Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered

1. Auflage 2021
ISBN: 978-0-367-37018-3
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 336 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 641 g

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Epistemology

This collection of original essays explores the topic of skeptical invariantism in theory of knowledge. It eschews historical perspectives and focuses on this traditionally underexplored, semantic characterization of skepticism.

The book provides a carefully structured, state-of-the-art overview of skeptical invariantism and offers up new questions and avenues for future research. It treats this semantic form of skepticism as a serious position rather than assuming that skepticism is false and attempting to diagnose where arguments for skepticism go wrong. The essays take up a wide range of different philosophical perspectives on three key questions in the debate about skeptical invariantism: (1) whether the standards for knowledge vary, (2) how demanding the standards for knowledge are, and (3) whether the kind of evidence, reasons, methods, processes, etc. that we can bring to bear are sufficient to meet those standards.

Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology and the philosophy of language.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Kyriacou, Christos

Wallbridge, Kevin

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction

Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge

Part I. The Source of Skepticism

2. Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism

Duncan Pritchard

3. Epistemic Standards: Impersonal, not Invariant

Krista Lawlor

Part II. Arguments for Infallibilist Skepticism

4. A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism

Nevin Climenhaga

5. Skeptical Invariantism, Considered

Gregory Stoutenburg

6. Moderate Pragmatic Skepticism, Moorean Invariantism, and Attributions of Intellectual Virtue/Vice

Christos Kyriacou

Part III. Arguments for Fallibilist Skepticism

7. In Defense of a Moderate Skeptical Invariantism

Davide Fassio

8. A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism

Robin McKenna

9. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation

Michael Hannon

10. Situationism, Implicit Bias, and Skepticism

Kevin Wallbridge

Part IV. Wittgensteinian Anti-Skepticism

11. "I Know", "I know", "I know." Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism and Skepticism

Annalisa Coliva

12. ‘Logical’ and ‘Epistemic’ Uses of ‘to Know’ or ‘Hinges’ as Logical Enabling Conditions

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

Part V. Assertion and Knowledge Discourse

13. Assertion Compatibilism

Mona Simion

14. Knowledge and Loose Talk

Alexander Dinges

15. Knowledge Claims and the Context of Assessment

Wayne A. Davis

Über Autor(innen)

Christos Kyriacou is a Lecturer at the University of Cyprus and received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. His main interests lie in epistemology, metaethics, and their intersection.

Kevin Wallbridge works on issues in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. He has been a Lecturer at the University of Southampton and a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Cyprus. His PhD in Philosophy is from the University of Edinburgh.