Status in Law and Morality

Erscheinungsjahr 2026
ISBN: 978-0-19-893669-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 467 g

The idea of status has long puzzled philosophers. Some people have higher social status than others, and some have distinct legal statuses, such as being an employee, a tenant, or a refugee. But why should that be the case? Why should some enjoy more esteem than others? And why should law pick out a class of persons, give it a label, and treat it differently?

Status in Law and Morality provides a philosophical account of status, arguing that it is a moral, and not just a legal or social, idea. The point of status is to protect the weaker party in social relations - the employee, or the tenant - through social recognition of their role as well as through legal regulation. Tracing the origins of the idea of status in law and in moral philosophy, this book challenges the commonly held view that status is an inherently inegalitarian idea that should have no place in modern law. It instead distinguishes between 'rank' and 'role' based statuses and argues that law ought to boost the self-esteem of those who hold vulnerable social roles.

Thought-provoking and pioneering, this book aims to revive the progressive character of status to work towards regulating unequal social relations and protecting vulnerable groups.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Letsas, George

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- CHAPTER 1: WHY STATUS?

- CHAPTER 2: STATUS IN ROMAN LAW: WHERE IT ALL STARTED

- CHAPTER 3: STATUS: 'A MORAL FIELD FOR PERSONS TO EXIST IN'

- CHAPTER 4: THE MODALITIES OF OFFENCES AGAINST STATUS

- CHAPTER 5: THE NATURE OF STATUS RELATIONS

- CHAPTER 6: FOUR OBJECTIONS

- CHAPTER 7: ROLE OBLIGATIONS REVISITED

- CHAPTER 8: TITLES AND THE SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF STATUS

- CHAPTER 9: EPILOGUE: FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS-AN INCOMPLETE TRANSITION

Über Autor(innen)

George Letsas holds the Chair in the Philosophy of Law at University College London (UCL). He is the Co-Director of the UCL Human Rights Institute and Deputy Director of the UCL Quain Centre for Jurisprudence. His main research interests are in legal philosophy and human rights. He has written widely on the interpretation of human rights, theory of European law, philosophy of contract law, and general jurisprudence. He is known for his defence of the evolutive interpretation of human rights, and his critique of the use of consensus by human rights courts as an interpretive method.