Oxford Studies in Epistemology

Volume 4
Erscheinungsjahr 2013
ISBN: 978-0-19-967270-7
Verlag: Oxford University Press(UK)

Buch, Englisch, 360 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 705 g

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include:

*traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc;

*new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism;

*foundational questions in decision-theory;

*confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology;

*topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology;

*topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and

*work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony and the ethics of belief.

Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gendler, Tamar Szabó

Hawthorne, John

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- 1: Igor Douven: The Epistemology of Conditionals

- 2: Jeremy Fantl: A Defense of Dogmatism

- 3: Jane Friedman: Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief

- 4: Daniel Greco: Probability and Prodigality

- 5: Sarah-Jane Leslie: Essence and Natural Kinds: When Science Meets Preschooler Intuition

- 6: Ram Neta: Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism

- 7: Susanna Rinard: Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense

- 8: Joshua Schechter: Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic?

- 9: Susanna Siegel: Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

- Symposium

- 10: Jennifer Nagel: Knowledge as a Mental State

- 11: Stephen A. Butterfill: What Does Knowledge Explain?

- 12: Johannes Roessler: Knowledge, Causal Explanation, and Teleology

- 13: Patrick Rysiew: Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?

- Index

Über Autor(innen)

Tamar Szabó Gendler is Professor of Philosophy at Yale University
; John Hawthorne is Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of Oxford