Buch, Englisch, 400 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm
19th International Symposium, SAGT 2026, Augsburg, Germany, September 15–18, 2026, Proceedings
Buch, Englisch, 400 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm
Reihe: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISBN: 978-3-032-38781-3
Verlag: Springer
This volume constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2026, held in Augsburg, Germany, during September 2026.
The total of 23 full papers and two 1- page Abstracts included in the proceedings was carefully reviewed and selected from 81 submissions. The SAGT conference series has become a leading interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and scientific progress acrosscontinents on incentives and computation arising in diverse areas, such as the oretical computer science, artificial intelligence, economics, operations research, and applied mathematics.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Informatik Künstliche Intelligenz
- Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Angewandte Informatik
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Forschung und Information Informationstheorie, Kodierungstheorie
- Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Professionelle Anwendung Computersimulation & Modelle, 3-D Graphik
- Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Programmierung | Softwareentwicklung Algorithmen & Datenstrukturen
- Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Technische Informatik Netzwerk-Hardware
- Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Informatik Mathematik für Informatiker
- Technische Wissenschaften Technik Allgemein Modellierung & Simulation
Weitere Infos & Material
.- Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequences of Permutations.
.- On the Power of Deception in Repeated Games.
.- Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness.
.- Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Deferred Inspection.
.- Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations.
.- Single-Agent Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Constrained Coalition Sizes.
.- Control and Bribery in Stable Marriage and Roommates: A Complete Complexity Landscape.
.- Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Structured Constraints.
.- Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences.
.- Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location.
.- Nucleolus Computation by Non-Zero-Constrained Optimization.
.- Efficiently Restructuring Sovereign Debt via Arctic Auctions with Convex Costs.
.- Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items.
.- Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms.
.- Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences.
.- Stability in Combinatorial Markets with Side Payments .
.- Hospitals/Residents with Inseparable Couples: Finding a Coalition Stable Assignment Is NP-Hard.
.- Bribery’s Influence on Ranked Aggregation.
.- Complexity of Eliminating (Majority) Illusion in Directed Networks.
.- Leveraging Matchings in Constrained Fair Division with a Conflict Graph.
.- Realist Vampire(s) Seeking Consenting Suicidal Person(s).
.- Extension of Excess Demand Ascending Auction to Multi-Demand Model by Discrete Convex Analysis Approach.
.- Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees.
.- Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals.
.- Computing Fair and Efficient Indivisible Chore Allocations with Bounded Surplus.
