Morality: From Error to Fiction

Erscheinungsjahr 2024
ISBN: 978-0-19-887936-7
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 256 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 239 mm, Gewicht: 540 g

We make moral judgments about all sorts of things, both mundane and momentous. But are any of these moral judgments actually true? The moral error theorist argues that they are not. According to this view, when people make moral judgments (e.g.,"Stealing is morally wrong") although they purport to say true things about the world, in fact the world does not contain any of the properties or relations that would be necessary to render such judgments true. Nothing is morally right; nothing is morally wrong. The first part of this book argues in favor of this version of moral skepticism. Moral properties, it is claimed, have features that cannot be accommodated within the naturalistic worldview. Some of these problematic features pertain to the “reason-giving” nature of moral properties; some pertain to puzzles surrounding the notion of moral responsibility. Suppose, then, that we decided that this radical skepticism about morality is correct-what, then, should we do with our faulty moral discourse? The abolitionist presents the most obvious answer: that we should just do away with morality (in the way that in the past we eliminated talk of bodily humors, say). The fictionalist presents a less obvious answer: that we should retain moral discourse even though we know (at some level) that it is false. The second part of this book advocates an ambitious version of moral fictionalism. This book is a sequel to the author's 2001 work The Myth of Morality.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Joyce, Richard

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Sachbuch
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie

Über Autor(innen)

Richard Joyce received his PhD from Princeton in 1998. Over the following years he held academic positions at the University of Sheffield, the Australian National University, and the University of Sydney-eventually taking up a professorship at Victoria University of Wellington in 2010. He is the author of Essays in Moral Skepticism (OUP, 2016), The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), and The Myth of Morality (CUP, 2001). In addition, he has edited several collections and has published numerous journal articles and book chapters, largely in the areas of metaethics and moral psychology.