Buch, Englisch, 488 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 895 g
Buch, Englisch, 488 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 895 g
ISBN: 978-0-444-52803-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science Ltd
Access to essential facilities or so-called bottlenecks has become the key public policy issue for the liberalization of network industries such as telecommunications, electricity, rail and so on. Still, access prices are not only important for competition in formerly monopolistic industries, but also for industries where competition has long been established such as payment and credit card networks or mobile telecommunications. As the latter industries have also come under closer scrutiny by regulatory agencies and competition authorities, this book is dedicated to the analysis of access pricing in theory and practice.
The structure of this book which is organized in five parts is as follows: The extended introduction will introduce the key concepts and issues including a brief explanation of the essential facility concept as well as the distinction between one-way and two-way access and will briefly survey the main contributions within the literature on access pricing theory and practice. While parts I and II deal with the theory of one-way and two-way access pricing, respectively, part III focuses on the newly emerging theory of access pricing with multihoming. Parts IV and V address the practice side and focus on industry-specific applications and special problems (Part IV) as well as public policy issues (Part V).
- Provides valuable theoretical and empirical analyses in Access Pricing and related topics
- Offers several different points of view
- Features research from highly reputed scientists working in this field
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Weitere Infos & Material
Chapter 1
Access Pricing: An Introduction
RALF DEWENTER and JUSTUS HAUCAP
1. Introduction to the Introduction
2. Access to Networks: Concepts and Issues
2.1. Essential Facilities
2.2. One-way Access
2.3. Two-way Access
3. Access Pricing: Theory
4. Access Pricing: Practice
4.1. The Retail-minus Approach
4.2. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
4.3. Cost-Based Concepts
4.4. Capacity-Based Pricing and Price Caps
4.5. Institutions
5. Contents of this Book: Theory
5.1. One-way Access Pricing
5.2. Two-way Access Pricing
5.3. Access Pricing and Multihoming
6. Contents of this Book: Practice
6.1. Application to Specific Markets
6.2. Policy
7. Conclusion
References
PART I - ONE-WAY ACCESS PRICING
Chapter 2
Access Pricing and Infrastructure Investment
JOSHUA S. GANS
1. Introduction
2. Model of Investment Timing
2.1. Investment costs
2.2. Investment benefits
2.3. Socially optimal timing
3. No Access Regulation
3.1. Motives for access
3.2. Motives for investment
3.3. Negotiations over access
3.4. Equilibrium investment timing
3.5. Summary
4. Access Price Regulation
4.1. Small Seekers
4.2. Two Large Firms
4.3. Summary
5. Practical Issues
5.1. Optimal usage charges
5.2. Access Holidays
6. Conclusion
References
Chapter 3
Network Financing with Two-Part and Single Tariff
AXEL GAUTIER
1. Introduction
1.1. Model overview and results
1.2. Related literature
2. Model
2.1. Demand, costs, and information
2.2. Regulation
2.3. Timing of the events
2.4. Benchmark: the regulated monopoly case
3. Optimal access charges
3.1. The entrants entry and supply decisions
3.2. Two-part tariff
3.3. Single tariff
4. Comparisons
4.1. Market Structure
4.2. Welfare
5. Concluding remarks
A Proof of Propositions
A.1 Proposition 3.2
A.2 Proposition 3.3
A.3 Proposition 4.4
References
Chapter 4
Unbundling the Local Loop: One-way Access and Imperfect Competition
PAUL W. J. DE BIJL and MARTIN PEITZ
1. Introduction
2. Policy on Local-Loop Unbundling in Telecommunications
2.1. Unbundling in the EU
2.2. Unbundling in the US
3. Regulatory Theory with Full Participation
4. Regulatory Theory with Partial Participation
5. Discussion and Conclusion
References
PART II - TWO-WAY ACCESS PRICING
Chapter 5
On the Role of Access Charges under Network Competition
STEFAN BUEHLER and ARMIN SCHMUTZLER
1. Introduction
2. Linear s
2.1. Assumptions
2.2. Comparative Statics
2.3. Are s Strategic Complements?
2.4. Do Higher Access Charges Shift Out the Reaction Curves?
3. Simplifying Assumptions: How Do They Affect the Role of Access Charges?
3.1. Full Coverage Networks
3.2. Full Coverage Networks and Balanced Calling Pattern
4. Non-linear Retail Tariffs
4.1. Assumptions
4.2. Comparative Statics
5. Extensions and Conclusions
References
Chapter 6
Access Pricing under Cost Asymmetry in Telecommunications
VIKTORIA KOCSIS
1. Introduction
2. Model for linear tariffs
2.1. Cost structure and access fee
2.2. Demand structure and consumer surplus
2.3. Price competition
2.4. Comparison and policy implications
3. Competition in two-part tariffs
3.1. Demand structure and consumer surplus
3.2. Price competition
3.3. Comparison and policy implications
4. Conclusions
A Proofs
B Simulation results
B.1 Comparison according to parameter value
B.2 Comparison according to access fee
References
PART III - ACCESS PRICING AND MULTIHOMING
Chapter 7
Interconnection Competition with Multiple Network Subscription
ROGER K. ALEXANDER
1. Introduction
1.1. Background to New Analysis Framework
1.2. Organization of Paper
2. Consumer Utility Model Setup
2.1. Consumer Discrete Subscription Choice Model
2.2. Direct Measurable Utility from Network Subscription
3. Network Competition - Dual Network Subscriptions
3.1. Network Marginal Costs and Price Competition Model
3.2. Network Calling Pattern
3.3. Two-Stage Network Competition
4. Network Competition Modeling: Linear Pricing
