Buch, Englisch, 384 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 740 g
Buch, Englisch, 384 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 740 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-926480-3
Verlag: OUP Oxford
Logic is fundamental to thought and language. But which logical principles are correct? The paradoxes play a crucial role in answering that question. The so-called Liar and Heap paradoxes challenge our basic ideas about logic; at the very least, they teach us that the correct logical principles are not as obvious as common sense would have it. The essays in this volume, written by leading figures in the field, discuss novel thoughts about the paradoxes.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- Part I: Soritical Paradoxes
- 1: Graham Priest: A Site for Sorites
- 2: Achille C. Varzi: Cut-Offs and their Neighbours
- 3: Stewart Shapiro: Vagueness and Conversation
- 4: Rosanna Keefe: Context, Vagueness, and the Sorites
- 5: Crispin Wright: Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach
- 6: Richard G. Heck, Jr.: Semantic Accounts of Vagueness
- 7: Scott Soames: Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates
- 8: Michael Glanzberg: Against Truth-Value Gaps
- 9: Delia Graff: Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness
- Part II: Semantic Paradoxes
- 10: Roy A. Sorensen: A Definite No-No
- 11: Keith Simmons: Reference and Paradox
- 12: J. C. Beall: On the Singularity Theory of Denotation
- 13: Hartry Field: The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness
- 14: Stephen Yablo: New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory
- 15: Agustin Rayo and Timothy Williamson: A Completeness Theorem for Unrestricted First-Order Languages
- 16: Vann McGee: Universal Universal Quantification
