Buch, Englisch, 378 Seiten, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 698 g
Essays on Inner Awareness
Buch, Englisch, 378 Seiten, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 698 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-880539-7
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self--a self-experience--whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called mineness, for-me-ness, pre-reflective self-awareness and subjective character, among others.
This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy.
This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question.
The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a 'sense of self' might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved.
The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- 1: Manuel García-Carpintero and Marie Guillot: Introduction: Views about Self-Experience
- Part I: Doubts and Questions About Self-Experience
- 2: Léa Salje and Alexander Geddes: Conscious Experience: What's In It For Me?
- 3: Tom McClelland: Four Impediments to the Case for Mineness
- 4: Robert Howell: Transparency and Subjective Character
- 5: Gianfranco Soldati: Mineness, Deflation, and Transparency
- 6: Wayne Wu: Mineness and Introspective Data
- 7: Krisztina Orbán and Hong Yu Wong: The Sense of Body Ownership: What Are We Studying?
- Part II: Putting Self-Experience to Work
- 8: Uriah Kriegel: The Three Circles of Consciousness
- 9: Martine Nida-Rümelin: Experiencing Subjects and So-called Mine-ness
- 10: Marie Guillot: The Phenomenal Concept of Self and First-Person Epistemology
- 11: Carlota Serrahima: The Bounded Body: On the Sense of Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space
- 12: Frédérique de Vignemont: The Phenomenology of Bodily Ownership
- 13: Richard Dub: Emotions of Mineness
- 14: Alexandre Billon: What Is It Like to Lack Mineness? Depersonalization as a Probe for the Scope, Nature and Role of Mineness
- 15: Jordi Fernández: The Ownership of Memories
