Rational Choice Politics

Four-Volume Set Auflage
ISBN: 978-1-4129-4502-8
Verlag: Blue Rose Publishers

Buch, Englisch, 1688 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 3260 g

Reihe: SAGE Library of Political Science

The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.

Volume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium
Volume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems
Volume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics
Volume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State

Autoren/Hrsg.

Dowding, Keith

Dewan, Torun

Shepsle, Kenneth A

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM
Part 1: Social Choice
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making - Duncan Black
A Direct Proof of Arrow' s Theorem - Julian H. Blau
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions - Amaryta Sen
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result - Allan Gibbard
Part 2: Equilibrium
A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule - Charles R. Plott
Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control - Richard D. McKelvey
Generic Instability of Majority Rule - Norman Schofield
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions - William H. Riker
On 64%-Majority Rule - Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff
Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice - Richard D McKelvey
The Uncovered Set and the Core - Gary C. Cox
Bargaining in Legislatures - David P. Baron and John Ferejohn
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice - Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan
Part 3: Electoral Systems
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions - Gary Cox
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout - Timothy J. Fedderson
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems - Massimo Morelli
VOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS
Part 4: Voting and Elections
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting - William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty - Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
The Swing Voter's Curse - Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Voting as Communicating - Thomas Pickety
The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model - Robert J. Barro
Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control - John Ferejohn
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence - Randall L. Calvert
Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters - Alberto Alesina
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy - Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium - Gerald H. Kramer
Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes - David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks
Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics - David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier
Part 5: Pressure Politics
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft - Gordon Tullock
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society - Anne O. Krueger
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence - Gary Becker
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests - Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris
Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented - Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger
Protection for Sale - Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective - William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
VOLUME 3: LEGISLATURES
Part 6: Bureaucracy
Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas - David Austen-Smith
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior - Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure - Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures - Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting - John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey
Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures - Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel
Buying Supermajorities - Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder
Where's the Party? - K