Buch, Englisch, 248 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 543 g
Buch, Englisch, 248 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 543 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-984127-1
Verlag: ACADEMIC
Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security.
First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey then proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a proposed United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states.
This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- I. Introduction
- A. The Need for a New Counterproliferation Foundation
- B. The Old Grand Bargain Breakdown
- i. The Goal of Nuclear Disarmament
- ii. The Flawed Nexus of Nuclear Disarmament and
- Nuclear Counterproliferation
- C. Legitimacy; The Challenge of Asymmetric Possession of Nuclear Weapons
- II. Futility of Nuclear Risk Management in a Purely Consensual Regime
- A. Nuclear Terrorism
- B. State-to-State Nuclear Weapons Risk
- C. Risk Reduction by Consent
- III. Security Council Mandate of Universal Standards
- A. 'Global Legislation' by the United Nations Security Council
- i. The Security Council as Global Legislator
- ii. The Legal Debate
- iii. The Legal Debate Enlightened by Political Realism
- iv. Counterproliferation as Best Prospect for Security Council Legislation
- B. Counterproliferation Beyond Current 'Legislation'
- C.Universal Standards
- i. Nuclear Security as an Independent International Interest
- ii. No Classification of States
- iii. International Administration of Universal Standards
- IV. Elements of an Effective Counterproliferation Architecture
- A. Expanding Deterrence; An International Nuclear Forensics Data Bank
- i. Contemporary Nuclear Forensics Capability
- ii. Expanded Deterrence
- iii. The Legal and Institutional Empowerment of Nuclear Forensics
- B. The Internationalization of Counterproliferation Intelligence
- i. The Incongruity of National Intelligence Resources and Transnational Nuclear Risk
- ii. The Imperative for International Institutionalization of Intelligence
- iii. Feasibility
- C. Export-Import Control
- i. The Club that Cannot Counter-Proliferate
- ii. Institutionalization of Export-Import Controls under Security Council Mandate
- D. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
- E. Interdiction of Nuclear Weapons Related Transport; The Proliferation Security Initiative
- i. Counterproliferation Designed to be Least Legal; 'An Activity, Not an Organization'
- ii. Interface of the Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law
- a. Coastal State Jurisdiction
- b. High Seas Jurisdiction
- c. Self-Defense
- iii. Institutionalization of the Proliferation Security Initiative under Security Council Mandate; Legitimacy and Effectiveness
- V. Compliance
- VI. Political Will
- VII. Conclusion
