Buch, Englisch, 560 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 840 g
Buch, Englisch, 560 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 840 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-504404-1
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Fascinating as the corporate takeovers of recent years have been--with their "golden parachutes" and junk bonds, "greenmailers" and white knights--it is far from clear what underlying forces are at work, and what their long-term consequences will be. Debate over these questions has become polarized: some see takeover threats as disciplinary mechanisms that induce managers to behave efficiently and move assets to higher valued uses or into the hands of more efficient managers; others claim that corporate raiders have produced few observable increases in operating efficiency, but rather have disrupted business planning, enforced a preoccupation with the short-term, and tilted the balance sheets of corporate America towards dangerously high debt levels. Such sharp conflicts in theory and evidence have produced considerable governmental confusion concerning the appropriate policy response. Scores of bills have been introduced in Congress, but legislators are no more in agreement than scholars.
Knights, Raiders, and Targets represents one of the first sustained efforts to refine and clarify these issues. Based on papers presented at a symposium sponsored by the Columbia Law School's Center for Law and Economic Studies, it also includes discussion of the informal presentations made at the symposium by the CEOs of several major corporations. This important book airs new theories and offers vital and exciting discussion of the essential issues attached to an event that has become central to American corporate culture.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- Contributors
- Sponsors
- Introduction
- 1: Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion
- CAPITAL MARKETS, EFFICIENCY, AND CORPORATE CONTROL
- 2: Martin Shubik: Corporate Control, Efficient Markets, and the Public Good
- 3: Robert J. Shiller: Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets
- 4: Franklin R. Edwards: Comment
- 5: Michael A. Salinger: Comment
- MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR AND TAKEOVERS
- 6: John C. Coffee, Jr.: Shareholders Versus Managers: the Strain in the Corporate Web
- 7: Malcolm S. Salter and Wolf A. Weinhold: Corporate Takeovers: Financial Boom or Organizational Bust?
- 8: Victor Brudney: Comment
- 9: Melvin A. Eisenberg: Comment: Golden Parachutes and Managers--A Risk-Neutral Perspective
- 10: Oliver E. Williamson: Comment: Shareholders and Managers--A Risk-Neutral Perspective
- EVIDENCE ON THE GAINS FROM MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS
- 11: Ellen B. Magenheim and Dennis C. Mueller: Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off after an Acquisition?
- 12: David J. Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer: Mergers and Managerial Performance
- 13: Edward S. Herman and Louis Lowenstein: The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers
- 14: Richard Roll: Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth
- 15: Michael Bradley and Gregg A. Jarrell: Comment
- 16: Warren A. Law: Comment
- 17: Discussion
- MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS: TAXES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND THE INCENTIVES OF MANAGERS
- 18: Ronald J. Gilson, Myron S. Scholes, and Mark A. Wolfson: Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions
- 19: Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus: Taxes and the Merger Decision
- 20: Michael C. Jensen: The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence
- 21: Richard S. Ruback: Comment
- 22: John L. Vogelstein: Comment
- 23: Elliott J. Weiss: Comment
- 24: Martin D. Ginsburg: Comment
- LEGAL RULES, TAKEOVER STRATEGIES, AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS
- 25: Lucian Arye Bebchuk: The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy
- 26: Deborah A. DeMott: Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation
- 27: Peter Frazer: The Regulation of Takeovers in Great Britain
- 28: Douglas H. Ginsburg: Comment
- 29: Marshall L. Small: Comment
- 30: Stanley Sporkin: Comment
- ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE
- 31: Joel Seligman: Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeovers and Control Transactions
- 32: Daniel R. Fischel: Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock
- 33: Robert H. Mundheim: Comment
- 34: A. A. Sommer, Jr.: Comment
- Index
