Buch, Englisch, 192 Seiten, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 382 g
Buch, Englisch, 192 Seiten, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 382 g
Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
ISBN: 978-0-521-62014-7
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterization of other-deception and characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias and the irrationality and objectionability of self-deception. She arrives at a non-intentional account of self-deception that is deeper and more complete than alternative non-intentional accounts and avoids the reduction of self-deceptive belief to wishful belief.
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Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1. Other-deception; 2. Two models of self-deception; 3. The need for an alternative model of self-deception; 4. Functioning to reduce an anxiety; satisfying a desire; 5. Self-deceptive belief formation: non-intentional biasing; 6. False consciousness; 7. Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself; 8. Irrationality; 9. What, if anything, is objectionable about self- and other-deception?; References; Index.
