Buch, Englisch, Band 65, 362 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 591 g
Buch, Englisch, Band 65, 362 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 591 g
Reihe: Cambridge Studies in International Relations
ISBN: 978-0-521-64415-0
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction; Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion; 3. Plausibility probes; 4. Statistical tests; Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences; 6. The extent of NIS concessions; 7. Evaluating the evidence; Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.
