Buch, Englisch, 464 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 741 g
Selected Readings
Buch, Englisch, 464 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 741 g
ISBN: 978-0-521-33658-1
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Decision theory and the theory of rational choice have recently been the subjects of considerable research by philosophers and economists. However, no adequate anthology exists which can be used to introduce students to the field. This volume is designed to meet that need. The essays included are organized into five parts covering the foundations of decision theory, the conceptualization of probability and utility, pholosophical difficulties with the rules of rationality and with the assessment of probability, and causal decision theory. The editors provide an extensive introduction to the field and introductions to each part.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
- Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Mathematik Allgemein Philosophie der Mathematik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie der Mathematik, Philosophie der Physik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction: Bayesian decision theory - foundations and problems Peter Gärdenfors, and Nils-Eric Sahlin; Part I. Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory: 2. Truth and probability Frank P. Ramsey; 3. Individual decision making under uncertainty R. Duncan Luce, and Howard Raiffa; 4. The sure-thing principle Leonard J. Savage; 5. Probable knowledge Richard C. Jeffrey; Part II. Conceptualization of Probability and Utility: Introduction: 6. Bets and beliefs Henry E. Kyburg; 7. Slightly more realistic personal probability Ian Hacking; 8. Risk aversion as a problem of conjoint measurement Bengt Hansson; Part III. Questionable Rule of Rationality: Introduction: 9. Allais' paradox Leonard J. Savage; 10. Sure-thing doubts Edward F. McClennen; 11. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky; 12. Generalized expected utility analysis and the nature of observed violations of the independence axiom Mark Machina; Part IV. Unreliable Probabilities: Introduction: 13. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms Daniel Ellsberg; 14. Self-knowledge, uncertainty, and choice Frederic Schick; 15. On indeterminate probabilities Isaac Levi; 16. Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making Peter Gärdenfors, and Nils-Eric Sahlin; Part V. Causal Decision Theory: Introduction: 17. Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility Allan Gibbard, and William L. Harper; 18. Causal decision theory David Lewis; 19. Ratifiability and stability Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz.
