The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics

Erscheinungsjahr 2026
ISBN: 978-0-19-751089-6
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 750 Seiten, Format (B × H): 186 mm x 256 mm, Gewicht: 1407 g

Normative ethics is the study of what makes actions right or wrong, and includes such approaches as consequentialism, traditional deontology (including Kantian theory), virtue theory (including Aristotelian theory), and the ethics of care, a feminist approach. With contributions from over forty philosophers, The Oxford Handbook in Normative Ethics provides an overview of the major issues in contemporary normative ethics. The handbook begins with an introduction that provides an overview of the field and the relationships among the topics addressed in the volume. The chapters in Part I start with basic distinctions, introducing consequentialism, deontology, virtue theory, and value theory. Part II focuses on methodology in normative ethics and epistemological questions. Part III spotlights issues in responsibility and agency. Part IV is dedicated to general problems for normative theories, including particularism, collective action problems, and moral status.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Copp, David

Rosati, Connie

Rulli, Tina

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Part I. Basic Distinctions

- 1: Julia Driver: Consequentialism

- 2: Philip Pettit: Direct Consequentialism, Unlimited

- 3: Brad Hooker: Rule-Consequentialism's Essence and Rationale

- 4: Richard Yetter Chappell: Consequentialism: Core and Expansion

- 5: Dale Dorsey: Welfarism

- 6: Ben Bradley: Hedonism

- 7: Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels: Desire-Oriented Theories of Welfare

- 8: Jason Raibley and Valerie Tiberius: Value Fulfillment and the Prudential Good

- 9: Guy Fletcher: Objective List Theory

- 10: Gwen Bradford: Perfectionism

- 11: David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Rossian Deontology

- 12: David Schmidtz: Moral Rights

- 13: Thomas E. Hill Jr.: Kantian Normative Ethics

- 14: Rahul Kumar: Contractualism

- 15: Christian Barry and Kerah Gordon-Solmon: The Doing and Allowing Distinction

- 16: Elizabeth Harman: Heroes and Jerks: Morality Beyond Requirement

- 17: S. Andrew Schroeder: Leaving (the Concept of) Deontology Behind

- 18: Paul Hurley: Against Consequentializing of Normative Theories

- 19: Julia Annas: Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics

- 20: Christine Swanton: Non-Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics

- 21: Rachana Kamtekar and Shaun Nichols: On Debunking Virtue

- 22: Stephanie Collins: The Ethics of Care as a Normative Ethical Theory

- 23: Anita M. Superson: Feminist Ethics

- 24: David B Wong: Normative Relativism

- Part II. Methodology and Epistemic Issues

- 25: Gerald Dworkin: Theory, Practice, and Moral Reasoning

- 26: Antti Kauppinen and Jaakko Hirvelä: Reflective Equilibrium

- 27: Natalie Gold: Thought Experiments in Ethics Or: Has the Trolley Problem Gone off the Rails?

- 28: Amelia Hicks: Ignorance and Duty: The Objective/Subjective Distinction in Ethics

- 29: Sarah Stroud: Morality and Epistemic Rationality

- 30: Joe Horton and Jacob Ross: Evaluative Uncertainty

- Part III. Responsibility and Agency

- 31: John Martin Fischer: Responsibility and Control: New Work

- 32: Nomy Arpaly: On Being "Blameless Among One's Contemporaries": Moral Ignorance and Widespread Wrongdoing

- 33: Elinor Mason: Negligence, Recklessness, and Strict Liability

- 34: Andrew C. Khoury: Moral Luck

- Part IV. General Problems for Normative Theories

- 35: Garrett Cullity: Particularism and Anti-Theory

- 36: Gustaf Arrhenius: Population Ethics: A Challenge to the Project of Normative Ethics?

