Rationalizing Parliament

Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France
Erscheinungsjahr 2008
ISBN: 978-0-521-07296-0
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 232 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 383 g

Reihe: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. The book investigates the decision by French cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to 'rationalize' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability and political accountability. Drawing on diverse methodological approaches, including formal models, multivariate statistics, historical analysis and qualitative case studies, Professor Huber contributes to general theoretical debates about the endogenous choice of institutions, and about the exogenous impact of institutional arrangements on political decision-making. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Huber, John D.

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Politische Parteien
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction; 1. Parliamentary government in the Fifth Republic; 2. Choosing institutions; 3. Restrictive procedures and policy conflict; 4. Restrictive procedures and bargaining among parties; 5. The confidence vote procedure and electoral politics; 6. Electoral politics, procedural choice, and the French budget; 7. Institutional arrangements, political parties, and parliamentary democracy.