Rational Decision and Causality

Erscheinungsjahr 2009
ISBN: 978-0-521-11011-2
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 248 Seiten, Format (B × H): 141 mm x 218 mm, Gewicht: 335 g

Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

In past years, the traditional Bayesian theory of rational decision making, based on subjective calculations of expected utility, has faced powerful attack from philosophers such as David Lewis and Brian Skyrms, who advance an alternative causal decision theory. The test they present for the Bayesian is exemplified in the decision problem known as 'Newcomb's paradox' and in related decision problems and is held to support the prescriptions of the causal theory. As well as his conclusions, the concepts and methods of Professor Eells introduces in the course of his analyses have extensive implications, not solely for probability theorists narrowly conceived, but for economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. They and their students will, in addition, find the early chapters of great use as a background and introduction to the subject as a whole.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Eells, Ellery

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Analytische Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface; Introduction; 1. Bayesianism; 2. The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theory; 3. Bayesian decision theories: some details; 4. The counterexamples; 5. Causal decision theories; 6. Common causes, reasons and symptotic acts; 7. A general defence of PMCEU; 8. Newcomb's paradox; Appendices; Bibliography; Index.