Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 352 g
Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 352 g
ISBN: 978-1-107-54750-6
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Coercive diplomacy - the use of threats and assurances to alter another state's behavior - is an indispensable to international relations. Most scholarship has focused on whether and when states are able to use coercive methods to achieve their desired results. However, employing game-theoretic tools, statistical modeling, and detailed case study analysis, Power Plays builds and tests a theory that explains how states develop strategies of coercive diplomacy, how their targets shield themselves from these efforts, and the implications for interstate relations. Focusing on the World Trade Organization, Power Plays argues that coercive diplomacy often precludes cooperation due to fears of exploitation, but that international institutions can solve these problems by convincing states to eschew certain tools for coercive purposes.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Internationale Wirtschaft
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Diplomatie
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical framework; 3. Bilateral agreements and state similarity; 4. WTO membership as a commitment strategy; 5. Coercive diplomacy in comparative perspective; 6. Agreements and the displacement of coercion; 7. Reduced effectiveness of coercion: evidence from the United States; 8. Conclusion.