Theories of Coalition Formation

1. Auflage 1984
ISBN: 978-0-89859-298-6
Verlag: CRC Press

Buch, Englisch, 384 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 870 g

Reihe: Basic Studies in Human Behavior Series

First published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members’ joint coordinated efforts. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations. The goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Kahan, James P.

Rapoport, Amnon

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Sozialpsychologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface, 1. PROLEGOMENA, 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES, 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET, 4. BARGAINING SETS, 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS, 6. EXCESS THEORIES, 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE, 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES, 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES, 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS, 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES, 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS, REFERENCES, AUTHOR INDEX, SUBJECT INDEX

Über Autor(innen)

James P. Kahan The Rand Corporation, Amnon Rapoport University of North Carolina and the University of Haifa.