Distinct Judicial Power

The Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 1606-1787
1. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-0-19-976587-4
Verlag: OUP US

Buch, Englisch, 512 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 816 g

Provides the first comprehensive exegesis of the origins of judicial independence in the United States
Brings together a wealth of information (charters, instructions, statutes, etc.) about the judicial power between 1606 and 1787, and sometimes beyond, which allows the reader to more easily understand the concepts
Discusses pre-Marbury v. Madison precedents for judicial review, including several previously unknown precedents
Articulates a new theory about the origins of judicial review: one that emphasizes the connection between judicial review and the rise of judicial independence
Provides a devastating critique of popular constitutionalism, an influential theory of constitutional interpretation that argues that judicial review should be drastically limited or eliminated altogether

A Distinct Judicial Power: The Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 1606-1787, by Scott Douglas Gerber, provides the first comprehensive critical analysis of the origins of judicial independence in the United States. Part I examines the political theory of an independent judiciary. Gerber begins chapter 1 by tracing the intellectual origins of a distinct judicial power from Aristotle's theory of a mixed constitution to John Adams's modifications of Montesquieu. Chapter 2 describes the debates during the framing and ratification of the federal Constitution regarding the independence of the federal judiciary. Part II, the bulk of the book, chronicles how each of the original thirteen states and their colonial antecedents treated their respective judiciaries. This portion, presented in thirteen separate chapters, brings together a wealth of information (charters, instructions, statutes, etc.) about the judicial power between 1606 and 1787, and sometimes beyond. Part III, the concluding segment, explores the influence the colonial and early state experiences had on the federal model that followed and on the nature of the regime itself.

It explains how the political theory of an independent judiciary examined in Part I, and the various experiences of the original thirteen states and their colonial antecedents chronicled in Part II, culminated in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. It also explains how the principle of judicial independence embodied by Article III made the doctrine of judicial review possible, and committed that doctrine to the protection of individual rights.

Zielgruppe

Professors, students, scholars, etc. of legal history, constitutional law, political science

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gerber, Scott Douglas

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Öffentliches Recht Staats- und Verfassungsrecht Verfassungsgeschichte, Verfassungsvergleichung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Rechtswissenschaften Recht, Rechtswissenschaft Allgemein Rechtsgeschichte, Recht der Antike
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Geschichte
• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Weltgeschichte & Geschichte einzelner Länder und Gebietsräume Geschichte einzelner Länder Amerikanische Geschichte
• Rechtswissenschaften Ausländisches Recht Common Law (UK, USA, Australien u.a.)

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface
A Note on Methodology
The Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary
1: The History of Ideas: From Aristotle's Theory of a Mixed Constitution to John Adams's Modifications of Montesquieu
2: Article III of the Constitution of the United States
II The Judicial Power in the Original Thirteen States and Their Colonial Antecedents
3: Virginia: Constitutionalizing Judicial Independence Prior to the U.S. Constitution
4: Massachusetts: A "Safety-Valve" Theory of Judicial Independence
5: New Hampshire: Judicial Review in the Rockingham County Inferior Court
6: Maryland: Chancellor Theodorick Bland and Salaries that "ought to be secured"
7: Connecticut: Disestablishment and Judicial Independence
8: Rhode Island: Last Bastion of Legislative Supremacy
9: North Carolina: Governor Thomas Burke and the Origins of Judicial Review
10: South Carolina: Judicial Review without an Independent Judiciary
11: New Jersey: The First State Court Precedent for Judicial Review
12: New York: Persistent Threats to Judicial Independence
13: Pennsylvania: (Almost) Adopting the Federal Model
14: Delaware: A High Court of Errors and Appeals
15: Georgia: Ineffective and Dependent Judges
Judicial Independence, Judicial Review, and Individual Rights
16: Conclusion
Appendix: Popular Constitutionalism-The Contemporary Assault on Judicial Review
Works Cited
Index

Über Autor(innen)

Scott Douglas Gerber is Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University and Senior Research Scholar in Law and Politics at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center. He teaches constitutional law and American legal history. He received both his Ph.D. and J.D. from the University of Virginia, and his B.A. from the College of William and Mary. His previous books include: The Declaration of Independence: Origins and Impact; First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas; Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall; and To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation. He has also published two novels.