Buch, Englisch, 462 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 854 g
Buch, Englisch, 462 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 854 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-928884-7
Verlag: OUP UK
Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity.
Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that
our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of
consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise.
The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our
persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion.
Zielgruppe
Philosophers and advanced students of philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophische Anthropologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Phänomenologie
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Bewusstseinszustände




