Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue

Erscheinungsjahr 2014
ISBN: 978-0-19-967215-8
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 346 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 236 mm, Gewicht: 641 g

Is religious faith consistent with being an intellectually virtuous thinker?

In seeking to answer this question, one quickly finds others, each of which has been the focus of recent renewed attention by epistemologists: What is it to be an intellectually virtuous thinker? Must all reasonable belief be grounded in public evidence? Under what circumstances is a person rationally justified in believing something on trust, on the testimony of another, or because of the conclusions drawn by an intellectual authority? Can it be reasonable to hold a belief on a topic over which there is significant, entrenched disagreement among informed inquirers, or should such disagreement lead all parties to modify or suspend their own judgments? Is there anything about faith that exempts it from measurement against such epistemic norms? And if we would so evaluate it, how exactly should we understand the intellectual commitments faith requires?

The volume's introduction provides a roadmap of the central issues and controversies as currently discussed by philosophers. In fourteen new essays written to engage nonspecialists as well as philosophers working in religion and epistemology, a diverse and distinguished group of thinkers then consider the place of intellectual virtue in religious faith, exploring one or more of the specific issues noted above.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Callahan, Laura Frances

O'Connor, Timothy

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Religionswissenschaft Religionswissenschaft Allgemein Religionsphilosophie, Philosophische Theologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Religionsphilosophie, Philosophische Theologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- Part I. What Is Faith?

- 1: W. Jay Wood: Faith's Intellectual Rewards

- 2: Lara Buchak: Rational Faith and Justified Belief

- 3: J. L. Schellenberg: How to Make Faith a Virtue

- Part II. Evidentialism and Faith

- 4: Trent Dougherty: Faith, Trust, and Testimony: An Evidentialist Account

- 5: Evan Fales: Making and Breaking Faith

- 6: Paul K. Moser: The Virtue of Friendship with God

- Part III. Trust and Faith

- 7: John Bishop: Trusting Others, Trusting in God, Trusting the World

- 8: Elizabeth Fricker: Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others--An Argument from Analogy?

- 9: Eleonore Stump: Faith, Wisdom, and the Transmission of Knowledge through Testimony

- 10: Linda Zagzebski: Trust, Anti-Trust, and Reasons for Religious Belief

- 11: Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O'Connor: Well-Tuned Trust as an Intellectual Virtue

- Part IV. Religious Disagreement

- 12: Sanford C. Goldberg: Does Externalist Epistemology Rationalize Religious Commitment?

- 13: Jennifer Lackey: Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously

- 14: Nicholas Wolterstorff: The Significance Of Inexplicable Disagreement

- Index

Über Autor(innen)

Laura Frances Callahan is a Clarendon Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at Oxford University, formerly a Wells Scholar at Indiana University. Her primary interests are in epistemology.

Timothy O'Connor is Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. He is the author of Persons and Causes (Oxford 2000) and Theism and Ultimate Explanation (Blackwell 2008) and the editor of five other volumes in the philosophy of mind and action and metaphysics.