Buch, Englisch, 440 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 822 g
Selected Collaborations
Buch, Englisch, 440 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 822 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-925336-4
Verlag: OUP Oxford
This volume collects the best of the work of Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith, showcasing their contributions to philosophical psychology, the theory of psychological and social explanation, moral theory and moral psychology.I. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY; 1. In Defence of Folk Psychology; 2. Folk Belief and Commonplace Belief; 3. Causation in the Philosophy of Mind; 4. Some Content is Narrow; II. PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL EXPLANATION; 5. Functionalism and Broad Content; 6. Program Explanation: A General Perspective; 7. Structural Explanation in Social Theory; 8. In Defence of Explanatory Ecumenism; III. MORAL THEORY; 9. Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation; 10. Ethical Particularism and Patterns; 11. Minimalism and Truth-Aptness; 12. A Problem for Expressivism; IV. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY; 13. Backgrounding Desire; 14. Parfit's P; 15. Practical Unreason; 16. Brandt on Self-Control; 17. Freedom in Belief and Desire
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie
Weitere Infos & Material
- I. Philosophical Psychology
- 1: Jackson and Pettit: In Defence of Folk Psychology
- 2: Jackson and Pettit: Folk Belief and Commonplace Belief
- 3: Jackson and Pettit: Causation in the Philosophy of Mind
- 4: Jackson and Pettit: Some Content is Narrow
- II. Psychology and Social Explanation
- 5: Jackson and Pettit: Functionalism and Broad Content
- 6: Jackson and Pettit: Program Explanation: A General Perspective
- 7: Jackson and Pettit: Structural Explanation in Social Theory
- 8: Jackson and Pettit: In Defence of Explanatory Ecumenism
- III. Moral Theory
- 9: Jackson and Pettit: Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation
- 10: Jackson, Pettit, and Smith: Ethical Particularism and Patterns
- 11: Jackson, Graham Oppy, and Smith: Minimalism and Truth-Aptness
- 12: Jackson and Pettit: A Problem for Expressivism
- IV. Moral Psychology
- 13: Pettit and Smith: Backgrounding Desire
- 14: Pettit and Smith: Parfit's P
- 15: Pettit and Smith: Practical Unreason
- 16: Pettit and Smith: Brandt on Self-Control
- 17: Pettit and Smith: Freedom in Belief and Desire




