Probability and Evidence

Erscheinungsjahr 2016
ISBN: 978-1-107-14210-7
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 146 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 378 g

Reihe: Cambridge Philosophy Classics

In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this engaging work has been revived for a new generation of readers.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Horwich, Paul

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface to this edition Colin Howson; Part I. Methodology: 1. Introduction; 2. Aspects of the scientific method; 3. A taste of Bayesianism; Part II. Probability: 4. The primitive theory; 5. Subjectivism; 6. The rationalist interpretation; 7. The logical interpretation; 8. The evidential state; 9. The empirical interpretation; Part III. Confirmation: 10. Explications; 11. The paradox; 12. A Bayesian pseudo-solution to the problem of induction; 13. Projection; Part IV. Induction: Section 1. The Nature of Inductive Inference; Section 2. Conditions of Rationality: 14. Demonstrable reliability; 15. The demonstrable reliability of c+; 16. Immodesty; 17. Audacity; Section 3. The Justification of Induction: 18. The impossibility of a noncircular rationale; 19. Inductive demonstration of reliability; 20. Semantic justification; Part V. Prediction: 21. Surprise; 22. Severe tests; 23. Ad hoc hypothesis; 24. Prediction versus accommodation; Part VI. Evidence: 25. The evidential value of varied data; 26. The value of further data; Part VII. Realism: 27. Popper; 28. Realism versus instrumentalism; 29. Putnam; 30. Glymour; 31. Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

Über Autor(innen)

Horwich, Paul
Paul Horwich is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is best known for his contributions to the philosophy of science, including a probabilistic account of scientific methodology. His most recent publications include Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy (2012) and Truth – Meaning – Reality (2010).