Network Games

A Formal Framework for Strategic Interactions in Interconnected Systems
Erscheinungsjahr 2027
ISBN: 978-3-032-45545-1
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm

Reihe: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control

Why can the weakest actor survive while the strongest falls? Why can a smaller ally provide effective support when a much stronger ally cannot? How can the withdrawal of a single actor set off a cascade?

Network Games develops a mathematical and computational framework for answering such questions. Countries and other actors must divide limited power among their own protection, support for allies, and actions against adversaries. Each choice acquires its meaning from the wider system of relations in which it is made.

The book begins with a simple three-country problem and builds from it three families of games. Power allocation games study the use of resources within a given strategic environment. Relation formation games allow alliances and rivalries to change. Competitive diffusion games trace the spread of norms and influence across the resulting system. In each of these settings, strategic position shapes the value of power. Alliances provide support and create commitments. The book identifies when an alliance can be treated as a single actor, what follows from the emergence of a power bloc, and why buffer states acquire leverage between rival coalitions. Patterns of support also govern whether a disturbance remains local or propagates beyond its point of origin.

Formal results are paired with algorithms and simulations. A computational study of the Taiwan Strait distinguishes among the power a country possesses, the power it has available, and the support it can deliver under different conditions, and assesses the implications of these differences for Taiwan’s security.

The framework is primarily diagnostic rather than predictive. It identifies binding constraints, reveals which relationships sustain an outcome, and shows how that outcome changes under alternative assumptions. The final chapter extends this reasoning to AI-enabled decision support and asks what should be derived, what can be learned, and where simulation and stress testing belong in the decision process.

The book is written for researchers and graduate students in international relations, game theory, network science, computational social science, control theory, and multi-agent systems, as well as analysts working on strategic and defence problems.

Zielgruppe

Graduate

Autoren/Hrsg.

Li, Yuke

Fachgebiete

• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Mathematik Allgemein Diskrete Mathematik, Kombinatorik
• Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Informatik Künstliche Intelligenz

Inhaltsverzeichnis

From International Systems to Network Games.- Mathematical Foundations of Adversarial Networks.- Power Allocation Games.- Strategic Position and System Stability.- A Computational Framework for Power Allocation Games.- Relation Formation Games.- Blocs, Buffers,and Swing Positions.

Über Autor(innen)

Yuke Li is a researcher working at the intersection of game theory, systems science, and international security. She received her B.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Peking University and her Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University. Her postdoctoral research in Yale’s Department of Electrical Engineering, funded by the U.S. Army Research Office, focused on game theory and multi-agent systems on networks. She is a Fellow at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Her current work examines multi-agent and networked-systems models for strategic analysis and AI-enabled decision support.