Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment
Buch, Englisch, 408 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 848 g
ISBN: 978-0-521-85578-5
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Is the science of moral cognition usefully modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar? Are human beings born with an innate 'moral grammar' that causes them to analyse human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness as they analyse human speech in terms of its grammatical structure? Questions like these have been at the forefront of moral psychology ever since John Mikhail revived them in his influential work on the linguistic analogy and its implications for jurisprudence and moral theory. In this seminal book, Mikhail offers a careful and sustained analysis of the moral grammar hypothesis, showing how some of John Rawls' original ideas about the linguistic analogy, together with famous thought experiments like the trolley problem, can be used to improve our understanding of moral and legal judgement.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologie / Allgemeines & Theorie Psychologische Theorie, Psychoanalyse Behaviourismus
- Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften Interdisziplinär Neurowissenschaften, Kognitionswissenschaft
Weitere Infos & Material
Part I. Theory: 1. The question presented; 2. A new framework for the theory of moral cognition; 3. The basic elements of Rawls' linguistic analogy; Part II. Empirical Adequacy: 4. The problem of descriptive adequacy; 5. The moral grammar hypothesis; 6. Moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence: a formal model; Part III. Objections and Replies: 7. R. M. Hare and the distinction between empirical and normative adequacy; 8. Thomas Nagel and the competence-performance distinction; 9. Ronald Dworkin and the distinction between mentalism and realism; Part IV. Conclusion: 10. Toward a universal moral grammar.




