This book engages in an analytical and realistic enquiry into legal interpretation and a selection of related matters including legal gaps, judicial fictions, judicial precedent, legal defeasibility, and legislation. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the central theoretical and methodological tenets of analytical realism. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual apparatus concerning the phenomenon of legal interpretation, which it subsequently applies to investigate the truth-in-legal-interpretation issue. Chapters 3 to 6 argue for a theory of legal interpretation - pragmatic realism - by outlining a theory of interpretive games, revisiting the debate between literalism and contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language, and underscoring the many shortcomings of the container-retrieval view and pragmatic formalism. In turn, Chapter 7, focusing on comparative legal theory, advocates an interpretation-sensitive theory of legal gaps, as opposed to purely normativist ones. Chapter 8 explores the connection between judicial reasoning and judicial fictions, casting light on the structure and purpose of fictional reasoning. Chapter 9 provides an analytical enquiry into judicial precedent, examining a variety of ideal-typical systems in terms of their normative or de iure relevance. Chapter 10 addresses defeasibility and legal indeterminacy. In closing, Chapter 11 highlights the central tenets of a realistic theory of legislation.
Chiassoni
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Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction: The Path of Analytical Realism.- 2. Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Forms of Interpretive Discourse.- 3. Interpretive Games.- 4. Taking Context Seriously.- 5. Frames v. Containers.- 6. Towards Pragmatic Realism.- 7. Legal Gaps.- 8. Judicial Fictions.- 9. Precedent.- 10. Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy.- 11. Legislation.
Pierluigi Chiassoni is Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Genova School of Law and a permanent fellow of Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy. His jurisprudential interests span from economic analysis of law, history of legal culture and history of analytical jurisprudence, to legal interpretation and human rights.
