Buch, Englisch, 284 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 615 g
Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Buch, Englisch, 284 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 615 g
Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
ISBN: 978-0-521-64164-7
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie der Mathematik, Philosophie der Physik
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Forschung und Information Entscheidungstheorie, Sozialwahltheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Mathematik Allgemein Philosophie der Mathematik
Weitere Infos & Material
Preface
Introduction: a chance to reconsider
1. Prudential rationality as expected utility maximization
2. Decision problems
3. Savage's theory
4. Evidential decision theory
5. Causal decision theory
6. A general theory of conditional beliefs
7. A representation theorem for causal decision theory
8. Where things stand
Notes
References.
