Microeconomic Theory

A Concise Course
Erscheinungsjahr 2005
ISBN: 978-0-19-928029-2
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 384 Seiten, cover to boards, Format (B × H): 177 mm x 254 mm, Gewicht: 808 g

Microeconomic Theory is based on lecture notes for a graduate course in microeconomic theory. It covers a broad range of topics, and to some extent the lecture structure is retained in the style of the book. The author provides a clear account of the main ideas in each area concisely, and in some depth of detail. The presentation is at an advanced level and provides succinct coverage of the material in a self contained discussion.

Chapters are organized and written independently making it possible to read any chapter without having read earlier material. Each chaper is written on the presumption that the reader has some familiarity with the topics or issues under discussion but would value further discussion, or a second point of view. While much of the material is mainstream, a substantial portion is not available in existing textbooks. The book covers a range of topics appearing in advanced courses in microeconomic theory. Coverage includes such topics as decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, auctions, bargaining, information models, principal- agent problems, signalling and screening games, cooperative games and models of learning.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bergin, James

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Mikroökonomie
• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Geschichtliche Themen Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Allgemeines

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- 1: Decision Theory

- 2: Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance

- 3: Strategic Form Games

- 4: Nash Equilibrium- Existence and Refinements

- 5: Mechanism Design

- 6: Auctions I: Independent Values

- 7: Auctions II: Dependent Values

- 8: Extensive Form Games

- 9: Equilibrium in Extensive Game Forms

- 10: Repeated Games

- 11: Bargaining

- 12: Information

- 13: The Principal-Agent Problem

- 14: Signaling

- 15: Screening

- 16: Common Knowledge

- 17: Mechanism Design: Complete and Incomplete Information

- 18: Cooperative Outcomes

- 19: Large Games

- 20: Evolution and Learning

Über Autor(innen)

James Bergin is Professor of Economics at Queen's University and Canada Research Chair Holder. James holds degrees from Princeton, London School of Economics and the National University of Ireland. His research interests include mechanism design, learning and evolutionary game theory, and anonymous games.