Corporate Governance Regimes

Convergence and Diversity
Erscheinungsjahr 2002
ISBN: 978-0-19-924787-5
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 718 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 1233 g

Corporate Governance Regimes addresses corporate law's leading question: whether one or another corporate law regime possesses relative competitive advantage. To this end, the editors have brought together an international team of scholars in economics and law to critically assess the new theories of ownership and control which seek to explain the important efficiency advantages of dispersed ownership and the inevitable limitations of control-oriented systems of governance.

Contributors describe and analyse the relative strength of the forces that shape the evolution of corporate law rules and practice. They also raise the issue of whether nations undertaking reforms should develop corporate governance policies that borrow from other systems' best practices, or pursue a course of internally designed corporate governance reforms. And, building on new theories of law and finance, they examine the incentives for introducing meaningful corporate governance reforms that disrupt or destabilize Europe's blockholding regimes.

The collection is divided into seven parts. Part One provides not only a means for assessing the key features of market- and control-based systems of governance but a standpoint for determining whether national governance systems are likely to converge on a single, optimal system of governance. Part Two introduces the reader to the building blocks of European corporate governance and the securities law harmonization program. Part Three examines the complex ownership and control structures that are found in Western Europe, investigating the consequences of large shareholdings for minority investors. Part Four offers law and finance analyses of the relationship between legal and financial systems and corporate performance. Part Five looks at the economic perspective on the operation of the market for corporate control and the key legal rules and institutions of the bankruptcy and insolvency regimes in the USA and Britain. Part Six is devoted to exploring the economic effect of institutional shareholder participation in corporate governance in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The final section, Part Seven, evaluates empirically the executive compensation arrangements in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The contributions supply a pool of current research on the motivational effect of performance-related remuneration and the substantial increase in top executive remuneration in the USA.

Autoren/Hrsg.

McCahery, Joseph A.

Moerland, Piet

Raaijmakers, Theo

Renneboog, Luc

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management Unternehmensorganisation & Entwicklungsstrategien
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Globalisierung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Politische Soziologie und Psychologie
• Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie | Soziale Arbeit Spezielle Soziologie Politische Soziologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- 1: J. McCahery and L. Renneboog: Introduction

- I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes

- 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?

- 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control?

- 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control

- 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom

- II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe

- 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act

- 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?

- III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe

- 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations?

- 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands

- 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies

- IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures

- 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model

- 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for Product and Capital Market Competition

- 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth

- V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm

- 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK

- 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American Bankruptcy Procedures

- 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution Threats in Different Financial Systems

- 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy

- VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance

- 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders

- 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds

- VII. Executive Compensation

- 27: R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog: Cash-Based Executive Compensation in Spain and the UK

- 28: P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom: Employee Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands

Über Autor(innen)

Joseph A. McCahery is Professor of International Business Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law and the Center for Company Law. He holds a visiting appointment at Leiden University Faculty of Law.

Piet Moerland is Professor of Corporate Governance at Tilburg University where he teaches courses on mergers and acquisitions and corporate governance.

M.J.G.C. (Theo) Raaijmakers is Professor of Corporate Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law.

Luc Renneboog is Associate Professor at the Department of Finance of Tilburg University and research fellow at the Center for Economic Research (Tilburg).