as an Analyst's and a Participants' Resource, in: Charles Antaki and Sue Widdicombe (eds), *Identities in talk*, London, Thousand Oaks 1998, 191-206, 192-194; Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London, 100-102.

has had a series of outbursts of violence, culminating in the Solo Riots (Surakarta) in 1998.<sup>6</sup>

We conducted twenty-four focus group discussions, eight groups of Muslims only, eight groups of Christians only and eight groups of Muslims and Christian together. Within each category we had groups of males and females who were subdivided on the basis of age (young and old) and profession (educated and uneducated). For the purpose of this article we focus on the groups of Muslims and Christians together.

We defined identity as “narrative of the self”<sup>7</sup> and studied it from a social constructivist point of view, using social-cognitive discourse analysis as method. In the socio-cognitive model of discourse analysis, developed, among others, by Norman Fairclough,<sup>8</sup> the cognitive refers to the ideational unit of analysis and the social refers to the relational unit of analysis. The relational unit is subdivided into subject positions and social relations. Subject positions are also called social identities and this is what we focus on in this article.

First, we make an analysis of the linguistic practice (description) at the micro, mezzo and macro level of social identity. Next we make an analysis of the discursive (interpretation) and the social practice (explanation). As interpretation and explanation go together, we combine these two steps. We explain the levels and stages of analysis by doing. We end with conclusions and discussion.

## 1. Analysis of linguistic practice

The first method is description; this is the analysis of the formal features of the text.<sup>9</sup> “It is sometimes useful for analytic purposes to focus upon a single word” or on “culturally salient keywords”, says Fairclough.<sup>10</sup> Another focus for analysis is “alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance”.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Jemma Purdey, The other May riots. Anti-Chinese violence in Solo, May 1998, in: Charles Coppel (ed.), *Violent Conflict in Indonesia. Analysis, Representation, Resolution*. London and New York 2006, 72-89.

<sup>7</sup> Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-identity. Self and identity in the late modern age*, Cambridge 1991, 76.

<sup>8</sup> Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge 1992.

<sup>9</sup> Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 76f.

<sup>10</sup> Op. cit., 185f.

<sup>11</sup> Op. cit., 77.

### (1) Micro level

We speak about identity at the micro or individual level when people speak for themselves, as believers of their religion (Christianity or Islam) and as citizens of the nation (Indonesian).

#### *My personal view is rather different*

Participants clearly distinguish personal beliefs and institutional beliefs. For example, a male Muslim professional participant said,

My background is Muslim Muhammadiyah ... The people of Muhammadiyah are sometimes perceived as very, very puritan. If [they] meet Christians, [they are] rather ... harsh. But in everyday life I could not escape my personal view, which is rather different [from Muhammadiyah]. I am more open, not only in social affairs. I and my Catholic or Christian friends often talk about our belief, our faith. And of course, we look for a meeting point, not for differences [between us].

In this text, the speaker does three things. First, he says that he comes from Muhammadiyah background. Second, he describes Muhammadiyah members as “very, very puritan”, this is to say that they are rather harsh when meeting Christians. Third, he says that he is not like that. His “personal view” is “more open” than the views of Muhammadiyah members.

Another Muslim participant in the group of young females said, “I am Muslim, but (I) don’t wear *jilbab* (veil)”. By adding “but” the participant suggests that it is common for Muslim women to wear a veil. But she does not do that. So the participants suggest that there are shared (or social) identities but that individual variation exists.

#### *I come from a pancasila family*

Participants seldom refer to themselves as individuals. Instead, they refer to their family backgrounds. When they describe themselves as “progressive”, “open” and “tolerant persons”, this is to say that they are “not fanatic”; participants say that they come from a “*pancasila* family”, a “plural family” or a “democratic family”.

A Muslim participant said, “My extended family from my father’s line exists of Christians and Muslims”. Similarly a Christian participant said, “My father is Hindu, my mother is Muslim, their children are Christians”. A young Christian female participant said: “I grew up in and come from two different cultures and religions. Fortunately my family is a very democratic family that respects the principle of human dignity”. The speaker uses the phrase “democratic family” in



relation to tolerance of religious differences in the family and respect for human dignity. Another female participant talks about “progressiveness” (*maju*) and the appreciation of religious plurality in a family. She says that nowadays people are “already quite progressive ... People do not really problematize the multireligious family”.

A Christian participant said, “In my extended family the two religions [Islam and Christianity] are mixed and our tolerance is very extraordinary, very extraordinary”. She uses over-wording (“very extraordinary, very extraordinary”) to emphasize religious “tolerance” in her family. Another Christian participant makes the same point by saying that “[my] relatives are Muslims and Christians. Moreover, many uncles of mine are Muslim”.

Several participants use the label “*Pancasila* family” to say that their families comprise different religions. A Christian participant in the professional group discussion stated, “I grew up in a *Pancasila* family... My father is Hindu, my mother is Muslim, [my father and mother’s] children are Christians”. Another Christian participant in the young male group also said, “I am from a *Pancasila* background too. [My] extended family consists of Christians, Catholics and Muslims”.

### *Relations between Muslims and Christians are good*

When speaking about their family backgrounds and thus about themselves, the participants not only speak about relatives, but also about Muslim and Christian neighbors in Solo who live in “harmony” and “tolerance”. An elderly Christian female participant mentioned that “harmony is very strong in the middle and lower classes of society”. Another Christian participant in the same group described a moment when she invited her Muslim neighbor to come to a Christian peace-meal (*slametan*) in her house. She said that she informed her neighbor, “I will be praying from ten to eleven o’clock. Please come at ten or after the praying. [My neighbor replied] It is okay for me, I’ll come at ten o’clock and join in by just sitting down”. A Muslim participant describes a similar case. He said that “in Solo [the relations] between Muslims and Christians are good, extremely good. For instance after the fasting month, the Christians prepare the breaking of the fast with enthusiasm. So tolerance is very high.” The speaker uses over-wording (“good, extremely good”) to emphasize tolerance between Muslims and Christians.