Buch, Englisch, 458 Seiten, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 962 g
Reihe: Studies in Economic Design
Buch, Englisch, 458 Seiten, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 962 g
Reihe: Studies in Economic Design
ISBN: 978-3-540-00267-3
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Some of the finest and most recent research in economic and political design is presented. Among the authors are several prominent academics as well as many new and promising researchers. They investigate social choice and electoral systems, auctions, matching, bargaining, coalitional stability and efficiency, regulation, the design of rights, mechanisms, games, hierarchies and information. The book is bound to become a standard reference as a collection displaying where we are and where we are going in a broad spectrum of areas in economic design.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politikberatung
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Wirtschaftstheorie, Wirtschaftsphilosophie
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Ökonometrie
Weitere Infos & Material
A: Social Choice and Electoral Systems.- Selecting a Social Choice Rule — An Exploratory Panel Study.- Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency.- Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem.- B: Buyers and Sellers.- On Determination of Optimal Reserve Price in Auctions with Common Knowledge about Ranking of Valuations.- On Auctions with Interest Linkages among Bidders.- Substitutes, Complements, and Equilibrium in Two-Sided Market Models.- Core Convergence in Two-Sided Matching Markets.- C: Bargaining.- Can and Should the Nash Program Be Looked at as a Part of Mechanism Theory?.- Impossibility of a Walrasian Bargaining Solution.- Characterization of Competitive Allocations and the Nash Bargaining Problem.- Kalai-Smorodinsky and Maschler-Perles Solutions under Pre-donation.- D: Coalitional Stability and Efficiency.- Stable Cartel Structures in a Dismantling Game.- A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities.- Coalition Structural Games and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.- E: Regulating and Organizing Markets.- Regulation and Markets for Catastrophe Insurance.- Incentive Compatible Regulation of Quality Provision by Natural Monopolies — The Role of Technical Progress.- On the Importance of Sequencing of Markets in Monetary Economies.- F: Designing Rights.- The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks.- Designing Severance Payments and Decision Rights for Efficient Plant Closure under Profit-Sharing.- Moral Hazard and Linear Contracts: Economies with Idiosyncratic Risks.- Equal Awards vs. Equal Losses: Duality in Bankruptcy.- G: Information.- Mechanism Design without Games.- Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty.
