The Democratic Constitution

Erscheinungsjahr 2004
ISBN: 978-0-19-517123-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 320 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 515 g

In this fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy, Devins and Fisher argue that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights. This highly readable narrative of how the Court and elected officials work in concert with the American people to shape constitutional values is an impressive affirmation of public participation in the political process.

Zielgruppe

Constitutional law, judicial process, war powers/ seperation of power, federalism

Autoren/Hrsg.

Devins, Neal E.

Fisher, Louis

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Demokratie

Über Autor(innen)

Neal Devins is Ernst W. Goodrich Professor of Law and Government at the College of William and Mary. He is also editor of the Constitutional Conflicts Book Series at Duke University Press. Louis Fisher is senior specialist in separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service. He testifies before congressional committees on a variety of constitutional issues, including war powers, executive privilege, item vetoes, legislative vetoes, and covert spending.