Buch, Englisch, 260 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 558 g
New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person
Buch, Englisch, 260 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 558 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-928279-1
Verlag: OUP Oxford
G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Moore calls it a 'paradox' that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers and other students of language, logic, and cognition. Ludwig Wittgenstein was fascinated by Moore's example, and the absurdity of Moore's saying was intensively discussed in the mid-20th century. Yet the source of the absurdity has remained elusive, and its recalcitrance has led researchers in recent decades to address it with greater care.
In this definitive treatment of the problem of Moorean absurdity Green and Williams survey the history and relevance of the paradox and leading approaches to resolving it, and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
Contributors
Jonathan Adler, Bradley Armour-Garb, Jay D. Atlas, Thomas Baldwin, Claudio de Almeida, André Gallois, Robert Gordon, Mitchell Green, Alan Hájek, Roy Sorensen, John Williams
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
Weitere Infos & Material
- I. Introduction and Historical Context
- Introduction
- The All-Seeing Eye: A History of Moore's Paradox
- II. Moore's Paradox and Knowledge
- Moorean Absurdity: An Epistemological Analysis
- The Normative Character of Belief
- Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle and Iterated Belief
- III. Moore's Paradox, Belief, and Assertion
- What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us about Belief - A New Moore's Paradox De Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access
- Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief
- IV. Moore's Paradox and Consciousness
- Consciousness, Reasons, and Moore's Paradox
- Moorean Absurdity and Showing What's Within
- V. Arguments from Moore's Paradox
- My Philosophical Position Says 'p' and I Don't Believe 'p'
- Moorean Pretence