- 37: Zofia Stemplowska and Henrik D. Kugelberg: Partial Compliance Theory

- 38: Judith Lichtenberg: Some Individual Responsibilities Intertwined With Collectives

- 39: William Wringe: Collective Obligations

- 40: Jeff Sebo: Moral Circle Explosion

- 41: Tina Rulli: The Moral Status of Possible Persons

- Part I. Basic Distinctions

- 1: Julia Driver: Consequentialism

- 2: Philip Pettit: Direct Consequentialism, Unlimited

- 3: Brad Hooker: Rule-Consequentialism's Essence and Rationale

- 4: Richard Yetter Chappell: Consequentialism: Core and Expansion

- 5: Dale Dorsey: Welfarism

- 6: Ben Bradley: Hedonism

- 7: Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels: Desire-Oriented Theories of Welfare

- 8: Jason Raibley and Valerie Tiberius: Value Fulfillment and the Prudential Good

- 9: Guy Fletcher: Objective List Theory

- 10: Gwen Bradford: Perfectionism

- 11: David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Rossian Deontology

- 12: David Schmidtz: Moral Rights

- 13: Thomas E. Hill Jr.: Kantian Normative Ethics

- 14: Rahul Kumar: Contractualism

- 15: Christian Barry and Kerah Gordon-Solmon: The Doing and Allowing Distinction

- 16: Elizabeth Harman: Heroes and Jerks: Morality Beyond Requirement

- 17: S. Andrew Schroeder: Leaving (the Concept of) Deontology Behind

- 18: Paul Hurley: Against Consequentializing of Normative Theories

- 19: Julia Annas: Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics

- 20: Christine Swanton: Non-Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics

- 21: Rachana Kamtekar and Shaun Nichols: On Debunking Virtue

- 22: Stephanie Collins: The Ethics of Care as a Normative Ethical Theory

- 23: Anita M. Superson: Feminist Ethics

- 24: David B Wong: Normative Relativism

- Part II. Methodology and Epistemic Issues

- 25: Gerald Dworkin: Theory, Practice, and Moral Reasoning

- 26: Antti Kauppinen and Jaakko Hirvelä: Reflective Equilibrium

- 27: Natalie Gold: Thought Experiments in Ethics Or: Has the Trolley Problem Gone off the Rails?

- 28: Amelia Hicks: Ignorance and Duty: The Objective/Subjective Distinction in Ethics

- 29: Sarah Stroud: Morality and Epistemic Rationality

- 30: Joe Horton and Jacob Ross: Evaluative Uncertainty

- Part III. Responsibility and Agency

- 31: John Martin Fischer: Responsibility and Control: New Work

- 32: Nomy Arpaly: On Being "Blameless Among One's Contemporaries": Moral Ignorance and Widespread Wrongdoing

- 33: Elinor Mason: Negligence, Recklessness, and Strict Liability

- 34: Andrew C. Khoury: Moral Luck

- Part IV. General Problems for Normative Theories

- 35: Garrett Cullity: Particularism and Anti-Theory

- 36: Gustaf Arrhenius: Population Ethics: A Challenge to the Project of Normative Ethics?

- 37: Zofia Stemplowska and Henrik D. Kugelberg: Partial Compliance Theory

- 38: Judith Lichtenberg: Some Individual Responsibilities Intertwined With Collectives

- 39: William Wringe: Collective Obligations

- 40: Jeff Sebo: Moral Circle Explosion

- 41: Tina Rulli: The Moral Status of Possible Persons

Über Autor(innen)

David Copp is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of California, Davis. He is author of Ethical Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity (2025), Morality, Normativity, and Society (1995), and Morality in a Natural World (2007), and he edited The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (2006). He served on the editorial boards of Ethics and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy and as a co-editor of the metaethics section of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He has published and lectured widely on topics in moral and political philosophy.

Connie Rosati is Roy Allison Vaughan Centennial Professor in Philosophy and Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin. She has authored articles in metaethics, ethics, and the philosophy of law, including "Agency and the Open Question Argument," "The Makropulos Case Revisited: Reflections on Immortality and Agency," "Constitutional Realism," and "Welfare and Rational Fit." She has

served as Co-Editor-in-Chief of Ethics, Legal Theory, and the metaethics section of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Tina Rulli is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of California, Davis. She works in normative ethics, applied ethics, and bioethics, with a focus on population ethics and reproduction. Her papers include "Preferring a Genetically-Related Child," "Conditional Obligations," and "IIA, Rationality, and the Individuation of Options." She is co-Editor-in-Chief at the Journal of Applied Philosophy.