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Buch, Englisch, 300 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 591 g
A Defense
Buch, Englisch, 300 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 591 g
Reihe: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
ISBN: 978-0-415-81882-7
Verlag: Routledge
Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson Part 1: The Limits of Materialism 2. Against Physicalism Uwe Meixner 3. Problems of Physicalism Regarding the Mind Andrea Lavazza 4. Materialism, Dualism, and the Conscious Self David Lund Part 2: Dualism and Empirical Research 5. Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato 6. Quantum Theory of Mind Henry P. Stapp 7. A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts Martina Fürst Part 3: Cartesian (Substance) Dualism 8. What makes me me? A Defence of Substance Dualism Richard Swinburne 9. Naturalism and the Unavoidability of the Cartesian Perspective Howard M. Robinson 10. On What We Must Think Ralph C.S. Walker Part 4: Non-Cartesian Dualism 11. The Promise and Sensibility of Integrative Dualism Charles Taliaferro 12. The Dialectic of Soul and Body William Hasker 13. Dualism, Dual-Aspectism, and the Mind David Skrbina 14. Why My Body is Not Me: The Unity Argument for Emergentist Self–Body Dualism E.J. Lowe




