Buch, Englisch, 336 Seiten, Format (B × H): 164 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 647 g
Buch, Englisch, 336 Seiten, Format (B × H): 164 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 647 g
ISBN: 978-0-12-374507-1
Verlag: Elsevier Inc
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.
Zielgruppe
<p>Graduate students and professors working in finance, economics, and industrial organization, and professionals learning about or developing auctions, either in a university setting or in industry.</p>
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
I Single Object Auctions
Private Value Auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
II Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Packages and Positions
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
III Appendices
Continuous Distributions
Stochastic Orders
Order Statistics
Affiliated Random Variables
Some Linear Algebra
