A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change
Buch, Englisch, 232 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 405 g
ISBN: 978-0-691-13607-3
Verlag: Princeton University Press
When the United States invaded Iraq, President Bush made it clear: the U.S. was not fighting the Iraqi people. Rather, all quarrels were solely with Iraq's leadership. This kind of assertion remains frequent in foreign affairs--sanctions or military actions are imposed on a nation not because of its people, but because of its misguided leaders. Although the distinction might seem pedantic since the people suffer regardless, Punishing the Prince reveals how targeting individual leaders for punishment rather than the nations they represent creates incentives for cooperation between nations and leaves room for future relations with pariah states. Punishing the Prince demonstrates that theories of leader punishment explain a great deal about international behavior and interstate relations. The book examines the impact that domestic political institutions have on whether citizens hold their leaders accountable for international commitments and shows that the degrees to which citizens are able to remove leaders shape the dynamics of interstate relations and leader turnover. Through analyses of sovereign debt, international trade, sanctions, and crisis bargaining, Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith also uncover striking differences in patterns of relations between democratic and autocratic states. Bringing together a vast body of information, Punishing the Prince offers new ways of thinking about international relations.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Politische Führung
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen
Weitere Infos & Material
List of Illustrations ix
List of Tables xi
Preface xiii
Chapter 1: We Have No Quarrel with the People 1
Leader Specifi c Punishments and Interstate Relations 3
Proper Nouns in International Relations 12
International Cooperation 15
Chapter 2: A Theory of Leader Specifi c Punishments 31
A Stochastic Prisoners? Dilemma with Leader Mortality 33
A Continuous Choice Prisoners? Dilemma 50
Appendix 65
Chapter 3: Political Institutions, Policy Variability, and the Survival of Leaders 77
Leader Survival 77
Selectorate Politics 79
Selectorate Institutions, Policy Choice, and Leader Survival 80
Policy Variability and the Turnover of Leaders 83
Chapter 4: Leader Specifi c Strategies in Human Subject Experiments 89
Human Subject Experiments 90
Results 93
Conclusions 101
Chapter 5: International Trade, Institutions, and Leader Change 109
Data 111
Setup of Econometric Tests and Model Specifi cation 115
Results 119
Conclusions 140
Chapter 6: Putting the Sovereign Back into Sovereign Debt 142
Institutions, Credibility, and Explanations of Debt 143
Modeling the Debt Repayment 145
Data 154
Debt, Repayment, and Leader Replacement 157
Conclusions 172
Chapter 7: Confl ictual Interactions 173
International Crises 173
Economic Sanctions 182
Chapter 8: Positive Political Theory and Policy 190
Building Trust and Cooperation 190
Positive Political Theory or Policy Advice? 192
Conclusions 199
Bibliography 201
Index 217




