Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright
1. Auflage 2012
ISBN: 978-0-19-927805-3
Verlag: OUP UK

Buch, Englisch, 448 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 916 g

This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as G. E. Moore's celebrated proof of an external world, and scepticism about the material world. Some papers explore the relationship of Wright's ideas with those of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence has always been a prominent aspect of Wright's philosophy. The essays collectively testify to the enormous interest and relevance of Wright's seminal contributions for present-day debates in areas as diverse as the philosophy of language and mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, and significantly advance research in these areas. The volume also contains Wright's substantial responses to his critics, which offer the most up-to-date versions of his ideas and a vigorous defence of his philosophy.

Zielgruppe

Scholars and advanced students in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Coliva, Annalisa

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- List of contributors

- Introduction

- Bio-bibliographical note

- Rule-Following and the Normativity of Meaning

- 1: Paul A. Boghossian: Blind rule-following

- 2: Christopher Peacocke: Understanding and rule-following

- 3: Paul Horwich: Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms

- 4: Akeel Bilgrami: Why meaning intentions are degenerate

- Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings

- 5: Barry C. Smith: The publicity of meaning and the interiority of mind

- 6: Dorit Bar-On: Expression, truth, and reality: some variations on themes from Wright

- Truth, Objectivity, and Relativism

- 7: Simon Blackburn: Some remarks about minimalism

- 8: Stewart Shapiro: Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall

- 9: Carol Rovane: How to formulate relativism

- Warrant, Transmission Failure, and Scepticism

- 10: Jim Pryor: When warrant transmits

- 11: José L. Zalabardo: Wright on Moore

- 12: Annalisa Coliva: Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives - is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?

- 13: Michael Williams: Wright against the sceptics

- Replies

- Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of Meaning

- Part II: Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings

- Part III: Truth, Objectivity, Realism, and Relativism

- Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement

- Index

Über Autor(innen)

Coliva, Annalisa
Annalisa Coliva is Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy) and Associate Director of COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy (Bologna). A Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, Coliva's main publications include Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (Palgrave, 2010) and, as editor, The Self and Self-Knowledge (OUP, 2012). She has published widely in Italian and English in epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, and history of analytic philosophy and is now working, with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, on a collected volume titled Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein.