Follesdal | Ontology | Buch | 978-0-8153-3741-6 | sack.de

Buch, Englisch, 454 Seiten, Format (B × H): 159 mm x 236 mm, Gewicht: 1000 g

Follesdal

Ontology


Erscheinungsjahr 2001
ISBN: 978-0-8153-3741-6
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 454 Seiten, Format (B × H): 159 mm x 236 mm, Gewicht: 1000 g

ISBN: 978-0-8153-3741-6
Verlag: Routledge


First published in 2001. Willard Van Orman Quine (1908- ) has played a crucial role in philosophy during the second half of the 20th century. Early encyclopedias classified him as a logician, but he soon came to be regarded as a general philosopher, to begin with as a philosopher of logic and language, but eventually as a metaphysician, whose radical thoughts about ontology, epistemology and communication have repercussions within all major areas of philosophy. This series includes a selection of essays from his five volumes of work.

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Weitere Infos & Material


ONTOLOGICAL COMMENT Geach, Peter, On What There Is Part I, Aristotelian Society Supplementary vol 25 [1951] Ayer, Alfred J, On What There Is Part II, Aristotelian Society Supplementary vol 25 [1951] Black, Max, Comments on the Preceding Paper of W V Quine, Daedalus 80 [1951] Church, Alonzo, Symposium: Ontological Commitment, Journal of Philosophy 55 [1958] Scheffler, Israel and Noam Chomsky, What Is Said To Be, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 19 [1958-59] Grandy, Richard E, On What There Need Not Be, Journal of Philosophy 66 [1969] INDETERMINACY OF REFERENCE (ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY) Jubien, Michael, Two Kinds of Reduction, Journal of Philosophy 66 [1969] Stich, Stephen P, Dissonant Notes on the Theory of Reference, Nous 4 [1970] Field, Hartry, Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference, Journal of Philosophy 70 [1973] Leeds, Stephen, How to Think About Reference, Journal of Philosophy 70 [1973] Morscher, Edgar, Ontology as a Normative Science, Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 [1974] Aune, Bruce, Quine on Translation and Reference, Philosophical Studies 27 [1975] Massey, Gerald, Indeterminacy, Inscrutability and Ontological Relativity, American Philosophical Quarterly 12 [1978] Davidson, Donald, The Inscrutability of Reference, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 [1979] Putnam, Hilary, The Way the World Is, In Realism with a Human Face {Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990] TRUTH Field, Harry, Quine and the Correspondence Theory, Philosophical Review 83 [1974] Davidson, Donald, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, In Dieter Henrich, ed., Kant oder Hegel [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983] Bergstrom, Lars, Quine's Truth, Inquiry 37 [1994] Quine, W V, Response to Bergstrom, Inquiry 37 [1994] Davidson, Donald, What is Quine's View of Truth?, Inquiry 37 [1994] Quine, W V, Response to Davidson, Inquiry 37 [1994] REALISM Kruger, Lorenz, Some Remarks on Realism and Scientific Revolutions, In Peter Bieri, Rolf Peter Horstmann and Lorenz Kruger, eds., Transcendental Arguments and Science [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979] Hylton, Peter, Rorty and Quine on Scheme and Content, Philosophical Topics 25 [1997] NOMINALISM Mohanty, J N, A Note on Modern Nominalism, Philosophical Quarterly (India) 32 [1960] PHYSICALISM Schuldenfrei, Richard, Dualistic Physicalism in Quine: A Radical Critique, Philosophical Forum 10 [1978] Dreben, Burton, Putnam, Quine and the Facts, Philosophical Topics 20 [1992] Putnam, Hilary, Reply to Burton Dreben, Philosophical Topics 20 [1992] PROPOSITIONS I


Dagfinn Follesdal, University of Oslo and Stanford University



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