Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 496 g
Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 496 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-511715-8
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- What is the Logic Strategy?
- Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
- Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities and Lexicographic Expected Utility
- Solutions Based on Ratifiability and Sure Thing Reasoning
- Undercutting the Ramsey Test for Conditionals
- Aumann's "No Agreement" Theorem Generalized
- Rational Failures of the KK-Principle
- How Much Common Belief is Necessary for a Convention?
- Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma
- Can Free Choice Be Known?
- Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma




