In Two Minds

Dual Processes and Beyond
Erscheinungsjahr 2009
ISBN: 978-0-19-923016-7
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 382 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 579 g

This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms.

Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual processes to summarize the state-of-the-art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work.

It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Evans, Jonathan St B. T.

Evans, Jonathan

Frankish, Keith

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
• Naturwissenschaften Biowissenschaften Biowissenschaften Neurobiologie, Verhaltensbiologie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie Intelligenz, Denken, Problemlösen

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- 1: Keith Frankish and Jonathan St B T Evans: The duality of mind: a historical perspective

- Part I - Foundations

- 2: Jonathan St B T Evans: How many dual process theories do we need: one, two or many?

- 3: Keith E Stanovich: Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: is it time for a tri-process theory?

- 4: Keith Frankish: Systems and levels: dual-system theories and the personal-subpersonal distinction

- 5: Peter Carruthers: An architecture for dual reasoning

- 6: Richard Samuels: The magical number two, plus or minus: dual process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds

- Part II - Perspectives

- 7: Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber: Intuitive and reflective inferences

- 8: Valerie Thompson: Dual-process theories: a metacognitve perspective

- 9: Eliot R Smith and Elizabeth C Collins: Dual-process models: a social psychological model

- 10: Emma E Buchtel and Ara Norenzayan: Thinking across cultures: implications for dual processes

- 11: Ron Sun, Sean M Lane and Robert C Mathews: The two systems of learning: an architectural perspective

- Part III - Applications

- 12: Paul A Klaczynski: Cognitive and social cognitive development: dual-process research and theory

- 13: Matthew D Lieberman: What zombies can't do: a social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness

- 14: Clare Saunders and David Over: In two minds about rationality?

- 15: Leland F Saunders: Reason and intuition in the moral life: a dual-process account of moral justification

Über Autor(innen)

Jonathan Evans has conducted a major research programme on thinking and reasoning since the 1970's. His publications include seven authored books and well over 150 scientific papers. His research includes study of cognitive biases in reasoning and judgement, and of the psychology of conditionals. He is one of the founders of the dual-process theory of reasoning and in recent years has extended this interest to broadly based dual-system theories of the mind.

Keith Frankish is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at The Open University. His research spans debates about the nature of belief, the structure of the mind, and consciousness. His publications include two authored books, three co-edited volumes, and numerous journal articles and book chapters. His 2004 book Mind and Supermind argued that a dual-systems perspective is implicit in everyday belief-desire psychology and explored the implications of this view for issues in philosophy of mind.