Buch, Englisch, 264 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 211 mm, Gewicht: 413 g
Buch, Englisch, 264 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 211 mm, Gewicht: 413 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-926760-6
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions.
McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
- Introduction
- 1: What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?
- 2: How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem
- 3: Solving the Philosophical Mind-Body Problem
- 4: What Is It Not Like to be a Brain?
- 5: Consciousness and Space
- 6: Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks
- 7: Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated
- 8: The Problem of Philosophy
- 9: Inverted First-Person Authority
- 10: The Objects of Intentionality
