Economic Organizations as Games

1. Auflage 1989
ISBN: 978-0-631-16888-1
Verlag: Wiley-Blackwell

Buch, Englisch, 228 Seiten, Format (B × H): 167 mm x 217 mm, Gewicht: 331 g

Economists have in recent years found the theory of games to be an attractive route for exploring imperfectly competitive markets. In this collection of articles, some of the best minds in contemporary economics on both sides of the Atlantic xplore both the potential and the limitations of this theoretical framework.

In a lengthy introduction, the editors conduct a comprehensive survey of the hypothesis of game theory and its goals which provides a unique perspective on the subject. At the same time, they warn the theory is not sufficiently well developed to provide an analysis of all games.

The papers which follow fall into three sections: equilibrium theory, imperfect competition and the design of organizations. Together they explore and illustrate many aspects of the economic application of game theory in industrial organization.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Binmore, Ken

Dasgupta, Partha

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface vii

Acknowledgements viii

INTRODUCTION Game Theory: A Survey

K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta 1

PART I EQUILIBRIUM THEORY

1 The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games,
I: Theory
P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin 49

2 The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games,
II: Applications
P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin 83

PART II IMPERFECT COMPETITION

3 On the Rate of Convergence of Oligopoly Equilibria in Large Markets: An Example
P. Dasgupta and Y. Ushio 103

4 Natural Oligopolies

A. Shaked and J. Sutton 107

5 Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
A. Shaked and J. Sutton 125

6 The Theory of Technological Competition

P. Dasgupta 139

7 Strategic Considerations in Invention and Innovation: The Case of Natural Resources

P. Dasgupta, R. Gilbert and J. E. Stiglitz 165

PART III THE DESIGN OF ORGANIZATIONS

8 On the Revelation Principle under Complete and Incomplete Information
R Repullo

9 Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
D. Mookherjee 197

Index 215

Über Autor(innen)

Ken Binmore is Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan.

Partha Dasgupta is Professor of Economics at the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of St. John's College.