Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas

Dilemmas of a Conventional Army
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-0-415-57012-1
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 260 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 401 g

Reihe: Middle Eastern Military Studies

This volume analyzes the conduct of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) counter-insurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) in the Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It employs primary and secondary resources to produce a comprehensive analysis on whether or not the IDF has been able to adapt its conventional conduct of warfare to the realities of the Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict and achieve any sort of victory over the Palestinian insurgents. Sergio Catignani provides new insights into how conventional armies struggle with contemporary insurgency by looking in particular at the strategic, operational, tactical and ethical dilemmas of the IDF over the last two decades. By examining the way in which the IDF and the Israeli security doctrine were formed and developed over time, he explores the extent to which Israeli security assumptions, civil-military relations, the organizational culture, command and control structure, and conduct of the IDF have affected its adaptation to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict.

Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas will be of much interest to students of low-intensity conflict and counter-insurgency, the Israeli army, the Middle Eastern conflict and strategic studies in general.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Catignani, Sergio

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Geschichtliche Themen Militärgeschichte
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Gewalt Terrorismus, Religiöser Fundamentalismus
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction2. Combat Motivation3. Political--Military Relations4. National Security Doctrine 5. Land and the Rise of the LIC Struggle6. The Intifada7. The Al-Aqsa Intifada 8. Strategic Impasse9. Unilateral Disengagement10. Conclusion11. Postface: The Lebanon Summer War

Über Autor(innen)

Sergio Catignani is Lecturer in Strategic and Security Studies at the University of Sussex. He has a PhD in War Studies from King's College London. He is the co-editor with Professor Clive Jones of Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Routledge, 2009).