The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism

Erscheinungsjahr 2023
ISBN: 978-0-19-006822-6
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 600 Seiten, Format (B × H): 173 mm x 253 mm, Gewicht: 1160 g

“Moral realism” is a family of theories of morality united by the idea that there are moral facts--facts about what is right or wrong or good or bad--and that morality is not simply a matter of personal preferences, emotions, attitudes, or sociological conventions. The fundamental thought underlying moral realism can be expressed as a parity thesis. There are many kinds of facts, including physical, psychological, mathematical, temporal, and moral facts. So understood, moral realism can be distinguished from a variety of anti-realist theories including expressivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory.

The Handbook is divided into four parts, the first of which contains essays about the basic concepts and distinctions which characterize moral realism. The subsequent parts contain essays first defending the idea that morality is a naturalistic phenomenon like other subject matters studied by the empirical sciences; second, that morality is a non-natural phenomenon like logic or “pure rationality”; and the final section is dedicated to those theories which deny the usefulness of the natural/non-natural distinction. The twenty-five commissioned essays cover the field of moral realism in a comprehensive and highly accessible way.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bloomfield, Paul

Weitere Mitwirkende

Copp, David

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- Paul Bloomfield and David Copp

- I. ABOUT MORAL REALISM AND ITS VARIETIES

- 1. Defining Moral Realism

- Jennifer Foster and Mark Schroeder

- 2. Metaphysical Structure for Moral Realists

- Tristram McPherson

- 3. Moral Realism and Objectivity

- Sigrún Svavarsdóttir

- 4. Epistemology for Realists

- Sarah McGrath

- 5. The Bearing of Moral Rationalism on Moral Realism

- Michael Smith

- 6. Does Anything We Care About Distinguish the Non-Natural from the Natural?

- Mark van Roojen

- 7. Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In Between

- Ralph Wedgwood

- 8. Can a Moral Judgment be Moorean?

- William Lycan

- 9. Real Ethics

- Simon Blackburn

- II. NATURALISM

- 10. Ethical Naturalism: Problems and Prospects

- Louise Antony and Ernesto Garcia

- 11. Ethical Realism and Robust Normativity

- David Copp

- 12. Moral Functionalism

- Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit

- 13. Function, Fitness, Flourishing

- Paul Bloomfield

- 14. Realism about the Good-For Human Beings

- L. Nandi Theunissen

- III. NON-NATURALISM

- 15. Moral Conceptual Truths

- John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, and Russ Shafer-Landau

- 16. Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments against Robust Moral Realism

- Joshua Schecter

- 17. The Explanatory Roles of Moral Facts and the Case for Moral Realism

- Robert Audi

- 18. Derek Parfit's Non-Naturalist Cognitivism

- Roger Crisp

- 19. Ardent Moral Realism and the Value-Laden World

- William J. FitzPatrick

- 20. Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed!

- David Enoch and Itamar Weinshtock-Saadon

- IV. NEITHER NATURALISM NOR NON-NATURALISM

- 21. Response-Dependent Realism

- Mark LeBar

- 22. Deflationary Meta-ethics

- Paul Horwich

- 23. On the Properties of Quietism and Robustness

- Matthew H. Kramer

- 24. Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism

- Mark D. Warren and Amie L. Thomasson

- 25. Moral Anti-Exceptionalism

- Timothy Williamson

Über Autor(innen)

Paul Bloomfield is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut and works on issues in moral philosophy and metaphysics. He is the author of Moral Reality (2001), Morality and Self-Interest (2008), and The Virtues of Happiness (2014).

David Copp is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at the University of California, Davis. He is author of Morality, Normativity, and Society (1995) and Morality in a Natural World (2007), and he has edited several anthologies, including The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (2006). He is editor of a monograph series with OUP called “Oxford Moral Theory.”