Buch, Englisch, 448 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 751 g
ISBN: 978-0-691-13374-4
Verlag: Princeton University Press
This book presents a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation, by a leading judge and legal theorist. Currently, legal philosophers and jurists apply different theories of interpretation to constitutions, statutes, rules, wills, and contracts. Aharon Barak argues that an alternative approach--purposive interpretation--allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important differences. Moreover, regardless of whether purposive interpretation amounts to a unifying theory, it would still be superior to other methods of interpretation in tackling each kind of text separately. Barak explains purposive interpretation as follows: All legal interpretation must start by establishing a range of semantic meanings for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In purposive interpretation, the text's "purpose" is the criterion for establishing which of the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning. Establishing the ultimate purpose--and thus the legal meaning--depends on the relationship between the subjective and objective purposes; that is, between the original intent of the text's author and the intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the time of interpretation. This is easy to establish when the subjective and objective purposes coincide. But when they don't, the relative weight given to each purpose depends on the nature of the text. For example, subjective purpose is given substantial weight in interpreting a will; objective purpose, in interpreting a constitution. Barak develops this theory with masterful scholarship and close attention to its practical application. Throughout, he contrasts his approach with that of textualists and neotextualists such as Antonin Scalia, pragmatists such as Richard Posner, and legal philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin. This book represents a profoundly important contribution to legal scholarship and a major alternative to interpretive approaches advanced by other leading figures in the judicial world.
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Introduction xi PART ONE: INTERPRETATION 1
Chapter One: What Is Legal Interpretation? 3
1. Definition of Legal Interpretation 3
2. The Limits of Interpretation 16
3. Basic Problems in Interpretation 26
4. Systems of Interpretation in Law 30
5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Interpretive Rules 38
6. The Status and Sources of Interpretive Rules 47
7. Laws of Interpretation, Jurisprudence, and General Hermeneutics 54
Chapter Two: Non-Interpretive Doctrines 61
1. The Essence of Non-Interpretive Doctrines 61
2. Filling in a Gap in a Legal Text 66
3. Resolving Contradictions Normatively 74
4. Correcting Mistakes in the Language of a Text 77
5. Deviating from the Language of the Text to Avoid Absurdity 80
6. Cy Pres Performance 80
7. From Interpretive Theory to Purposive Interpretation 82
PART TWO PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION 83
Chapter Three: The Essence of Purposive Interpretation 85
1."Purposive Interpretation": Terminology 85
2. Fundamentals of Purposive Interpretation 88
Chapter Four: The Semantic Component of Purposive Interpretation 97
1. Interpretive Theory and Semantic Theory 97
2. Types of Language 103
3. Canons of Interpretation 107
Chapter Five: The Purposive Component of Purposive Interpretation 110
1. The Essence of Purpose 110
2. Multiple Purposes 113
Chapter Six: Subjective Purpose: Authorial Intent 120
1. The Essence of Subjective Purpose 120
2. Abstract Purpose and Concrete Purpose 126
3. Subjective Purpose and the Problem of Multiple Authors 129
4. Sources of Subjective Purpose 135
5. Subjective Purpose as a Presumption about the Text's Purpose 145
Chapter Seven: Objective Purpose: Intent of the Reasonable Author; Intent of the System 148
1. The Essence of Objective Purpose 148
2. Sources of Objective Purpose: Internal and External 157
3. Presumptions of Objective Purpose 170
4. Contradictions between Purposive Presumptions 176
Chapter Eight: The Purposive Component: Ultimate Purpose 182
1. The Weight of Subjective and Objective Purpose in Determining Ultimate Purpose 182
2. Type of Text: Will, Contract, Statute, and Constitution 185
3. Type of Text: The Effect of a Text's Age on Its Ultimate Purpose 191
4. Type of Text: Distinguishing Texts by Scope of Issues Regulated 193
5. Type of Text: Changes in Regime Character and Society's Fundamental Assumptions 195
6. Type of Text: Texts Based on Rules and Texts Based on Standards 197
7. Type of Text: Content of the Provision 200
8. The Effect of Type of Text on Ultimate Purpose 203
9. Formulating Ultimate Purpose 205
Chapter Nine: Discretion as a Component in Purposive Interpretation 207
1. The Essence of Judicial Discretion 207
2. Situations of Judicial Discretion 214
Chapter Ten: The Theoretical Basis for Purposive Interpretation 218
1. The Need to Justify a System of Interpretation 218
2. Social Support for Purposive Interpretation 221
3. Jurisprudential Support for Purposive Interpretation 224
4. Hermeneutic Considerations in Favor of Purposive Interpretation 230
5. Constitutional Considerations in Favor of Purposive Interpretation 233
Chapter Eleven: Purposive Interpretation and Its Critique of Other 260
Systems of Interpretation 1. Purposive Interpretation and Subjective Systems of Interpretation 260
2. Purposive Interpretation and Objective Systems of Interpretation: Textualism,"Old " and "New "269
3. Purposive Interpretation and Pragmatism 286
4. Purposive Interpretation and Dworkin's System of Interpretation 290
5. Purposive Interpretation and Free Interpretation 297
6. Critique of Purposive Interpretation and Some Responses 301
PART THREE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 305
Chapter Twelve: The Interpretation of Wills 307
1. The Uniqueness of a Will and How It Affects Interpretation 307
2. The Language of a Will 309
3. The Purpose of a Will 309
Chapter Thirteen: The Interpretation of Contracts 318
1. The
