Evidence Inquiry

1. Auflage 1994
ISBN: 978-0-631-19679-2
Verlag: John Wiley & Sons

Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 399 g

In this important new work, Haack develops an original theory of empirical evidence or justification, and argues its appropriateness to the goals of inquiry. In so doing, Haack provides detailed critical case studies of Lewis's foundationalism; Davidson's and Bonjour's coherentism; Popper's 'epistemology without a knowing subject'; Quine's naturalism; Goldman's reliabilism; and Rorty's, Stich's, and the Churchlands' recent obituaries of epistemology.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Haack, Susan

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface.

Introduction.

1. Foundationalism versus Coherentism: The Dichotomy Disclaimed.

2. Foundationalism Undermined.

3. Coherentism Discomposed.

4. Foundherentism Articulated.

5. The Evidence of the Senses: Refutations and Conjectures.

6. Naturalism Disambiguated.

7. The Evidence Against Reliabilism.

8. Revolutionary Scientism Subverted.

9. Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect.

10. Foundherentism Ratified.

Notes.

Bibliography of Works Cited.

Index.

Über Autor(innen)

Susan Haack, formerly Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. She is author of Deviant Logic and Philosophy of Logics, and of articles on epistemology, metaphysics, and pragmatism.