Buch, Englisch, 392 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 600 g
Buch, Englisch, 392 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 600 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-921689-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Do humans start life with the capacity to detect and mentally represent the objects around them? Or is our object knowledge instead derived only as the result of prolonged experience with the external world? Are we simply able to perceive objects by watching their actions in the world, or do we have to act on objects ourselves in order to learn about their behavior? Finally, do we come to know all aspects of objects in the same way, or are some aspects of our object understanding more epistemologically privileged than others?
"The Origins of Object Knowledge" presents the most up-to-date survey of the research into how the developing human mind understands the world of objects and their properties. It presents some of the best findings from leading research groups in the field of object representation approached from the perspective of developmental and comparative psychology.
Topics covered in the book all address some aspect of what objects are from a psychological perspective; how humans and animals conceive what they are made of; what properties they possess; how we count them and how we categorize them; even how the difference between animate and inanimate objects leads to different expectations. The chapters also cover the variety of methodologies and techniques that must be used to study infants, young children, and non-human primates and the value of combining approaches to discovering what each group knows.
Bringing together leading researchers, communicating the most contemporary and exciting findings within the field of object representation, this volume will be an important work in the cognitive sciences, and of interest to those across the fields of developmental and comparative psychology.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
- Sozialwissenschaften Pädagogik Pädagogik Pädagogische Psychologie
- Naturwissenschaften Biowissenschaften Biowissenschaften Neurobiologie, Verhaltensbiologie
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologie / Allgemeines & Theorie Experimentelle Psychologie
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Entwicklungspsychologie Kinder- und Jugendpsychologie
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie Wahrnehmung
Weitere Infos & Material
- 1: Laurie R Santos and Bruce M Hood: Object representation as a central issue in cognitive science
- 2: Jennifer M Zosh and Lisa Feigenson: Beyond 'what' and 'how many': Capacity, complexity and resolution of infants' object representations
- 3: Kerry E Jordan and Elizabeth M Brannon: A comparative approach to understanding human numerical cognition
- 4: Marian L Chen and Alan M Leslie: Multiple object tracking in infants': four (or so) ways of being discrete
- 5: Erik W Cheries, Stephen R Mitroff, Karen Wynn and Brian J Scholl: Do the same principles constrain persisting object representation in infant cognition and adult perception? The cases of continuity and cohesion
- 6: Jonathan I Flombaum, Brian J Scholl and Laurie R Santos: Spatiotemporal priority as a fundamental principle of object persistence
- 7: Rebecca Rosenberg and Susan Carey: Infants' representations of material entities
- 8: Kristin Shutts, Lori Markson and Elizabeth S Spelke: The developmental origins of animal and artefact concepts
- 9: Dima Amso and Scott P Johnson: Building object knowledge from perceptual input
- 10: Denis Mareschal and Andrew J Bremner: Modeling the origins of object knowledge
- 11: Fei Xu, Kathryn Dewar and Amy Perfors: Induction, overhypotheses, and the shape bias: some arguments and evidence for rational constructivism
- 12: Renée Baillargeon, Di Wu, Sylvia Yuan, Jie Li and Yuyan Luo: Young infants' expectations about self-propelled objects
- 13: Nathalia Gjersoe and Bruce Hood: Clever eyes and stupid hands: current thoughts on why dissociations of apparent knowledge occur on solidity tasks




